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STS-61 Mission Director's Post-Mission Report
Abstract
This report details events that occurred before and during the STS-61 Space
Shuttle mission and makes recommendations for future mission execution.
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) First Servicing Mission (SM-1) was a highly
successful space flight. The HST hardware installation tasks designated as success
criteria by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) were all
accomplished. All planned optional tasks were completed as well. The new optical
instruments were later demonstrated to have corrected the spherical aberration
present when the telescope was placed into orbit in April 1990.
Key to the success of the HST SM-1 was the fact that the HST had been designed
and built to be maintained by astronauts during extravehicular activity (EVA). The
success of this mission came also as a result of total commitment to the mission by
NASA and its contractor team. This mission was probably the most complex Shuttle
mission flown to date. NASA was willing to devote the necessary resources to
ensure its proper completion.
Because of the complexity and importance of this mission, NASA management
established a number of independent review groups to assess the management,
design, planning, and preparation for the mission. The review groups made key and
timely recommendations which caused or contributed to a number of mission
enhancements.
This report recommends the following.
• A mission management plan for each complex mission
• Appointment and empowerment of a mission director for each future highly
complex mission
• Continued use of coordinated independent peer review for critical missions
• Extended template for complex missions for earlier completion of mission
preparation milestones
• Uniform NASA-wide EVA hardware certification requirements
• Single point of control for mission safety and assurance activities
• Single EVA safety process
• Central coordinated strategic plan for NASA public affairs activities for high
profile missions
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Executive Summary
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) First Servidng Mission (SM-1) was a highly
successful space flight (STS-61). The success criteria established by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) before the mission, consisted of the
successful replacement of the HST's solar arrays (SAs), rate sensor unit no. 2 (RSU 2)
and wide field/planetary camera (WF/PC); installation of the corrective optics space
telescope axial replacement (COSTAR) and the magnetic sensing system no. 1 (MSS
1); and replacement of HST's RSU 3, electronic control unit no. 3 (ECU 3), and solar
array drive electronics no. 1 (SADE 1). Not only were all these tasks performed,
making the mission a success, but also all the planned secondary tasks were accom-
plished, namely installation of the Goddard high resolution spectrograph (GHRS)
redundancy kit, the coprocessor for the HST main computer and MSS 2 and replace-
ment of both types of RSU fuse plugs and ECU 2.
The many tasks of the mission occurred remarkably close to the way that the
tasks were planned. Launch of the Orbiter Endeavour occurred on December 2, 1993,
at approximately 3:27 AM CST. On the first and second flight days Orbiter systems
were made ready for rendezvous with and capture of the HST and for the EVAs.
On the third flight day the crew performed rendezvous maneuvers, established
communications with the HST, grappled the HST, and berthed it in the Orbiter
payload bay, all according to plan.
On the fourth flight day the first extravehicular activity (EVA) occurred, during
which replacements were performed of RSU 2, RSU 3, ECU 1, ECU 2, and the RSU
fuse plugs. Preparations for the next day's SA replacements also were made.
Unexpected difficulty in dosing the RSU compartment doors was eventually
overcome with the use of a payload retention device strap and the efforts of both
EVA crewmembers. Physical distortion in one the SAs prevented its complete
retraction.
On the fifth flight day the distorted SA was manually jettisoned. The jettison
procedure had been practiced during one of the joint integrated simulations 0ISs)
before the mission, and it did not negatively affect the EVA schedule. Both SAs were
successfully replaced during this second EVA.
The third EVA, performed on the mission's sixth day, included the WF/PC
replacement and the installation of both MSS modifications. Deterioration of one of
the old MSS covers was discovered during was discovered during the EVA.
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During the fourth EVA on the next day, installations of the COSTAR and of the
coprocessor occurred with no significant problems. Also during this EVA the crew-
members removed the insulated covers of several pieces of flight support equipment.
Two of these covers were modified after the EVA for use as covers to be installed on
both MSSs during the fifth EVA.
Early on the eighth flight day, the Orbiter was boosted to an orbit of approxi-
mately 321 by 320 nautical miles. Also on the eighth day, commands to the HST were
unable to move the SA primary deployment mechanisms, resulting in a decision to
have the EVA crewmembers manually deploy the SA booms during that day's EVA.
During this fifth and final EVA, the crewmembers performed the replacement of the
SADE 1, manually deployed the SA booms, installed the GHRS redundancy kit, and
installed the new covers on both MSSs. Commands sent to the HST successfully
unfurled both SAs. Data problems encountered following the EVA were eventually
attributed to a malfunctioning channel in one of the HST's data interface units (DIUs).
When the DIU was switched to an alternate channel, it functioned properly.
The HST was redeployed on flight day 9.
The crew was given a day off on flight day 10.
On flight day 11, the Commander and Pilot practiced Orbiter approaches and
landings using the portable in-flight landing operations trainer (PILOT).
During the twelfth flight day the Endeavour landed at Kennedy Space Center at
approximately 11:25 PM CST on December 12, 1994.
During the mission the replacement hardware was shown to be electrically
functional. The new optical instruments were later demonstrated to have corrected
the spherical aberration present when the telescope was placed into orbit in April
1990. These new instruments improved the telescope's optical performance to levels
expected from the original design.
Key to the success of the HST SM-1 was the fact that the HST had been designed
and built to be maintained by astronauts during EVA. Astronauts and other EVA
experts were very heavily involved in the HST design process. While budget limita-
tions during the building of the HST prevented the incorporation of EVA-friendly
features into every component, nearly all the components were made at least EVA-
compatible, meaning that even though special tools or procedures would still have to
be developed to work on the component, it is accessible and replaceable by an
astronaut wearing a pressurized extravehicular mobility unit (EMU).
The success of this mission came also as a result of total commitment to the
mission by NASA and its contractor team. The fact that the HST was launched
containing a flawed mirror, the fact that a large number of components were in need
7'
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of servicing or replacement, and the fact that not all of these components were EVA-
friendly, combined to make this mission probably the most complex Shuttle mission
flown to date. Multiple NASA centers and numerous contractors were involved in
the design, development and execution of the telescope and EVA hardware and the
formulation of the procedures for the servicing mission. NASA was willing to devote
the necessary resources to ensure adequate high-fidelity training for the flight crew
and ground support personnel. Although the ratio of EVA training hours to in-flight
EVA hours was not greater than that of some earlier Shuttle EVA missions, and
because the five EVAs of HST SM-1 were the most ever conducted during a mission,
the total EVA training load was also the greatest of any Shuttle mission to date. The
quality of training was also higher than that for previous missions because of
increased emphasis on end-to-end EVA and remote manipulator system (RMS)
training and contingency procedures training. A large number of simulations were
conducted for this mission, including internal simulations held at Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), and Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC) and JISs involving the entire mission team. Every EVA was simulated with
EVA crewmembers in underwater training facilities during JISs.
Because of the complexity of the mission and of its importance to NASA and to
the public, NASA management took extraordinary steps to ensure its success. A
number of independent review groups, both inside and external to NASA, were
established to assess the management, design, planning and preparation for the
mission. These groups produced a large number of recommendations, most of which
are discussed in detail in this report. While some might argue that the review groups
made many recommendations that would have been accomplished anyway in the
normal course of mission activities, the Mission Director believes that the review
groups made key and timely contributions in a number of areas.
Recommendations to evaluate STS-61 hardware and EVA procedures on
previous missions led to the realization that the planned Orbiter attitude for some of
the EVA tasks would result in an environment too cold for the EVA astronauts. If
this discovery had occurred during STS-61, significant negative impact to the
servicing mission could have occurred.
A review group's recommendation to upgrade the breathing system and remote
manipulator system (RMS) simulator in the Neutral Buoyancy Simulator (NBS) at
MSFC helped to bring about those improvements. Although there was a significant
delay in the implementation of these recommendations, both were completed in time
to be used for final end-to-end training for the mission. This upgraded capability for
integrated EVA and RMS training was key to the success of the mission.
The recommendation to assign and train a backup crew for the mission resulted
in the designation of the STS-61 EVA Capsule Communicator (Capcom) to also be the
backup EVA crewmember. This assignment proved to be beneficial in increasing the
Capcom's familiarity with the EVA tasks and in allowing greater flexibility in the
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scheduling of crew training events. The Mission Director recommends that for
future critical EVA missions, NASA consider the assigmnent of a crewmember to
serve as both EVA Capcom and backup EVA crewmember.
Review group recommendations to perform JISs for each EVA with crewmem-
bers in underwater training facilities and with participation of mission management
provided the opportunity to refine normal procedures and mission team coordina-
tion and to train for real-time contingency operations that were stressed during the
simulations.
A review group recommended that as many as possible of the commands to the
HST be sent from within the Orbiter instead of from the ground to prevent delays of
EVA activities caused by waiting for the ground commands. Partly as a result of
practice that occurred during the JISs, HST commanding that was performed during
the STS-61 EVAs was well coordinated and timely. The Mission Director recom-
mends that the balance of on-board versus ground commanding of payloads
continue to be given high priority during mission planning. The amount of
commands that can be sent by the flight crew should be maximized to the extent
practical, and the commanding protocols should be thoroughly rehearsed and
evaluated during JISs.
An EVA assessment group's recommendation to move EVA tools from the
payload bay into the Orbiter cabin resulted in the saving of valuable EVA time.
On the basis of the positive results from independent reviews, the Mission
Director recommends that the use of independent peer review be continued for
critical missions. A multidisciplinary team having relevant expertise should be
established to perform a thorough and comprehensive independent assessment of
flight readiness. The team activities should be coordinated with standard mission
milestones to impart minimal interference to mission preparation activities.
The use of a single team as mentioned above is the preferred form of peer
review, but if reviews are to performed by multiple independent organizations,
their activities should be consolidated to the maximum extent possible and
performed in coordination with established program and mission milestones to
minimize dupUcation of effort by those preparing for the mission. Reviewing
organizations should be sensitive to their potential for interfering with mission
preparation activities.
A recommendation that NASA establish a mission manager for this mission
resulted in the appointment by the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight of
Mr. Randy H. Brinldey as the STS-61 Mission Director on December 15, 1992. In this
position, Mr. Brinkley was tasked "to coordinate the efforts of the team working to
safely and successfully accomplish the HST Servicing Mission." Mr. Brinkley chaired
the Mission Coordination Team, which was established to coordinate Level I
4
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activities and to oversee Level II and m management activities during mission
preparation. The team included management representatives of the Space Shuttle
and HST Program offices. The Mission Director served to coordinate and expedite
both the Space Shuttle and HST Programs' responses to the recommendations. The
Mission Director also served to help focus and consolidate the efforts of the review
groups to minimize impacts to mission preparation activities. The Mission Director
also coordinated communication with and external inquiries from the General
Accounting Office (GAO) and Congressional staff members.
The STS-61 Mission Director recommends that NASA continue the practice of
appointing mission directom for highly complex space flights as designated by the
NASA Administrator. A mission director should provide management direction
and oversight of the integration, flight preparation, and mission training processes
and accomplishment of the mission. A mission director should be responsible for
proper coordination among the various NASA offices, NASA centers, NASA pro-
gram managers and personnel external to NASA who have a responsibility for the
safe and successful execution of the mission. A mission director should be respon-
sible for ensuring compliance with all safety and mission assurance requirements
and for resolution of key issues involving any aspect ofthe mission. A mission
director should also co-chair the Mission Management Team. A mission director
should provide concurrence in the mission's goals, objectives, priorities, and
policies, in crew selection, in cargo mix, in the determination of flight readiness of
all disciplines participating in the mission and of the flight hardware, and in the
date and time of launch.
Also in response to the recommendation to establish a mission manager, the
Space Shuttle Program named Mr. Hal Lambert as Mission Manager for $IS-61 on
February 18, 1993. In this position, Mr. Lambert was in charge of a Level In HST
SM-1 Management Team. The team was "established to provide management
overview and resolution of issues associated with the mission. This team [was]
responsible for coordinating the integration activities between GSFC, JSC, and KSC
[Kennedy Space Center], maintaining overall program schedules, ensuring mission
capabilities and mission priorities [were] compatible and directing the activities in
support of this mission as necessary to ensure mission success." The team was "not
intended to replace the existing management structure, but to facilitate problem
resolution and increase the mission visibility throughout the existing system. The
HST SM-1 Management Team [was to] work with the Mission Director to keep him
informed of the status and progress of lIST repair preparation." Following STS-61,
the Space Shuttle Program implemented the practice of assigning mission managers
within the Integration and Operations Office for each Shuttle mission.
Recommendations from several reviews focused on the great need to present to
the public the proper perspective of the mission. NASA public affairs activities for
STS-61, while extensive, were not well coordinated among the significant mission
participants. The Mission Director recommends that for missions having high
5
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public interest, a well-coordinated strategic plan for public affairs be implemented
and be under the control of a single NASA office. The plan should include the
publication of a dear set of mission success criteria, and a plan of action to be
followed if the mission were not a success,
Recommendations to take extraordinary steps to ensure that the mission
payload hardware would be protected from contamination during preflight process-
ing resulted in the implementation of a special contamination control plan at KS(=.
However, in spite of the extra precautions taken as a result of this plan, windblown
sand and debris entered the payload change-out room while payload hardware was
in the room. The Mission Director recommends that for all missions having
payloads sensitive to contamination, there be in place at the launch site a compre-
hensive plan to protect the payloads from all sources of contamination, including
human-generated and natural sources.
The Mission Director commends the HST and Space Shuttle Programs for the
complex communications and coordination efforts by the various NASA centers and
contractors and for their accomplishments in unifying the work of the varied disci-
plines. However, some problems did occur because of the lack of proper coordina-
tion. The most significant of these problems are summarized here, with recommen-
dations for future courses of action.
GSFC tool coatings were designed on the basis of outdated Orbiter attitude
profiles. JSC and GSFC used different conventions for numbering bits in their digi-
tal payload data processing schemes using the Shuttle general processing computer.
These kinds of problems might have been detected sooner, or even prevented if
technical meetings had been more detailed, more frequent, and started earlier.
In a number of different instances both before and during the mission, mission
personnel met with difficulty in transferring technical data from one location to
another. The Mission Director recommends that the use of electronic communica-
tions be maximized for future missions, both during mission preparation and
during the mission itself. Methods of transfer of verbal, data, graphical and
pictorial information should be readily accessible by the entire mission team.
The Mission Director recommends that a computerized system be developed
to support decision making during EVA replanning, The system should provide
the flight control team with access to EVA timelines, procedures, data for tools,
hardware, and payload systems, photographs and engineering drawings.
Another example of lack of coordination is that JSC and GSFC used different
philosophies in the development of EVA tool certification and verification require-
ments. The Mission Director recommends that NASA establish a single set of
requirements for EVA hardware. JSC's newly formed EVA and Crew Equipment
6
] Executive Summm_ I
Project Office is a start at accomplishing this goal, but the office must be given the
authority to control all EVA hardware.
Earlier designation and participation of the EVA crew would have resulted in
more crew involvement in the design of EVA tasks, especially the coprocessor and
SADE tasks, resulting in easier EVA operations. The Mission Director recommends
that complex Shuttle missions be performed using an extended flight production
template, with milestones, including the designation of key crewmembers,
occurring earlier than for standard missions.
For STS-61, mission support personnel who were to support night shifts and
especially the EVAs were generally given reduced preflight work schedules immedi-
ately before the mission to allow them to voluntarily adjust their sleep schedules.
However, there was not a formal team-wide plan to ensure that this happened for all
critical personnel. The Mission Director recommends that for critical missions that
include crew operations (especially EVAs) occurring during normal sleep hours, a
formal plan be implemented to facilitate the necessary sleep shifting of the
mission support personnel (including management) before launch.
During the preparation for this mission there was discussion of the possibility of
an astronaut's performing an EVA on each of two consecutive days. This would be a
violation of one of the crew constraints contained in Appendix K of the Space Shuttle
Crew Procedures Management Plan. This constraint could be waived during a
mission, but there was a confusion over whether a flight director alone or only the
Mission Management Team (MMT) had the authority to waive it. The Mission
Director recommends that the authority to waive Appendix K constraints be
clearly defined.
Another area in need of greater definition of roles and responsibilities is the
total area of mission assurance. For STS-61 there was no single person or organiza-
tion actively working to coordinate the efforts to enforce compliance with the various
sets of safety requirements. There was also no discernible overall risk management
or mission assurance effort for the mission. The Mission Director recommends that
for each mission a single point of contact be designated who is actively responsi-
ble for all aspects of mission assurance and safety, including payload, Orbiter,
operational, and EVA safety.
The Mission Director also recommends that NASA develop a single process
that is responsible for all aspects of EVA safety and mission assurance.
To provide a tool for the implementation and coordination of many of the
above recommendations, the Mission Director recommends the development of a
management plan for complex missions. It should be developed early in the
mission planning flow and should be coordinated among the various elements of
the mission team.
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Introduction
On December 15, 1992, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight named
Mr. Randy H. Brinkley as the STS-61 Mission Director. Mr. Brinkley assembled a
small staff at the Johnson Space Center and his office was operational by mid-
January, 1993.
This report details events that occurred before and during the STS-61 Space
Shuttle mission, the Hubble Space Telescope First Servicing Mission. Information
included in this report was obtained from records maintained by the Mission
Director and his staff, from post-mission submittals solicited from and provided by
the various engineering and operations disciplines that had participated in the
preparation and execution of the mission, and from presentation materials and
minutes from mission planning and review meetings. Opinions expressed in the
body and first appendix of this report are those of the STS-61 Mission Director, and
not necessarily those of the other contributors.
The recommendations contained in this report include suggestions for
improved mission execution. Some of these recommendations can be considered
lessons learned, but many others are ideas that have been in common use by NASA
and its contractors. They are included here for consideration in executing future
HST servicing missions as well as the assembly and maintenance of the International
Space Station.

Pre-Mission Events
Pre-mission events significant to the experience base of mission management
are detailed in chronological order in this section. Mission Director's recommen-
dations resulting from these events are presented in boldface type following the
event(s) that prompted the recommendation(s).
Planning and preparations for the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) First Servicing
Mission (SM-1) were well under way even before the HST was deployed in April
1990. (The first HST Maintenance Mission Payload Operations Working Group
[POWG] meeting was held in August 1988.) However, the focus of the mission
planning changed dramatically following the discovery of spherical aberration in the
HST images resulting from a manufacturing error in the primary mirror. The mirror
surface had been misshaped by 0.002 mm. The wide field/planetary camera no. II
(WF/PC II) had been planned before the optical flaw was discovered. Its design was
changed to compensate for the problem in the primary mirror. The corrective optics
space telescope axial replacement (COSTAR) was designed to correct the focus of the
light entering the faint object camera (FOC), the Goddard high resolution spectro-
graph (GHRS) and the faint object spectrograph (FOS). Problems caused by jitter
induced into the HST by solar array (SA) thermal distortions led to the decision to
build and install new arrays. Concern over long-term reliability of the gyroscope
systems, or rate sensor units (RSUs), resulted in the decision to replace two of the
three RSUs on the HST. As of February 1992, the baselined tasks for HST SM-1 were
those involving the COSTA_R, the WF/PC II, new SAs, and two RSUs.
On March 16, 1992, Dr. Story Musgrave was announced as Payload Commander
for STS-61.
From March 26 through April 14, 1992, an extensive series of sixteen tests was
conducted in MSFC's Neutral Buoyancy Simulator (NBS). In these space-suited
underwater runs with eleven astronauts fincluding Dr. Story Musgrave and Mr. Greg
Harbaugh) as subjects for twelve of the runs, EVA procedures and preliminary
timelines were developed or enhanced for replacement tasks for the SAs, the
COSTAR, the RSUs, the electronic control units (ECUs), and the WF/PC II. This
series of evaluations was also used to assess the design concepts for the WF/PC
installation tool (WIT), the small orbital replacement unit (ORL0 protective enclosure
(SOPE), the WF/PC mirror cover, the GHRS "H" cable, and the DF-224 coprocessor.
Results of these tests are presented in HST SM 92.1 Executive Summary. Report.
dated April 27, 1992. One of the recommendations in the report is that "every effort
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should be made to fund an RMS [(remote manipulator system) simulator] with flight-
like characteristics .... The present configuration of a single joint RMS and its
limitation to station-keep will seriously impact crewmember training." The report
also mentions that the limitation on the water depth to which a suited subject could
descend during a training run caused negative impacts on training. A Nitrox
(oxygen-enriched air) breathing system would allow the subjects to achieve a greater
depth for a greater period of time, thereby allowing enhanced training. The eventual
incorporation of an upgraded RMS simulator and a Nitrox breathing system into the
NBS in time to support only the October 1993 training runs is discussed below in
connection with the recommendations from General Thomas Stafford's HST SM
Review Team's second meeting, which occurred February 11-12, 1993.
Numerous hardware and procedure changes were made as a result of these NBS
runs. However, some conditions identified as problems in the report were not
resolved until very late in the mission flow. The report pointed out the lack of
existing capability to support end-to-end timeline verification, but this capability was
not realized until the October 1993 NBS runs, after the late installation of the new
RMS and the Nitrox systems. The report also stressed the need to finalize tool
stowage and tool management. The final tool stowage and tool management major
determinations were not made until late August 1993.
An assessment of the HST SM-1 extravehicular activities (EVAs) was conducted
by former astronaut Dr. Joe Allen, who issued his report on July 17,1992. He had
been asked by the NASA Office of Space Science and Applications to assess the then-
current EVA plan regarding strategy, timeline, and overall feasibility. Among his
recommendations, he cautioned NASA to guard against blindly pursuing accommo-
dations for low probability contingencies at the expense of not being ready for the
scheduled activities and the more likely contingencies.
He also recommended that the original large ORUs, which were to be replaced,
be used for reinstallation practice prior to the installation of the new ORUs. As a
result, partial reinsertion of the WF/PC I was performed during STS-61, as was a
handling evaluation of the high speed photometer (HSP), which was replaced by the
COSTAR. This type of on-orbit assessment proved to be of significant value during
the mission.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 1: EVA tasks requiring
precise handling of medium and large masses should be rehearsed
on orbit to the extent possible. Tasks involving small, difficult-to-
handle objects such as noncaptive screws should also be practiced on
orbit.
Dr. Allen also dted the need for the new ORUs to have high fidelity with respect
to the old ORUs. This concern is basic to the design of any servicing EVA and is a
high priority concern of the NASA EVA community. During the FIST SM-1 EVAs, no
12
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significant hardware fit problems were encountered. However, a number of previ-
ous Space Shuttle EVAs have met with significant difficulties in connecting two
pieces of hardware because some "simple detail" was overlooked.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 2: Every effort should be
made to completely understand and to be able to duplicate on the
ground the configuration of hardware that is on orbit. Methods that
can be used to help achieve this capability include detailed records
(including photo documentation and accurate engineerin 8 drawings,
both made of the as-deployed configuration), molds of the interfaces,
accurate tooling representing mating interfaces, etc. Such a
capability to duplicate on earth what exists in orbit should be
considered an initial design requirement for on-orbit hardware.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 3: The Space Station
Program should develop and maintain a detailed three-dimensional
computer model of the planned Station configuration similar to
Orbiter models maintained in the PLAID and Integrated Graphics
Operations and Analysis Laboratory (IGOAD systems at JSC The
model should be made easy to update as design changes are made. It
should be accessible by the Space Station community of designers,
customers, and operators. It should be maintained as an as-built
model of the station during and after the assembly phase.
Another area of concern for Dr. Allen, public affairs strategy, was shared by
General Thomas Stafford's HST SM Review Team and by the Group Task Force on
Satellite Rescue and Repair. Dr. Allen was concerned about the tendency of the
national press to ignore successful science, but focus a great deal of attention on
failures. To enhance that chances of mission success, and at the same time to
strengthen the public perception that NASA was doing all could to succeed, he
recommended that NASA select experienced EVA crewmembers for the mission, that
ample performance margin be held in management reserve, that an Orbiter having a
long on-orbit stay capability be used, and that the EVA crew begin practicing the
EVA procedures immediately to increase proficiency, and, therefore, timeline
margin. He recommended that the mission tasks be divided into a short list of tasks
required to fix the mirror problem; another list of things to do, if time permits, to
improve the quality and quantity of new data by installing the new SAs; and yet
another lower prioritylist,includingthe tasksinvolvingRSUs, ECUs, and GHRS
repairkit,justin casetherewere any time leftover. A significantamount of attention
was given toformation of a public-affairsplan forHST SM-I. An HST public-affairs
team was formed in January 1992. Itcomprised representativesof theHST Program
and Projectteams, theNASA centers,the European Space Agency (ESA) and the
servicingmission contractors.The team addressed therolesand responsibilitiesof
thevariousorganizationsduring threephases of themission: the firstincluded the
pre-missionperiod up to thirtydays beforelaunch,thesecond period was from
13
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thirty days before launch until landing, and the third phase was from landing until
completion of systems and instrument verification. Biweekly planning sessions were
held. Photos, printed materials and videotapes were provided to educators and to
the press. A writers' workshop was conducted at the Space Telescope Science
Institute in Baltimore, Maryland, and at GSFC in June 1993. A mission operations
media workshop was held at JSC in August 1993, in conjunction with the second JIS,
allowing the press to see the simulated mission activities. Intensive activities with
the press, immediately before and during the mission, ensured wide distribution of
information. One of the goals of these workshops and briefings was the
indoctrination and education of the numerous reporters who were not accustomed to
covering NASA and mission operations.
While the amount of work devoted to the public-affairs plan was extensive, it
was not coordinated as well as it should have been. The effort was led by personnel
of the NASA Office of Space Science. It was not well coordinated with the Office of
Space Flight or the Office of Policy Coordination and International Relations. The
overall public-affairs efforts functioned largely independently from mission
management, instead of in support of it.
In an attempt to prevent the press from declaring the mission to be a failure if
some minor problem were to occur in orbit, NASA devised and presented to the
media NASA's own mission success criteria. It clearly divided the EVA tasks into
primary tasks, which, if not accomplished, would likely trigger a second servicing
mission soon after the first one, and into secondary tasks, which, if not performed,
would not cause the mission to be considered a failure. The primary tasks were
considered to be those involving SAs, RSU 2, WF/PC, COSTAR, MSS 1, RSU/ECU 3
and SADE.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 4: For critical and high-
interest NASA missions, a thorough public-relations strategic plan
should be implemented. It should be well coordinated among all
involved NASA offices. A single NASA office should be in charge
of the implementation and updating of the plan at all NASA centers
and any other key sites (vendor facilities, etc.). Mission success
criteria should be generated by mission management early in
mission plannin 8 and provided to the press by the public-affairs
organization(s). A contingency plan of action in response to mission
"failure" should be in place and announced before the mission.
Information at all levels of detail should be readily available to the
press. The mission's importance should not be overstated, and its
complexity should not be understated.
The JSC-based HST Review Team, chaired by Richard Fitts, released their
findings in the Hubble Space Telescooe (HST) Review Team Final Report. dated July
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17, 1992. The team had been chartered by the Shuttle Program Office in early June
1992 to perform an independent, non-advocate review of FIST SM-1 to:
a. Ensure that adequate and documented plans were in place to evaluate the
operations concepts and preliminary design to the point of readiness to
enter the standard flow
b. Ensure that Intelsat and Assembly of [Space] Station by EVA Methods
(ASEM) lessons learned are applied
c. Review the operating concepts and preliminary design to assess likelihood
of mission success and recommend changes as appropriate
d. Determine if all tasks and timelines were workable and if adequate
margins existed to ensure success
The Fitts team recommended that the mission be constrained to an Orbiter
capable of extended duration missions, specifically one capable of a mission duration
of eight planned days, one payload contingency day and two landing contingency
days. A similar recommendation was made by the Stafford review team.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 5." Design all critical
missions so that maximum possible mission duration is incorporated
at the inception of mission planning. Early development of mission
requirements is necessary. If needed to provide adequate margins,
an Orbiter with increased-duration modifications should be used for
the mission.
The Fitts team also recommended that NASA avoid adding tasks that would
require a fourth EVA. (At the time of this review, only three EVAs were planned.)
Additional HST problems would later cause an increase to five EVAs, but the
extended-duration capabilities of the Orbiter Endeavour accommodated these five
EVAs with adequate margin.
The Fitts report also recommended that EVAs continue to be designed to be
accomplished by two crewmembers in six hours or less, even though EVAs of seven
or more hours are possible. This has been the standard practice in EVA planning and
continues to be a good way of ensuring timeline margin.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 6: To ensure that timeline
margin exists for each EVA day, continue to plan tasks for an EVA so
that they will take no longer than six hours to complete.
Another Fitts team recommendation was to determine whether certain high
priority tasks should be three-crewmember EVAs. Plans were put into place to
provide three-crewmember water training runs for the HST crew. However, after
analyses of the HST EVA tasks indicated that there would be little value added by a
third crewmember for any of the tasks, it was decided to not conduct the training. If
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three-crewmember capability is determined to be useful for Space Station Assembly
and Maintenance EVAs, either scheduled or contingency, those EVAs could be
significantly enhanced by hardware modifications.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 7: Analyze future HST and
Space Station EVAs, both scheduled and contingency, to determine
whether three-czewmember EVA capability would be desirable. If
so, modify the Orbiter air-locks, Shuttle extravehicular mobility
units (EMUs), and trainin s facilities to accommodate three-
crewmember EVAs. The modifications should include a third air-
lock-to-EMU umbilical connection, an EVA radio capable of three-
channel operation, and other changes as appropriate.
The Fitts team also recommended human thermal vacuum testing (HIV_ of the
flight ORUs, using the assigned flight crew to the extent possible. Due to the large
size, the delicacy, and the cleanliness requirements of the FIST ORUs, it was not
practical to test them in the JSC HTVT runs. The ORUs were tested in non-human
thermal vacuum tests. Many of the EVA tools were included in the HTVT. Each of
the four HST SM-1 EVA crewmembers had been the test subject in a cold HTVT run
within the two years before STS-61. Historically, HTVT has found problems with
flight hardware (especially tool) designs that would not have otherwise been
discovered before flight. The STS-61 HTVT did uncover some significant hardware
problems, which are discussed in connection with the Brasher team presentation on
July 13,1993.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 8: Flight hardware
(including tool) operations and interfaces should be verified as early
as possible before flight, in worst-case thermal vacuum conditions to
the extent possible.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 9:. EVA crewmembers
scheduled to perform EVA tasks in severe thermal conditions should
experience those conditions in their flight EMUs (or equivalent) in
vacuum chamber testing before their flight.
The Fitts team recommended that NASA consider the practicing of HST SM-1
tasks on prior Shuttle flights, using full scale mockups of HST ORUs. It was decided
that there was not sufficient time before the mission to comply with this
recommendation.
The Fitts team also recommended that potentially difficult FiST tasks be
rehearsed on missions before the HST SM-1. EVAs on $IS-57 and STS-51 were used
to evaluate some of the tools, operations, and Orbiter attitudes planned for use on
STS-61 and to evaluate contamination generated by the crew. Insight was gained
from these prior missions relating to the hardware and tasks. Far more important,
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however, was what was learned about the Orbiter bottom-to-sun orientation that had
been planned for some of the HST tasks. During the STS-57 EVA, this attitude was
found to be extremely cold and uncomfortable by the EVA crewmembers. This result
led the EVA and HST communities to pursue and develop a different attitude that
kept the EVA astronauts at a comfortable temperature level and still kept sunlight
away from the light and heat-sensitive areas of the HST hardware.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 10:. NASA should expand
its efforts to evaluate all new hardware, untried procedures, and
thermal effects of new Orbiter attitudes, during missions before the
missions for which they are require& Development of mission
requirements is needed as early as possible to allow time to support
these earlier missions. For HST servicing missions, the HST Project
organization should develop the plan to exercise tasks and hardware
as early as possible. The Space Station Program should closely
analyze EVA thermal environments (especially those which will
exist while an Orbiter is attached to the Station) to ensure adequate
EVA thermal capability.
Another Fitts team recommendation was to investigate modifications to the
ORU interface designs to reduce sensitivity to clearance tolerances. Further
assessment satisfied the team that the ORU designs were adequate, but the concern
remains valid for all EVA hardware interface designs.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 11: Designs of all hardware
having the potential to be attached to or removed from other
hardware during EVA should be thoroughly assessed for adequate
temperature and vacuum tolerances. Past flight experience and the
knowledge base of previous EVA designers should be used in this
assessment. See also Mission Director's Recommendation No. &
The Fitts team recommended that NASA develop alternate techniques to
perform ORU removal and installation that do not rely on the use of the Orbiter's
RMS. A significant amount of effort went into the development of and training for
the "non-RMS" procedures. It was determined before the STS-61 mission that all the
scheduled EVA tasks could be performed during the mission, even without the use of
the RMS. Initial assessment of the crew's capability to manually capture and berth
the HST without the RMS was considered, but procedures and training for this
contingency were not developed. Even though there has never been a complete loss
of RMS operability in flight, it is important that this type of contingency planning
and training be maintained.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 12: Critical EVA tasks
should be designed so that they can be fully accomplished if there
were total loss of the use of the RMS.
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Mission Director's Recommendation No. 13: The Space Shuttle
Program should thoroughly assess the feasibility of manual capture
and berthing of the HST. If determinedto be feasible, such
procedures should be developed and future HST servicing mission
EVA crews should be trained to perform them.
The FiRS team recommended that all critical design tasks be designed so that
adequate crew restraints are available. Extensive testing at JSC's Weightless
Environment Training Facility (WETF) and Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC's)
NBS resulted in verified proper placement of crew restraints.
The Fltts team also suggested that NASA implement an expanded EVA
integrated simulation template for HST to allow both nominal and malfunction EVA
timelinestobe exercisedby the integratedteam. The Space ShuttleProgram (SSP),
with total support from the HST Project, performed a JIS for each EVA day, during
which the mission support team and, on at least two occasions, the SSP and HST
management were extensively exposed to nominal and malfunction situations. This
training was very effective in improving coordination among the different
organizations involved in supporting this mission. See also Mission Director's
Recommendations Nos. 21 through 24 and No. 72 and the discussions preceding
them.
The FiRs team also recommended the establishment of a single point of contact
for EVA training hardware. In a presentation to the Stafford review team on
February 12, 1993, Mr. Hal Lambert was named as the single point of contact for all
EVA hardware. In a March 29, 1993, memorandum, Mr. Lambert designated Mr. Jim
Jaax as the single point of contact. After Mr. Jaax was given a job reassignment, Steve
Poulos was named to lead JSC's HST Tool Configuration Control Board (CCB) and to
be the single point of contact for EVA hardware beginning April 12, 1993. See
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 75.
The FiRs team recommended that, for EVA-intensive flights such as HST, EVA
crewmember selection be made as early as possible. The payload commander for
_1 was named approximately 21 months before flight, and the other three EVA
crewmembers 16 months before flight. These early assignments were extremely
beneficial in providing flight crew involvement in mission and hardware design
earlier than the normal point in the mission flow. Also beneficial to STS-61 was the
early involvement of the capsule communicator (Capcom)/Backup EVA crewmem-
ber in crew training and EVA task development. The subject of the backup EVA
crewmember is discussed in connection with Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 64.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 14: For EVA missions,
select the Payload Commander, the EVA crew, and the Capcom as
early as possible.
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For complex EVA missions it would also be beneficial to perform all planning
and requirements milestones earlier in the flow to allow time for proper procedures
and hardware development and verification. According to JSC's April 15, 1994,
edition of "Hight Production Generic Templates," the approximate timing for some
key mission events follows.
EVENT MONTHS BEFORE FLIGHT
Flight Definition and
Requirements Directive
(FDRD) Baselining
15.5
Cargo Integration Review
(CIR)
11.5
Flight Planning and
Stowage
Review (FPSR)
8.5
Flight Operations Review 3
(FOR)
For STS-61 the approximate timing follows.
EVENT MONTHS BEFORE FLIGHT
FDRD 17
CIR 11
FPSR 8.5
FOR 4
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Mission Director's Recommendation No. 15: For complex EVA
missions, perform flight production milestones earlier than in the
standard template. For the second HST servicing mission, consider
the following template.
EVENT MONTHS BEFORE FLIGHT
Selection of Payload
Commander and EVA
crew*
24
BaseUning of Flight
Definition Requirements
Directive
2O
Cargo Integration lS
Review
Flight Planning and
Stowage Review
11
Flight Operations 4
Review
Other mission milestones should be moved earlier proportionately.
* For missions requ/rin 8 close coordination among the commander,
pilot, RMS operator(s) and EVA crew, consideration should be given
to selectin S the entire crew at this time.
The Fitts team recommended that to maximize the likelihood of mission success,
NASA should consider EVA crew selection criteria such as EVA experience or
demonstrated EVA proficiency. While it is probably not essential that all EVA
crewrnembers for critical EVAs have previous on-orbit EVA experience, it is
important that the Payload Commander and others involved in the mission design
and planning be experienced. Because of the complex logistical and safety aspects
involved in EVA, it is also beneficial to have a Commander who has flown an EVA
mission and an EVA-experienced Capcom. Space Station assembly will be more
EVA-intensive than any previous space mission. The corps of EVA-experienced
crewmembers should be expanded to the maximum extent possible before Station
assembly.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 16: Use EVA-experienced
flight crewmembers, preferably the Payload Commander and other
2O
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EVA crewmember(s) who are assigned to the mission, to help
develop and evaluate critical EVA hardware, tasks, and procedures.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 17: To the extent possible,
assign an EVA-flight-experienced Commander and Capcom to
critical EVA missions.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 18: To increase margins for
the success of the Space Station assembly, determine the tasks
required for assembly and the number of crewmembers required to
perform them. Use EVAs on prior Space Shuttle missions to practice
those tasks and to provide EVA experience to as many different
astronauts as possible.
The Fitts team also recommended that EMU interchangeability be considered as
a criterion for crew selection. This practice would increase the flight crew's capability
to substitute a backup EMU if any primary EMU were to fail to function properly.
A similarly important backup capability would be the capability to substitute a
backup EVA crewmember in flight if one of the primary crewmembers becomes
unable to perform the EVA.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 19: For critical EVA
missions, select EVA crewmembers so that the required EVA tasks
can still be fully accomplished if either a crewmember or an EMU
becomes unable to support an EVA.
The Fitts team recommended that the then-current design of JSC's EVA
hardware be reviewed with respect to the HST task requirements, and to implement
improvements where needed to increase the chances for mission success. See
Mission Director's Recommendations No. 8, No. 10, No. 11, No. 74, and No. 77.
Another Fitts team recommendation was a human factors assessment of all EVA
system elements to identify changes necessary to improve the overall operational
effectiveness for future EVA flights. A human factors assessment was not separately
conducted for HST SM-1. The improvements made to the EVA design based on
human factors were by-products of the training template activities. Future EVAs,
and especially Space Station EVAs, would be well served by a structured human
factors assessment process. This task might appropriately be assigned to JSC's newly
formed EVA and Crew Equipment Project Office.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 20: Establish a formal
human factors assessment effort to identify and facilitate
improvements to generic EVA capabilities and hardware and to
enhance EVA procedures as required for specific EVA tasks. This
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responsibility might best be assigned to the newly formed EVA and
Crew Equipment Project Office.
On July 17,1992, the Flight Definition and Requirements Directive (FDRD) was
updated by Program Requirements Control Board Directive (PRCBD) No. S042061, to
include the STS-61 mission. This PRCBD designated the launch date to be December
2, 1993, and the mission duration to be eight days. It also designated the use of a fifth
cryotank set in OV-105 for the mission. This configuration was expected to provide
capacity for four contingency days. This mission duration represented an increase of
two contingency days over the previous plans (eight planned days plus two landing
contingency days [8+2]) and an increase of one contingency day over the minimum
duration recommended by the Fitts team (eight planned days plus one payload
contingency day, plus two landing contingency days [8+1+2]). The IMAX cargo bay
camera (ICBC) and the in-cabin IMAX camera were also placed on the flight by this
directive.
On July 23,1992, the first HST Flight Techniques Panel meeting was held.
On August 8,1992, the Program Review Team (PRT) for HST SM-1, chaired by
Dr. Michael Greenfield, released the report of its first of four reviews. The PRT had
been chartered by NASA Acting Deputy Administrator on July 14, 1992, to provide
the program and project offices with high-level, independent assessment of the
thoroughness of the development, integration, and verification processes and to
ensure that the multicenter HST servicing team was addressing problems satisfac-
torily. In this first report, the PRT recommended that the HST Project Office develop
spedfic decision-making guidelines and define the management process to be in
place during the mission, and that these guidelines and this process be exercised in
JISs. Prior to the JISs, GSFC mission support personnel participated in a number of
GSFC-only simulations, giving them a considerable amount of experience with the
decision and information flow among their own organizations. This early practice
contributed significantly to the efficiency of the more expansive JISs and should be
continued for future servidng missions. It should also be considered for implemen-
tation within the Space Station Program. The large number of JISs and the involve-
ment of management personnel in them resulted in a well prepared and coordinated
team. However, the training objectives of the JISs and the areas in need of improve-
ment were not well documented in post-JIS reports to the partidpants.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 21: Continue the practice of
having all mission support personnel, including management and
especially customer management, participate in joint integrated
simulations OISs) for critical missions. JISs for scheduled EVAs
should be conducted with EVA crewmembers in underwater training
facilities, unless facility or mock-up limitations prevent the crew
from performing realistic activities.
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Mission Director's Recommendation No. 22: For critical missions,
the Mission Operations Directorate should develop more dearly
defined and detailed training objectives for the JISs for flight
controllers, flight directors, and mission and customer management.
Post-JIS reports should be distributed to the JIS participants
detailing these objectives and how well they were achieved.
Corrective actions should be assigned and lessons learned should be
formulated and distributed.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 23: For HST servicing
missions, continue the practice of conducting HST Project internal
simulations. They should be well structured and the results should
be well documented.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 24: The Space Station
Program should assess the benefits of performing internal
simulations prior to the JISs for Space Station assembly. If
determined to be of value, they should be well structured, with clear
training objectives, and the results should be documented and
distributed to the partidpants. Objectives should include the
definition and exercising of the relationship between the Launch
Package Teams and the Flight Control Team during both nominal
and contingency operations.
The PRT also recommended that GSFC's servicing mission manager, the
systems management team, and the supporting HST and Space Support Equipment
(SSE) documentation all be located at JSC during the mission. It is extremely
important to have quick access to all technical information about a payload or other
hardware to help support trouble-shooting efforts. The system used for photo-
graphic image retrieval during STS-61 was not well indexed or conducive to rapid
image retrieval.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 25: The Mission
Operations Directorate should assess the methods used to access
payload technical data, drawings, and photographs during the STS-
61 simulations and during the STS-61 mission. Corrective actions
should be implemented to eliminate all identified problems. Work
should continue on improvement of storage and retrieval efficien-
des. See Mission Director's Recommendations No. 41 and No. 71.
The PRT recommended that the Payload Integration Plan (PIP) be completed as
soon as possible. For complex missions, it is important that all mission requirements
documentation be released earlier than for a standard mission. This accelerated
documentation schedule would allow more time for the mission planners and
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designers to develop and perfect hardware, techniques, and procedures. See Mission
Director's Recommendation No. 15.
The PRT also recommended the development of a top-level fault tree to address
issues at the systems level for individual instruments. GSPC performed an
extraordinary amount of contingency analysis and planning (including a top-level
fault-tree analysis), which, along with their extensive internal simulations, allowed
mission support personnel to respond quickly and properly to complicated
problems. Such analysis and planning would be beneficial also to the Space Station
Program.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 26: The Space Station
Program should consider the development of a top-level fault-tree
analysis.
The PRT advised the HST project to coordinate with the Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) boards to establish consistent certification criteria for all GSFC-
developed tools before proceeding with tool development and assembly. The goal of
establishing consistent tool certification criteria has not yet been achieved. There
continue to be philosophical differences in the ways different centers certify hard-
ware. In some cases there are differences in the ways two very similar hardware
items, both belonging to JSC organizations, are certified. Payload hardware, GFE,
contractor-furnished equipment (CFE), payload integration nominal cost hardware
(PINCH), and different NASA centers all have their own distinct certification
approval processes. Inconsistendes in certification requirements are, at best,
wasteful of program resources, and, at worst, dangerous. Certification of EVA
hardware is further discussed below in connection with the Brasher team's July 13,
1993, presentation. See Mission Director's Recommendation No. 75.
The PRT report also recommended that the HST Project and JSC develop a
common position regarding the types of crew training events and operational
assessments that are suitable to conduct using GSFC's High-Fidelity Mechanical
Simulator (HFMS). The hardware interface evaluations, verifications, and training
conducted for STS-61 using the HFMS were extremely valuable. The HST EVA
Servicing Mission Support Plan (EVASP [#8266, LMSC/P015686]) was developed to
define testing activities using the HFMS, among other facilities. It would be useful to
have a similar training plan to define and coordinate all training requirements for
future HST servicing missions.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 27: Consider the
implementation of an overall training facilities requirements control
document for future HST servicing missions. It should define, as
early as possible, the testing and training to be done at the various
training facilities (vendors, High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator
[HFMS], KSC, WETF, Neutral Buoyancy Simulator [NBS], et aL).
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The PRT also recommended that all sources of crew-induced contamination be
identified and resulting operational constraints be developed and documented. A
number of spedal procedures were implemented for STS-61 to help prevent
contamination of HST hardware. Tools and crew aids received spedal cleaning.
"Highly sensitive" cleaning procedures were invoked for items in the Orbiter payload
bay, crew cabin and air lock. The cabin air cleaner and a replacement payload bay
liner were flown. A special bake-out of the EMU glove new thermal micrometeoroid
garments was performed to reduce the chance of HST contamination from out-
gassing of the materials during the EVAs. After the payload bay was contaminated
by sand and debris at Launch Pad A, the payload bay received another special
deaning before the payload was installed. (The contamination of the payload bay
and the Payload Change-out Room [PCR] is discussed below in connection with Dr.
Greenfield's July 28,1993, report [See Mission Director's Recommendation No. 80.]
and in the entry for October 30, 1993.) The Space Shuttle and payload were also
transported to Launch Pad B, from which they were launched. On the basis of the
results of post-S'IS-61 HST testing and operations, it appears that no significant
contamination was introduced into the telescope during the EVAs. However, some
concerns still exist about the chances of contaminating HST and other sensitive
payloads during future missions. The crew observed that it was common for paint to
chip from handrails when in contact with tether hooks. Pieces of multi-layer
insulation (MLD and labels were seen floating from their original locations. A GHRS
sensor indicated a pressure change, and, therefore, the introduction of gas into the
HST after the firing of Orbiter reaction control jets. IMAX film made during the
mission revealed apparently metallic debris floating out of the payload bay near the
HST.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 28: The Space Shuttle
Program should perform a complete assessment of the results of the
HST SM-1 mission relating to potential sources of contamination.
The results of this assessment should then be provided to all
payload owners, including the HST Project, and the Space Station
Program. Review crew comments, indications of pressure spikes
inside the HST, and films and videotape made during the mission
(including IMAX film of EVAs and videotapes made during the
opening of the payload bay doors).
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 29: The HST Project
should examine returned components removed from HST for
indications of previous contamination and of material deterioration
that would indicate the potential for generation of contamination by
similar materials still on orbit. These results should be incorporated
into the Space Shuttle Program's assessment discussed in Mission
Director's Recommendation No. 28.
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Mission Director's Recommendation No. 30:. The Space Shuttle
Program should develop and publish data indicating temperature
ranges and locations within the payload bay that should be avoided
by payloads sensitive to vapor or condensation of Orbiter supply
water, waste water, flash evaporator system water, reaction control
system (RCS) jet combustion products, and leaking RCS propellants.
The PRT recommended that the HST Project produce and provide for use in
training and during the mission a drawing indicating areas of the HST that should
not be touched by EVA crewmembers. Such a drawing was provided to the EVA
training personnel who then incorporated the information into the crew's training
sessions.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 31: Continue to provide to
EVA astronauts clear and detailed training in what, if any, items in
or near the EVA work areas should not be touched by them. These
items should be represented by mock-ups durin 8 training to ensure
that EVA procedures can be accomplished without contact with the
"no-touch" zones.
The PRT assessed the verification process used to ensure that the COSTAR
would fit into the high-speed photometer (HSP) bay, both structurally, and optically.
The team determined that the methods used, which included the use of the Axial Bay
Simulator (located in the HFMS), were adequate. To ensure that future replacement
instruments can be dimensionally verified preflight, it is essential that strict
configuration control be maintained on ground sizing fixtures.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 32: For as long as the HST
is in service, the HST Project should use strict configuration control
to maintain the fidelity of their High-Fidelity Mechanical Simulator.
The PRT recommended that accurate mock-ups of all scientific instrument
critical clearance areas be made available to the assigned flight crew during their
training. It is essential that crew training be conducted with accurate representations
of the hardware that will be used in flight.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 33: For both the Space
Shuttle and the Space Station Programs, continue and expand the
efforts to make trainin 8 mock-ups that are dimensionally as flight-
like as possible. Be alert to any differences between training and
flight hardware and incorporate the necessary precautions into the
training plan to avoid negative training. Take precautions to prevent
damage from handling, shipping, etc., and deterioration from
corrosion, inadequate maintenance, etc.
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The PRT recommended that materials and training should be provided to repair
any multi-layer insulation (MLD or tape that may be pulled loose during any
scientific instrument (SI) removal. No MLI problem was encountered during the SI
operations during the mission. With the increasing age of the HST MLI and the
increasing likelihood of micrometeoroid and debris impacts to the telescope, there is
a significant chance that MLI repair capability will be needed during future HST
servicing missions. The potential need for such a repair capability was emphasized
during the mission when it was visually discovered that a particle had perforated the
HST high gain antenna dish.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 34: Develop and verify the
adequacy of a multi-layer insulation (MLI) repair kitfor future HST
servicing missions. It should enable EVA astronauts to repair the
black MLI inside the telescope cavities and the MLI external to the
telescope and to repair light leaks resulting either from micrometeor-
oid or other damage to the telescope or from poorly fitting doors or
light seals.
The PRT was interested in methods of verification that light leaks were not
present in the body of the HST at the completion of the mission. It was determined
that there was no practical, simple test that could be performed during the STS-61
mission. Such a test would allow any needed repairs to be made without requiring
another servicing mission.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 35: Reassess the feasibility
of developing a method for detecting light leaks in the HST during
future servicing missions.
The PRT was also concerned about the possibility that last-minute changes to
flight or ground documentation made necessary by changes in hardware or
procedures might not be made in time if they are simply submitted through the
normal approval processes. The team recommended that the HST Project take an
active role in working with the JSC operations community to ensure that all needed
changes are made. The HST Project did work closely with the JSC operations
personnel to ensure that there were very few surprises found during the mission.
The Problem Review Team Report No. 1 also addressed the issue of early crew
designation, which is discussed in connection with the Fitts team recommendations
and in Mission Director's Recommendations No. 14 and No. 15.
The Flight Requirements Document was approved on August 14, 1992. It
established the mission's requirement to support three planned EVAs, two payload
contingency EVAs, and one Orbiter contingency EVA. This six-EVA capability was
the minimum capability recommended in the July 17, 1992, report of the Fitts team.
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On August 14,1992,the group that was established at JSCto investigate the
problems encountered during the Intelsat capture EVAs on STS-49 released a
memorandum documenting the results of their assessment (JSC, GA-92-064). Some
of their recommendations had applicability to the HST SM-1.
The Intelsat group recommended that sufficient engineering analysis be
performed before commitment to an operations concept. While the overall concept
for HST servicing had been established years earlier, some innovative mission
development and training methods were employed for STS-61. Virtual reality
techniques were used in the development of some of the RMS positions and
procedures and in the verification of others. In addition, some air-bearing devices
used in the Apollo program were employed in a new way to provide training for
mass handling.
The Intelsat group also recommended that the limitations of simulation methods
used for critical design verifications and crew training activities be verified,
documented, and regularly reinforced to the personnel involved in these activities.
For STS-61, adequate precaution was taken to make the flight crew aware of which
aspects of their training were flight-like, and which were unique to the training
method being employed. An example is the demonstration of the actual flight ORUs
to the crew fairly early in the training schedule, so that they would know how the
training mockups differed from the flight items. The validity of the S'IVo_l
simulation methods was independently assessed by the EVA Peer Review Team,
chartered by the STS-61 Mission Director and led by Col. Jerry Ross. This team found
that the methods provided valuable training and that limitations were adequately
communicated to the crew. See Mission Director's Recommendation No. 55.
The Intelsat group recommended the development of a project management
plan that defines roles and responsibilities, tasks, and analyses for hardware
development, operations, and training for missions with high complexity and risk.
GSFC released the first version of their HST First Servicin_ Mission Management
Plan in October 1992. It was revised significantly in September 1993. The Space
Shuttle Program published their Space Shuttle Program Project Plan for STS-61 in
April 1993.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 36: For complex missions a
management plan should be developed early in the planning flow.
The development and execution of the plan should be coordinated
among the various elements of the mission team.
The Intelsat group also recommended the use of peer review to validate
operations concepts and the design before committing to new high-complexity
missions. Although they were not formed solely in response to this recommenda-
tion, peer review groups did make significant contributions to the success of the HST
SM-1. The Tool Review Team, headed by Mr. Warren Brasher, helped to implement
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corrective actions for the tool problems discovered during human thermal vacuum
testing and helped to enhance the effectiveness of the STS-61 tool certification
process. The recommendations of this team are discussed below in connection with
the team's July 13,1993, presentation of the results of their investigation. Another
team, led by Col. Jerry Ross, enhanced STS-61 EVA efficiency with their recommen-
dations for revising EVA procedures and tool stowage locations. Such review
activities can add significant value to the preparation for a critical mission, but care
should be taken to prevent negative impacts to the mission team activities caused by
the review team's need to become educated on mission details.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 37: For critical missions,
including HST servicing and Space Station assembly and maintenance
missions, a multidisciplinary team should be established to provide a
thorough and comprehensive independent assessment of flight
readiness. The team should identify areas of potential risk and make
recommendations of appropriate actions to enhance mission success.
The team must possess a relevant experience base. The team leader
and panel chairs must possess broad program experience. The core
team members should be selected for applicable technical back-
ground and mission experience, including EVA experience from a
similar mission or membership in a previous similar assessment
effort. The team should identify and use a large pool of independent
experts, both internal and external to NASA in all key areas. It
should plan for sub-panel assessment activities to be led or
coordinated by a core member of the team.
There should be established a good understanding of, and
agreement on, the team's objectives, approach, and schedule, among
the team, mission management, payload (e.g., Space Station) and
Space Shuttle program management, and contractors. The team
should establish close and on-going interaction with the mission
team management, A Mission Director, ff assigned, should be the
overall focal point for interface and should establish the process for
contractor interface. The team should establish a formal process for
working with the mission team, using an informal working
relationship but maintaining a formal response and action process.
The team's effort should begin with payload hardware design
reviews and continue until launch. The team should develop a plan
of action and milestones for team effort based on established
funding. It should optimize its level of effort for available funding
and carefully track costs. The team should strive to minimize
disruption by scheduling their reviews in coordination with
established events and milestones for mission hardware, for Space
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Shuttle PmKram (SSP) mission preparation milestones, and center
and Headquarters reviews. Their readiness review effort should be
expanded for critical design review and test readiness reviews. A
small sub-panel of technical experts should participate in hardware
reviews. Their expertise should include EVA experience as
appropriate. Their effort should focus on design, testing, interfaces,
fit, and processing. The team's effort should again be expanded for
mission planning and mission preparation activities. The team
should influence mission operation plans and contingencies.
The team should make extensive use of lessons learned data bases
from related activities. It should make extensive use of available
data and individual team members should conduct reviews prior to
the collective assessment effort in order to minimize travel.
It should conduct an independent assessment of the flight
worthiness of the design, the fabrication and testing, and the
inteszation and preparation of the mission hardware, software, and
supporting systems. The team's review should assess exceptions to
performance and build norms, analyze waivers and deviations,
review failures and their resolutions, and assess payload hardware-
to-Orbiter interfaces. The team should also review preflight
planning activities, training and simulation plans, and mission
plans. The mission management should be reviewed regarding
structure, processes, responsiveness, and effectiveness. The team
should assess dosure of anomalies and management response to
review team issues and recommendations.
The Intelsat review group also stressed the importance of enhancing and
demonstrating EVA technologies and capabilities to the maximum practical extent,
including demonstration of complex Space Station EVA requirements. See Mission
Director's Recommendations No. 1, No. 7, No. 10, No. 13, No. 18, No. 20, No. 45, No.
51, No. 84, and No. 85.
In August 1992,another seriesof NBS testswas conducted. The nineteentests,
includingthirteenruns with Dr. Story Musgrave and Lt.Col.Thomas Akers as
subjects,performed procedures verificationfornon-RMS removal/installationof
WTIPC (usingWT/PC installationtool[WIT]),HSPICOSTAI_ RSUs, SAs, ECUs and
GHP, S switching box;testingof contingency procedures forthe high-gainantenna
(HGA), SA primary deployment mechanism (PDM) and secondary deployment
mechanism (SDM), WF/PC scientificnstrument protectiveenclosure(SIPE)latches,
axialSIPE safetybar,WTIPC and COSTAR rapidsating,and solararray drive
assembly (SADA) damp; verificationof nominal RMS procedures forWF/PC (with
and Without WIT) and integratedDF-224 and coprocessor;and testingof develop-
mental procedures forRSU, HGA retraction,and low gain antenna (LGA) cover.
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During these runs the crew preferred the use of foot restraints for most tasks, in spite
of the extra time required for set-up. (Minimization of the performance of free-
floating tasks was also one of the lessons learned from the STS-49 ASEM EVA.) After
these tests the use of power tools was considered to be the baseline method for bolt
installation and removal. The crew also preferred that nominal change-out of the
WF/PC should be performed without using the WIT. A number of Jet Propulsion
Laboratory 0PL) and GSFC personnel believed that the WIT would allow safer, more
secure handling of the WF/PC by the crew. It was later decided in the Flight
Techniques Panel meeting on December 11, 1992, to not use the WIT for the task. It
was also pointed out after these NBS runs that the management of tools, crew aids,
and tethers needed continual review.
On August 28, 1992, Dr. Jeffrey Hoffman, Dr. Kathryn Thornton and Lt. Col.
Tom Akers were announced as the remaining three EVA crewmembers for STS-61.
Earlier assignment of the entire EVA crew would have allowed greater crew
participation in the March and August 1992 NBS development runs, and therefore
greater crew involvement in the hardware design and EVA procedures development.
See Mission Director's Recommendations No. 14 and No. 15.
On September 10, 1992, General Thomas Stafford convened at GSFC the first
meeting of his HST SM Review Team, which he had formed at the request of the
NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The team was tasked to review all
aspects of the mission plans, "including the adequacy of servicing and repair
hardware and preflight planning and training." On September 18, 1992, the quick-
look report of their assessment was released.
Stafford's team recommended the establishment of a mission manager. On
December 15, 1992, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight named Mr. Randy
Brinkley as Mission Director, who served to "coordinate the efforts of the team
working to safely and successfully accomplish the HST Servicing Mission." The
Mission Director is discussed below in connection with Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 48. On February 18, 1993, the Space Shuttle Program named
Mr. Hal Lambert as Mission Manager, who was to provide Shuttle management
overview and resolution of issues associated with the mission. The Mission Manager
is discussed below in connection with the November 25, 1992, mission status telecon.
Stafford's team also recommended the testing in a thermal vacuum facility of
tolerances and especiaily the mechanical interfaces of mission tools, equipment,
replacement units, and scientific units. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 8.
Stafford's team recommended the upgrading of the RMS simulator at MSFC's
NBS. By the time of the Stafford team's second meeting, which occurred February 11-
12, 1993, no apparent progress had been made toward this upgrade. This subject is
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discussed below in connection with the recommendations from that February
meeting.
Stafford's team recommended that as much on-orbit testing as possible be
performed on the HST while the Orbiter was still nearby. They also specifically
recommended that the aperture door (AD) be opened while the Orbiter was still
within reach. Extensive work, some performed before this recommendation was
made, went into the development and execution of tests performed during or after
each EVA to verify that replacement components were electrically alive and that no
noticeable problems were caused by the EVA activities. These tests were very
effective methods of indicating that the EVA activities were properly performed. The
issue of when to open the AD had been in work for both the HST deployment
mission (S'I_31) and the STS-61 mission. When analysis indicated the risk of
contamination to HST to be acceptably low, it was also decided to open the AD while
the HST was still grappled by the Orbiter's RMS.
Stafford's team suggested that, given the greater inherent risk of a night landing,
NASA verify that a night launch was essential to the success of the mission. Because
of the limited number of days each month in which both potential launch-abort
landings and the nominal end-of-mission landing would occur in daylight, it was
decided not to make daylight landing a mission requirement. Development of a
night scene for the portable in-flight landing operations trainer (PILOT) was acceler-
ated to support STS-61 in-flight training. The commander and pilot for STS-61 both
received extensive night-landing training in the Shuttle training aircraft and the
shuttle mission simulator. However, there are no established requirements for
training for night landings.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 38: Establish nighttime
Shuttle training aircraft (STA) training requirements for the
commanders and pilots of all Space Shuttle missions. This is
especially critical for missions scheduled to land at night and for
ground-up rendezvous missions, which have the potential for
landing at night, depending on when they are launched. Establish
requirements for demonstrated minimum performance levels for
night landings.
Stafford's team recommended that HST EVA priorities be defined as soon as
possible. Given the dynamic nature of the condition of HST as component degrada-
tion continued, it was understandable that EVA task priorities would change fairly
late in the mission development. However, this situation is not conducive to efficient
mission preparation. Requirements should still be established early and updated as
required.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 39: To help ensure efficient
and successful planning and execution of complex EVA missions, it
32
[ Pre-Mission Events |
is important that EVA task priorities be established as early as
possible, preferably well before the standard time of publication of
the Payload Integration Plan, and before the occurrence of the Cargo
Integration Review.
Stafford's team also recommended that, given the experience of the STS-61 EVA
crew, NASA consider waiving the requirement against performing EVAs before the
fourth day of the mission. After thorough review of this suggestion, it was decided
to keep the first EVA scheduled for the fourth day. An earlier EVA day would have
seriously compressed the timeline for the large amount of preparatory activities. It
would also have increased the risk of something being left undone and of some
crewmembers still being under the effects of space adaptation syndrome (SAS) when
scheduled to perform an EVA. For future critical missions, the scheduling of an EVA
before flight day four should be considered only for experienced crews with low risk
of SAS, and after a thorough analysis of pre-EVA activities and timelines.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 40: Scheduling of critical
EVAs before flight day four should be done only for missions whose
critical crewmembers have an established history of being free of
space adaptation syndrome symptoms by the flight day of the EVA,
and should be done only with the concurrence of the crew and the
flight surgeon, based on a thorough analysis of pre-EVA activities
and timelines.
The Stafford team cautioned NASA against scheduling secondary objectives to
be accomplished prior to the primary ones. While this concept is basic to all Shuttle
mission planning, because of the changing priority of the tasks of HST SM-1, it was a
matter of consideration until fairly late in the mission planning. The flight plan was
made according to this philosophy, except where the time predicted to perform the
task having the next greatest priority exceeded the time remaining in the EVA. In
these cases lessor priority tasks were scheduled. The most noticeable example of this
type of exception is the SA change-out, which, although it was the top priority task,
was performed during EVA 2, because it could not be performed in a single EVA
unless some preparatory work had been performed first.
The Stafford team cautioned NASA to not relay excessively optimistic
expectations to the news media and the public. The STS-61 public affairs activities
are discussed above in connection with the Dr. Allen recommendations of July 17,
1992. See Mission Director's Recommendation No. 4.
Mr. John Young released memorandum no. AC5-92-37 on September 17, 1992.
It raised a number of issues related to STS-61 and future missions. He suggested the
thorough review of photographs taken of HST both at the place of manufacture and
on orbit, to look for any unexpected conditions. While thousands of photographs
have been taken of HST and its components, it is not a simple matter to organize
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them in a rapidly retrievable manner. The storage and retrieval systems used during
STS-61 did not have easily usable or complete indexes.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 41: For the future HST
servicin 8 missions, as well as for all other critical EVA missions,
includin 8 Space Station assembly and maintenance missions, it is
important to develop comprehensive collections of photography
(including videotape and digital imagery) of the flight hardware,
organized in a manner that will support timely analysis and
troubleshooting. To the extent possible, plan to make a complete
photographic record of the prelaunch and on-orbit configurations of
deployed hardware to help ensure that future mission planning will
be based on accurate data. Imagery data should be maintained in a
readily accessible, rapid-retrieval system. See Mission Director's
Recommendations No. 25 and No. 71.
Mr. Young stated that the crew scheduling constraints found in Appendix K of
the Space Shuttle Crew Procedures Management Plan are often waived during a
mission to increase the chances of mission success. In the planning of HST SM-1, the
question arose whether a crewmember could perform EVAs on consecutive days,
without approval of the mission management team (MMT). Some mission support
personnel believed that the flight director has the authority to waive the constraint.
Others believed that a decision from the MMT is required.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 42: To provide clearer
decision-making Ku/delines for matters involving crew activity
constraints, the authority to waive constraints in Appendix K of the
Space Shuttle Crew Procedures Management Plan should be clearly
defined.
Mr. Young cautioned that, because of the high criticality of the EVA power
tools, the battery and power tool provisions should be "overkilled." During STS-51, a
power ratchet tool battery failed to provide power for as long at it was expected to.
During STS-61, an HST power tool failed. In both of these cases, sufficient spares
were flown to allow completion of the scheduled tasks. Since such failures of EVA
hardware are not uncommon, it is necessary to have ample backups for tools and
batteries.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 43: For critical EVA tools
and batteries, ensure that ample in-flight backups are available. If
the use of power tools is essential to the completion of required
tasks, fly enough tools and batteries to accommodate multiple
failures of each.
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Mission Director's Recommendation No. 44: Review the
performance of the batteries used during the STS-61 EVAs. Assess
the adequacy of the strategy used to manifest the types and
quantities of the batteries that were flown. Compare the STS-61
battery plan to other techniques and technologies, including in-
flight recharging, and other types of batteries.
Mr. Young recommended an investigation into the concept of self-rigidizing
tethers attached to the waist area of the EMU to provide the capability to restrain the
EVA crewmember in less time than it would take to set up a foot restraint. This
concept was not developed for STS-61. Such an attachment device would likely be
useful to the Space Station Program, where the potential exists for EVAs to be
performed in locations not accessible from foot restraints.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 45: Investigate alternatives
or improvements to the present foot restraint concept, to enable an
EVA crewmember to be secured at worksites for which the present
foot restraints are not satisfactory.
On September 29, 1992, the Group Task Force on Satellite Rescue and Repair
released their report in Washington, D. C. The task force, part of the NASA Advisory
Council, had been established by the NASA Administrator on May 14, 1992, "to
review policies, pricing, and implementation for undertaking unanticipated satellite
rescue and repair missions utilizing the Space Shuttle." The task force was chaired by
Dr. Eugene Covert, Head of the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The report contains six recommendations
related to the implementation of rescue and repair missions.
The first recommendation is that NASA should continue to ensure that safety
requirements are met for all satellite rescue and repair missions. The NASA safety
processes for an EVA mission are complex and disjointed. Hardware provided by
the payload customer is subjected to review by the Payload Safety Review Panel
(PSRP). In-flight operations that serve as controls to safety hazards are submitted by
the PSRP to the Mission Operations Directorate's (MOD's) Flight Techniques Panel(s)
for assessment of EVA safety. MOD is tasked with the responsibility for overall
operational safety verification, which it performs as part of its Flight Techniques
Panel process. A majority of the Space Shuttle Program's (SSP's) EVA hardware is
classified as flight crew equipment (FCE), a subset of the SSP's government-furnished
equipment (GFE). EVA equipment that is built especially for a specific payload is
usually classified as payload GFE hardware. Although these two different types of
GFE items are controlled by two different configuration control boards (CCBs), they
are both subjected to the same GFE safety approval process, which is separate and
distinct from the PSRP. Some EVA items (such as some tools) that are flown on every
mission for contingency purposes are classified as contractor-furnished equipment
(CFE). CFE is reviewed under yet another set of safety requirements. Some Orbiter
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equipment that is incorporated to accommodate a specific payload is classified as
payload integration nominal cost hardware (PINCH) and is approved through a
process different from the CFE process. For each mission an integrated cargo hazard
assessment flCHA) is performed, using a standard checklist of generic hazards to
screen for hazards caused by any of the payloads on a mission due to their proximity
to or interaction with Orbiter systems, other payloads, or personnel.
For each mission, a Prelaunch Assessment Review (PAR) is conducted by the
Safety, Reliability, Quality Assurance, and Mission Assurance personnel of the
various NASA centers and NASA Headquarters. At the PAR are heard descriptions
and assessments of any significant known problems that might affect the mission
under review. The Systems Safety Review Panel (SSRP) at JSC, at its discretion, can
assess any aspect of mission hardware, preparation, or procedures for compliance
with safety requirements. Because both the PAR and the SSRP are rev/ew bodies,
their assessments occur dose to the launch date, and therefore usually cannot
proactively affect the mission under review.
Typically, there is no one entity that actively controls or coordinates the various
safety processes during the preparation for a Space Shuttle mission. For HST SM-1,
there was no discernible comprehensive mission assurance effort.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 46: For each NASA human
space mission, designate a single point of contact who is directly
responsible for coordinating the entire safety and mission assurance
effort for the mission (including hardware, systems, and operations).
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 47: NASA should develop
a single process that is responsible for all aspects of EVA safety and
mission assurance (S&MA). This process should assess the
integrated EVA-related S&MA aspects of flight crew equipment,
other government-furnished equipment, payload-related hardware,
and EVA, Orbiter, and payload operations.
The second task force recommendation was that mission managers should be
assigned upon acceptance of a mission and that the mission manager should be
responsible for all aspects of preflight mission execution. A mission manager was
named within the Space Shuttle Program to manage the Level lII (project level)
aspects of the mission, but not "all aspects." The STS-61 Mission Director was
designated by the Associate Administrator for Space Flight to "coordinate the efforts
of the team," but was not given full responsibility for the team. For future significant
NASA missions, a Mission Director should be appointed and be given clearly defined
roles and responsibilities.
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Mission Director's Recommendation No. 48: A mission director
should be appointed for future HST servicing missions and other
highly complex space flights designated by the NASA
Administrator. The mission director should be responsible for the
management direction and oversight of the integration and flight
preparation process and accomplishment of the mission. The
mission director's responsibilities should include oversight of the
mission training and concurrence in the determination of the flight
readiness of the flight crew, the integrated operations team, the
customer management team, and the mission management
personnel. The mission director should provide concurrence in the
date and time of launch, and the launch window. The mission
director should also concur in the mission goals, objectives,
priorities, and policies. The mission director should participate and
concur in the selection of the crew. The mission director should be
responsible for the proper coordination among the various NASA
offices, NASA centers, NASA program managers, and persons,
groups, and organizations external to NASA who have a
responsibility for the safe and successful execution of the mission.
The mission director should establish special committees and/or
assessment teams, as required, to assess the readiness of the STS and
cargo to support mission requirements. The mission director should
have final approval authority of the cargo mix, including secondary
payloads, detailed test objectives (DTOs), and detailed
supplementary objectives (DSOs). The mission director should be
responsible for the resolution of key issues involving any aspect of
the mission. The mission director should co-chair the Mission
Management Team (MMT). The mission director should be
responsible for ensuring that the Space Transportation System (STS)
and cargo comply with all safety requirements. The mission director
should be responsible for mission assurance and flight readiness of
the STS and cargo, and provide concurrence in resolutions of
payload or Orbiter anomalies that have a potential impact on
mission success. The mission director should be a signatory on
certificates of flight readiness that pertain to the specific flight for
which the director has responsibility. The mission director should
provide concurrence in the approval or disapproval of flight specific
waivers. The mission director should represent and report directly
to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight.
The third recommendation of the group task force was that mission integrated
training is essential for all aspects of Shuttle training. See Mission Director's
Recommendations Nos. 21-24, No. 59, and No. 72.
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The fourth recommendation was that NASA should adequately communicate
the inherent complexity of rescue missions to the public. The _1 public affairs
activities are discussed above in connection with the Dr. Allen recommendations of
July 17, 1992. See Mission Director's Recommendation No. 4.
The fifth recommendation of the task force was that NASA should commit to
the maximum use of individuals with previous experience (both internal and external
to NASA) and past lessons learned to help ensure mission safety and success. For
HST SM-1, significant contributions were made by EVA-experienced astronauts
directly involved in the mission, including the flight crew themselves, and by
astronauts and former astronauts participating in EVA procedure reviews, most
notably the Independent EVA Assessment team established by the HST Mission
Director and led by Col. Jerry Ross. NASA also made significant use of EVA
planning and training personnel who had extensive experience on previous EVA
missions. Their use of proven, and, in some cases, innovative training methods
resulted in the excellent preparation of the EVA crew for their tasks.
EVA lessons learned were also used by the EVA designers and trainers for STS-
61. Typically, lessons-learned databases are maintained for internal use by the
various disciplines of flight planning personnel. Because these databases are kept
informal, they often contain conflicting advice resulting from differing opinions
expressed by different crewmembers and other personnel. If these databases were
edited to represent dear guidelines, where possible, and made available to the
greater NASA and customer community, they would be of greater use to payload
and mission designers.
A lessons learned steering committee led by the NASA Office of Safety and
Mission Assurance has begun working to develop new systems and procedures to
enhance the availability of aerospace-related lessons both among the NASA centers
and between NASA and other government agencies.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 49: The Space Shuttle
Program should formalize its various lessons-learned databases and
make them widely available to the Shuttle customer and design
commun/ties. The EVA and Crew Equipment Project Office might
be the proper owner of the EVA and RMS lessons databases.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. S0:. NASA should complete
the development of a NASA-wide and inter'agency database of
lessons learned from aerospace programs. Input of data from
government programs should be program requirements. The
database should be well publicized and easily accessible to NASA
program and project managers.
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The sixth implementation recommendation from the group task force is that
NASA should upgrade its EVA capability, including the use of state-of-the-art EVA
tools and training methods. The improvements in EVA training employed during
STS_I, including RMS-II, Nitrox, some of the air-bearing equipment, and virtual
reality, were important to the success of the mission. Such improvements and
innovations should be continued and expanded upon.
Mission Directors Recommendation No. 51: Expand and use state-
of-the-art EVA tools and training methods (such as RMS II presently
installed at MSFCs NBS, Nitrox, virtual reality, improved air-
bearing techn/ques, et aL) to perform training and EVA tasks with
maximum efficiency. Investigate other potential sources of ideas for
improvements, including time-motion studies and the experiences
and techniques of the Russian space program. Especially consider
improvements in the area of thermal protection of the EVA
crewmembers, assessing the desirability of devices such as hand
warmers and an EVA infrared temperature sensor.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 52: Fund and develop a
fully integrated EVA tra/n/ng facility (such as the proposed JSC
Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory [NBL]), which would incorporate a
large capacity pool, state-of-the-art RMS simulator, Nitrox, flight-
like video and audio communication capabUities, and any other
features useful to provide the flight crew and flight controllers the
best possible end-to-end EVA training.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 53: For Space Station EVAs
and for other EVAs with worksites too large to fit into underwater
trainin 8 facilities, develop alternate training method(s) that will
accomplish reliable end-to-end timeline quantification and crew
training r Consider the use of virtual reality to provide three-
dimensional training for handling large masses and to develop
methods of translating objects that cannot be simulated in water-
training facilities.
On October 14-15, 1992, the eighth HST Payload Operations Working Group
(POWG) EVA Working Group (EVAWG) splinter meeting was held. Minutes of the
meeting were released December 6, 1992. Preliminary EVA scenarios were presented
at this meeting for consideration. The servidng tasks were listed in three priority
categories:
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Primary
COSTAR
WF/PC II
Secondary
Solar Ai'rays H
Tertiary
RSU 2
DF-224 Coprocessor
GHRS Repair Kit
RSU 3
The preliminary timeUnes projected that these tasks could be accomplished in
three six-hour EVAs.
There was also a discussion of the possible RMS lI and Nitrox upgrades to the
NBS at MSFC. The Nitrox system was scheduled for completion in February 1993,
and the EMU backpacks for the Nitrox system were scheduled for June 1993.
Additional funding was needed for the RMS II. The upgrading of the RMS facility at
the NBS had been recommended by the HST SM 92.1 Executive Summary_ Report
(April 17, 1992) and by General Stafford's HST SM Review Team's first report
(September 18, 1992), but it was stated by the EVAWG that the EVA community did
not consider the RMS lI to be required for STS-61. These upgrades are discussed
below in connection with the recommendations from the Stafford team's February 11-
12, 1993, meeting.
Also during the EVAWG, a presentation was made detailing the recently
updated crew-induced load criteria for EVA hardware. The new requirements were
greater than had been previously presented to GSFC personnel, which they had been
using to design their EVA hardware. These new criteria had not yet been incorpo-
rated as overall Shuttle Program requirements. The representative of JSC's Loads
and Dynamics Section agreed to work with GSFC personnel to determine if the
criteria should be applied to the specific hardwareand tasks to used for STS-61.
From October 5 through November 13, 1992, another series of NBS evaluations
was conducted. This series of twenty-three tests, including thirteen with the STS-61
EVA crewmembers as subjects, provided the crew with familiarization of all the then-
nominal ORU change-outs; evaluated change-out of WF/PC without the use of the
RMS and with and without the use of the WF/PC installation tool (WIT); and
evaluated new ORU hardware concepts and new space support equipment (SSE)
designs.
The first HST mission status telecon was conducted on November 25, 1992. It
was chaired by Mr. Hal Lambert, manager of the Space Shuttle Integration and
Operations Office. These meetings would later be held biweekly. On February 18,
1993, Mr. Lambert was designated as Mission Manager for STS-61 by the Space
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Shuttle Program Manager and was placed in charge of an HST SM-1 Management
Team, which included the Flight Integration Manager, the HST Program Manager,
the Payload Integration Manager, the Cargo Engineering Office Manager, the Lead
Flight Director, the Payload Commander, the chairperson of the HST Tools
Configuration Control Board (CCB), JSC's Materials Branch Chief, a representative of
the Orbiter Project Office, the Space Shuttle Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
(SR&QA) Office Manager, GSFC's Associate Director of Flight Projects for HST, the
HST Flight Systems and Servicing Project Manager, a representative of KSC's Shuttle
Payloads Operations Division, and the KSC Launch Site Support Manager. On
March 30, 1993, a representative of the STS-61 Mission Director was added to the
team membership. The team was "established to provide management overview and
resolution of issues associated with the mission. This team will be responsible for
coordinating the integration activities between GSFC, JSC, and KSC, maintaining
overall program schedules, insuring mission capabilities and mission priorities are
compatible and directing the activities in support of this mission as necessary to
ensure mission success." The team was "not intended to replace the existing
management structure, but to facilitate problem resolution and increase the mission
visibility throughout the existing system. The HST SM-1 Management Team will
work with the Mission Director to keep him informed of the status and progress of
HST repair preparation."
Topics of discussion in this first HST mission status telecon included the
tracking of the action items generated by the Stafford and Fitts HST review teams.
One of the action items assigned during this telecon directed the chairman of the HST
Tools CCB to ensure that proper certification had been or would be accomplished for
all EVA tools. The EVA tool certification for _1 was a difficult and controversial
problem and is discussed above in connection with the recommendations made in
the August 8, 1992, report of Dr. Greenfield's Program Review Team and below in
connection with Mission Director's Recommendation No. 75.
A team was chartered by the Space Shuttle Program Office to evaluate the
causes for the substantially greater time required to perform the STS-49 Assembly of
Station by EVA Methods (ASEM) EVA, than was predicted preflight. This ASEM
Process Improvement Team (PIT) released the report of its findings on December 3.
1992. The team recommended the establishment of formal working groups for EVA
hardware and define any improvements needed for HST. The HST Tool CCB served
as the formal working group for this mission. Significant improvements were made
to the EVA hardware for STS-61. The EVA and Crew Equipment Project Office has
since been established and should serve as the working group for all future EVA
missions.
The ASEM PIT's report mentioned that some on-orbit tasks could not be
performed because of suit stiffness, even though they were easily performed during
WETF training. Training suits have been empirically demonstrated to be more
flexible than flight suits. This concern led to the increase of EMU pressure during
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many of the HST training runs in an effort to increase stiffness. However, the HST
EVA crew reported after the mission that the stiffness of the flight space suits was
still greater than that of the training suits at the higher pressure.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 54: For EVA flight crews,
develop and provide training EMUs that have flight-like stiffness.
Underwater facilities are used for the greatest amount of EVA training.
Working in water has subtle and potentially misleading qualities when compared to
working in space. The Mission Operations Directorate has developed a set of such
items to be included in the crew training briefings to help prevent negative training.
The ASEM PIT recommended that this list be completed and reinforced to the crew
during their water training.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 55:. To minimize negative
EVA trainin& continue to quantify shortcomings of training
facilities and to make sure that the differences between the training
and flisht environments are well understood by the flight crew.
Work to eliminate these differences where possible. Also, where
possible, provide alternate part-task training to compensate for
facility shortcomings. Maximize the repeated exposure of actual
flight hardware to the crew throughout their training.
The ASEM PIT recommended that the Flight Crew Operations Directorate and
JSC Medical Operations assess the potential benefit of implementing a strength and
conditioning program for EVA crewmembers. The services of a professional training
coach and a training regimen were provided to the STS-61 EVA crew. While fatigue
has not yet been a significant problem in Shuttle EVAs, such a program would serve
to enhance a crewmember's capabilities and improve the probability of task
completion in the event of other difficulties during an EVA.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 56: Continue the
refinement of the strength and conditioning program in which STS-
61 EVA crewmembers participated. Implement this program as a
requirement for all assigned EVA crewmembers.
On December 3, 1992, Col. Richard Covey, Comdr. Kenneth Bowersox and Mr.
Claude NicoUier were announced to be the final three crewmembers for the STS-61
mission. Mr. Nicollier and Comdr. Bowersox were the primary and backup RMS
operators for the mission. Earlier assignment of these two crewmembers would have
allowed them to participate extensively in the March, August, and November 1992
NBS development and training runs. This earlier involvement would have more
greatly enhanced the critical coordination required between the RMS operator and
the EVA crewmembers. See Mission Director's Recommendation No. 15.
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The third FIST SM-1 Flight Techniques Panel meeting was held on December 11,
1992. Topics discussed during the meeting included the potential use of the WIT.
The panel decided to plan the task without the use of the WIT. The subject of
rendezvous with HST on flight day 2 was also discussed. The crew expressed a
desire to consider a day 2 rendezvous only in the event of a reduced-duration flight.
The second STS-61 Mission Status Telecon was also held on December 11, 1992.
During this meeting, the contamination specialist on the Mission Management Team
was assigned actions to evaluate the potential for contamination caused by the
chafing of painted EVA handrails by EVA tether hooks and whether it was required
to replace the entire Orbiter payload bay liner for STS-61.
John Young released memorandum AC5-92-53 on December 16, 1992. In this
memorandum, he recommended that, because of the physiological performance
degradation induced by sleep shifting, the launch and EVA activities should not
occur at night. Although daytime launch and mission operations are desirable goals,
it is usually impractical to impose such a requirement on rendezvous missions. It is
prudent to maximize the chances of success for night missions. Sleep-shifting
regimens currently used by NASA for the flight crews have been effective in
minimizing performance degradation. Sleep shifting for mission support personnel
is discussed in connection with Mission Director's Recommendation No. 90.
Mr. Young also suggested that NASA consider narrowing the launch window to
maximize ascent performance. For STS-61, it was determined that ascent margin was
adequate with the longer window, and that the longer window was desirable to
accommodate small problems in the launch countdown. For Space Station missions,
however, the launch window is expected to be approximately five minutes per day.
Small problems during Space Shuttle countdowns are not uncommon, and some
launches occurred only because of relatively large windows. The Shuttle launch
teams have little experience with requirements to launch on time. On the basis of
STS-61 post-flight discussions, the Space Shuttle Program performed a launch
probability study focused on the likelihood of successfully launching the Shuttle
during this five minute window.
Mission Directmas Recommendation No. 57: The Space Shuttle
Program should review the current launch criteria and procedures
and incorporate changes that would safely enhance the likelihood of
supporting the expected requirement for a five-minute launch
window for Space Station missions.
The STS-61 Cargo Integration Review (CIR) was held January 6-8,1993. Its
purpose was to ensure compatibility of flight operations planning and engineering
hardware and software design with payload requirements. During the review, the
planned launch date was determined to be December 2, 1993. GSFC personnel
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agreed during the meeting to develop EVA scenarios to be followed in the case that
only one or two EVAs were available during the mission.
A number of issues and problems were discussed during the CIR. GSFC
provided length data for their starboard flight support system (FSS) cable that
differed significantly from their wiring mockup that had been used for the design of
Orbiter wiring for the mission. Consequently, Orbiter cable routing had to be
redesigned and the associated controlling documentation required major changes.
Another issue raised during the CIR was the launch location of the portable foot
restraint (PFR) to be used for operations with the HST Tool Box. The PFR socket on
the tool box had not been certified to withstand launch and landing loads with the
PFR installed. Significant EVA time savings could be realized, however, if the PFR
could remain attached to the tool box instead of being transferred to another location
at the beginning and end of each EVA. During the January 29,1993, HST status
telecon, $200,000 was approved for the redesign of the PFR and the tool box to
withstand launch and landing loads.
Also at the CIK there were open concerns of possible contamination from the
crew compartment, EMUs, tool stowage foam, aft shroud beta cloth, tools, the ICBC,
and paint chips caused by the chafing from EMU safety tethers. All of these concerns
would eventually be satisfied by test or analysis. Another open contamination item
was the fact that KS(= had not yet agreed to implement GSFC's contamination control
plan for operations at KSC. KS(= later did approve and implement the plan.
There was discussion during the CIR related to the Orbiter's center of gravity
(CG). At the time of the CIR, STS-61 appeared to meet the return-to-launch-site
(RTLS) CG location requirements after incorporation of several relief options,
including installation of extra weight in Orbiter bay 13 (aft ballast). Concerns existed,
however, that any cargo modifications or additions could adversely affect the CG
location.
At the time of the CIR, the RMS clearance assessment for some of the EVA tasks
and RMS maneuvering time estimates for incorporation into EVA timelines had not
been completed. The potential for these maneuvering times to cause the EVA
tlmelines to increase, as well as not-yet-defined photographic requirements and the
possibility that new tasks would be added to the EVAs, caused EVA personnel
concern that not all the required tasks could be accomplished in the three EVAs that
were scheduled. A CIR discrepancy notice (DN) submitted by the Mission Director's
Office recommending that a fourth EVA be added was disapproved because the issue
was currently being worked by upper level NASA management. The number of
scheduled EVAs is further discussed below in connection with the February 2, 1993,
update of the Flight Requirements Document and in connection with the briefing to
General Pearson on March 9, 1993.
44
[ Pre-Minion Events i
On January 17,1993, the first of the "EVAs of opportunity" was conducted
during STS-54. Although the "EVAs of opportunity" concept was intended to
perform EVAs to evaluate techniques and increase capabilities for future missions
such as HST servicing and Space Station construction, the STS-54 EVA included little
activity of direct benefit to the HST EVAs. The decision to perform the EVA on STS-
54 had been made approximately three months before the flight. Restrictions were
imposed on the development of this EVA requiring that it be accomplished with no
additional training, no additional hardware, and no significant impact to the flight
plan or to payload operations. As mentioned above, recommendations had been
made by the Fitts team (July 17,1992) to perform in-flight dry runs of difficult HST
tasks and by the Intelsat group (August 14, 1992) to take advantage of opportunities
to demonstrate EVA technologies and capabilities to the maximum practical extent.
If these recommendations had been implemented sooner, the S'IS-54 EVA could have
been designed to be of greater benefit to HST SM-1. See Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 10.
A tool familiarization meeting was conducted in Houston on January 20, 1993.
It was announced in this meeting that tools controlled by JSC would be considered
government furnished equipment and that GSFC tools would be considered payload
hardware. This different treatment of hardware led to confusion over certification
requirements and methods and over requirements for data reporting. See the
discussion related to the recommendations contained in Dr. Greenfield's Problem
Review Team's August 8, 1992, report and the discussion related to Mission
Director's Recommendation No. 75.
On January 26,1993, Dr. Greenfield's PRT released their second report, which
resulted from the team's meetings in conjunction with the CIR earlier in the month.
One of the recommendations in this report was that a joint GSFC/JSC/KSC team
develop a configuration-controlled master list of the HST and Orbiter tools required
to support the mission. The STS-61 HST Tools and Crew Aids Master List was
baselined by JSC's Payload GFE CCB on January 28,1993. Although the list was
controlled at JSC, the responsibility of certifying the tools remained at the NASA
centers that produced the individual tools. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 75.
The PRT recommended that NASA investigate options to combine the unsched-
uled EVA for payload deployment with the Orbiter safety contingency EVA. While
the Orbiter contingencies for which EVA astronauts are trained are not expected to
take a fun six hours to perform, it is important to not assume that such an EVA could
be combined with a payload EVA. Because the safety of the crew and the orbiter is
the top priority in mission planning and execution, consumables budgeted for
Orbiter contingency EVAs should not be used for any other activities.
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Mission Director's Recommendation No. 58: Shuttle consumables
reserved for Orbiter contingency EVAs should not be reallocated for
any other purposes.
The PRT recommended that NASA perform an independent peer review by
experienced EVA astronauts to assess the planned operations and training approach.
At the direction of the STS-61 Mission Director, an EVA Peer Review Team (EPRT)
was formed in July 1993. It was led by Col. Jerry Ross and was composed of NASA
EVA and HST experts and current and former EVA-experienced astronauts. The
EPRT assessed the training plan, including options in case of a launch slip. They
reviewed nominal and contingency EVA timelines and procedures, and the EVA
tools and hardware verification plan. They conducted extensive interviews with the
training team, the integrated operations team, and the mission management. EVA-
experienced astronauts on the team both directly observed crew training and
personally performed key nominal and contingency procedures. STS-61 EVA
timeUne enhancements resulted from the implementation of the EPR'Fs recommen-
dations to move the stowage location of the primary EVA tools from the payload bay
to the middeck, their suggested improvements to the RSU change-out procedure, and
their recommendation to perform parallel EVA operations. The EPRT also assessed
the possible use of a three-crewmember EVA and the performance of back-to-back
EVA.s, switching crew during the same day, and determined that neither of these
options would benefit the HST SM-1.
The PRT recommended that the quantity and nature of ground commands
during the EVA be reviewed and verified to cause the minimum possible time
impact. They also recommended that the increased use of onboard, aft deck payload
commanding be considered. The commanding that was executed during STS-61 was
well coordinated and performed in a timely manner. This good performance was
partly a result of practice that occurred during JISs for the mission.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 59:. For HST servicing
missions and for Space Station missions, continue to achieve the
proper balance of payload commanding performed from the ground
and performed by the flight crew. To the extent practical, maximize
the amount of commanding which can be performed by the flight
crew, to avoid delays caused by wa/ting for a good air-to-ground
communications link. Thoroughly rehearse and evaluate the
commanding protocols during joint integrated simulations.
Dr. Greenfield's team recommended that the aft flight deck commanding of HST
be verified preflight in an end-to-end test between the Orbiter and GSFC. Communi-
cations and commanding testing done in preparation for STS-61 revealed problems in
software and a potential data link problem (inverted data) which might require panel
rewiring by the crew during flight. A special cable was flown on STS-61 to be used
for this purpose if needed. This rewiring was not required during HST SM-1,
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because the in-flight acquisition of signal resulted in data of the proper polarity (not
inverted).
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 60:. Continue to maximize
the mount of end-to-end communications and commanding testing
performed before critical missions.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 61: For the next HST
servicin 8 mission, fully understand the potential for acquiring
inverted data from the HST. If the capability for in-flight rewiring is
determined to be necessary, make the necessary preflight modifica-
tions to Orbiter equipment to allow the crew to perform this action
with minimal effort (e.g., operating a simple switch).
The Flight Requirements Document was revised February 2, 1993, to include a
mission duration of nine days plus two payload contingency days and two landing
contingency days. The revision also changed the number of EVAs to three scheduled
EVAs plus one payload contingency EVA and one Orbiter contingency EVA (3+1+1),
even though MOD planning at this t_-ne assumed a 4+2+1 EVA capability. The
Shuttle Program preferred to delay the commitment to additional EVAs in order to
discourage the addition of tasks of lesser importance. The number of scheduled
EVAs is fixrther discussed in connection with the presentation to General Pearson on
March 9, 1993.
At the request of the NASA Administrator, Dr. Joseph Shea formed a team to
review HST SM-1. His Task Force on the HST Servicing Mission held its first
meeting, at GSFC, February 4-5, 1993. The task force's findings from this and its
subsequent meetings were published in May 1993, and are discussed later in this
section.
The second meeting of General Stafford's FIST SM Review Team occurred at JSC
on February 11-12, 1993. The team released the report of their findings March 15,
1993. The team recommended that NASA strive to conduct JISs with EVA
crewmembers located in the NBS at MSFC. One such JIS was conducted on October
8, 1993.
The Stafford review team repeated their September 1992 recommendation to
upgrade the RMS simulator at MSFC's NBS, and recommended the incorporation of a
Nitrox breathing system. The team believed that insufficient Shuttle Program
management attention had been given to these upgrades prior to the February
meeting. Neither of these systems was upgraded in time for the June 1993 NBS
testing. Several factors contributed to the delay in incorporation of the two systems.
Although an informal group began working on the Nitrox system in January 1992, its
work was not given high priority by the Centers or by the Space Shuttle Program
until late in the STS-61 flow. A formal Nitrox working group had been in the process
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of formation at the time of the February Stafford team meeting. Needed funding
authorization was not provided by JSC to MSFC until early 1993. The RMS upgrade
did not receive program recognition as a high priority until February 1993. As a
result of these delays, neither upgrade was in place in time for the largest series of
HST training runs, which occurred in June 1993. MSFC personnel were later able to
overcome significant technical obstacles, and to perform upgrades of both systems
before the October 1993 tests. Both systems were of great significance in allowing the
crew to validate timelines and to receive valuable end-to-end timeline training.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 62: Identify requirements
for joint center operations as early as possible in the mission flow to
allow time to resolve technical, budgetary, and administrative issues
without causing impacts to mission schedules.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 63: The Space Station
Program should thoroughly assess requirements for integrated
RMS/EVA training in comparison to available facilities. If it is
determined that facilities at other centers are required (e.g., MSFC's
Neutral Buoyancy Simulator), necessary intercenter agreements
should be established as soon as possible to ensure availability and
proper configuration of facilities.
The Stafford team recommended the assignment and training of a backup crew.
This recommendation had been made by the STS-61 Mission Director to the team
during the February meeting. Mr. Greg Harbaugh, the EVA Capsule Communicator
(Capcom) for STS-61, was also named as backup crewmember on March 9, 1993. The
extra EVA training he received as backup crewmember provided the capability to
minimize the schedule impact in case one of the EVA crewmembers became unable
to support the mission. It also provided Mr. Harbaugh greater familiarity with the
EVA tasks than he would have received otherwise, and therefore enhanced his
capabilities as Capcom. He was also better able to contribute to the efforts of the
EPRT, of which he was a member.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 64: For HST servicing
missions and for critical Space Station assembly missions, NASA
should consider designating a crewmember to serve as both EVA
Capcom and backup EVA crewmember.
The Stafford team also recommended maximization of the scope of human
thermal vacuum tesl_g (See Mission Director's Recommendations No. 8 and No. 9.)
and the development of a mission management plan (See Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 36.)
A biweekly STS-61 mission status telecon was also held on February 12, 1993.
During the meeting, schedules were presented showing that the RMS H installation
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would not occur in time for the June 1993 NBS training runs. It was also announced
at the meeting that the EVA DTO had been approved for S'I_57, and that each task
in the EVA would have HST or Space Station relevance.
An EVAWG meeting was held February 23, 1993. This meeting included
discussions of concerns about the WF/PC cavity cover, which was later deleted; foot
restraint load requirements that had recently been increased, and the recently
baselined task to replace four power distribution unit (PDLD fuses which had been
incorrectly sized in their original design.
During the POWG meeting that was held February 24-26, 1993, a discussion
took place involving expected thermal environments during $1S-61. HST Project
Management had designed thermal coatings for EVA tools and crew aids based on
the assumption that the Orbiter would perform three attitude maneuvers each orbit.
However, at the time of the POWG meeting, the Shuttle Program was planning to fly
an inertial attitude (with no maneuvers) which would result in a colder thermal
environment than was used for the GSFC tool coating design. Since both of the
above attitude scenarios complied with GSFC's published ORU environment
constraints, GSFC personnel were cautioned to make design decisions based on the
thermally worst-case attitude allowed by the ORU constraints. In this case, improved
communication between the two NASA centers could have prevented wasted effort,
and possibly inadequate hardware design.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 65: Maximize communica-
tion among all organizations supporting critical missions, both
before and during the missions, to minimize wasted effort and
inaccurate data. This communication can be facilitated by periodic
technical interchange meetings and by regular management
meetings similar to the biweekly STS-61 mission status telecons
conducted by the Mission Manager. Also maximize use of electronic
systems for the transfer of verbal and graphical communications,
including photographs and engineering drawings, among the entire
mission team.
On February 25, 1993, the Shea task force held a meeting the Lockheed Missiles
and Space Company (LMSC) headquarters. The task force's findings from this and
its other meetings were published in May 1993, and are d_d later in this section.
A JSC/MSFC Nitrox Combined Working Group meeting was held at MSFC
February 25, 1993. Discussion items at this meeting included the maintenance of air
capability as a backup to Nitrox for the June runs, and that because of different dive
table requirements recognized at the different NASA centers, JSC support divers and
suit subjects would have different time limits imposed upon their dives than would
personnel from other centers.
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Mission Directors Recommendation No. 66: Establish a single
NASA-wide set of underwater diving requirements (dive tables).
In early March 1993, STS-61 crewmembers traveled to the facilities of the
vendors who were supplying the lIST replacement hardware for training sessions
using the actual flight ORUs. This training proved to be extremely valuable, as it
enabled the crew to become familiar with mechanisms that may have functioned
differently from the training hardware. Differences were made known to the crew to
minimize negative training that may have otherwise occurred. While it is always
desirable to train with exact duplicates of flight hardware items, it is often impractical
to produce training hardware to the exact flight specifications. In these cases, it is
important that the crew be given the chance to see, handle and operate the actual
flight hardware even if only in a restrictive controlled setting (clean room).
Mission Directors Recommendation No. 67: For critical EVA
missions, continue to maximize the amount of preflight experience
the EVA crew receives with the actual flight hardware.
On March 4, 1993, the Mission Coordination Team was established. It was
established to coordinate Level I activities and to oversee Level II and HI
management activities during mission preparation. The team was chaired by the
STS-61 Mission Director, and included management representatives of the Space
Shuttle Program and the HST Program Offices.
On March 8-9, 1993, at NASA Headquarters, the Shea task force held the last of
its four meetings. The report of their findings and recommendations was released in
May 1993, and is d_ later in this section.
On March 9, 1993, mission management personnel made informal status
presentations to NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight, General Jed
Pearson. During this meeting General Pearson indicated that he did not want the
mission to be in progress over the Christmas holidays, because it would then
interfere with scheduled maintenance activities at KSC, causing schedule and cost
impacts to KSC operations. If the launch were to be delayed by more than two
weeks, then it would be rescheduled for January 1994. He also indicated that he
would not require the launch or landing to occur in daylight. It was reported to
General Pearson that Dr. Shea's task force was concerned that the mission was too
constrained by the Shuttle Program's reluctance to increase the number of scheduled
EVAs beyond three, and that EVA and contingency planning and training were being
negatively affected. The task force was expected to recommend the scheduling of
five EVAs to ensure maximum timeline margin. Two weeks after this meeting, the
mission plans were officially changed to include five scheduled EVAs.
During the biweekly HST mission status telecon on March 12, 1993, GSFC
personnel were authorized to proceed with the Nitrox facility construction in the
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NBS. This upgrade is discussed above in connection with the recommendations from
General Stafford's task force's February 11-12, 1993, meeting.
On March 17, 1993, the STS-61 FPSR was conducted. During this review,
approval was given to several change requests (CRs) which added items and
evaluations to the mission, including the Orbiter drag chute DTO, two payload bay
color television cameras, a number of medical DSOs, and an EVA dosimetry
evaluation DSO. Approval was also given to the submittal to the Program
Requirements Control Board of a CR adding a secondary payload, the Air Force
Maui optical site calibration test (AMOS), to the mission. The subject of DTOs and
DSOs is discussed below in connection with Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 88.
It was announced during the FPSR that stowage volume in the crew
compartment was full, and that any additions of stowed items would require
deletions of other items from the manifest. However, after the later approval of some
innovative stowage methods, room was found for the addition of items in the crew
compartment, including some of the EVA tools and the PILOT DTO hardware.
A discussion during the FPSR addressed the possibility of changing the nominal
mission length from nine to eleven days. No one in the meeting was aware of any
significant problems that would be caused by this increase. The idea of manifesting
six EVAs was also discussed. It was thought that the training and simulation
schedules would not be able to accommodate more than five EVAs without requiring
a launch delay.
On March 22, 1993, the second revision was made to the STS-61 Flight
Requirements Document. It was updated to reflect a mission duration of eleven days
plus two landing-contingency days (11+2). The number of EVAs was also updated to
five scheduled EVAs plus two payload-contingency EVAs and one Orbiter-
contingency EVA.
At the biweekly HST mission status telecon held March 26, 1993, it was reported
that the HST had entered a "safe" mode, believed to be caused by a malfunctioning
SA drive electronics (SADE) unit. At this time, it was not yet considered very likely
that a SADE replacement would be added to the mission. The addition of the fuse
plug task was discussed. Both of these tasks would later be added to the mission.
On March 30, 1993, a technical interchange meeting was held in which it was
established that hitch pins would need to be reinstalled by the EVA crewmembers
only into PIP pins that were oriented in the Z axis and into ones that were known or
suspected to be damaged. The installation of hitch pins is difficult and time-
consuming while wearing EMU gloves. This decision significantly reduced the
number of required installations.
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On April 6, 1993, Dr. Greenfield's PRT released the report resulting from its
third meeling, which had been held in conjunction with GSFC's Test Readiness
Review (TRR) on March 23-25, 1993. One of the recommendations from this report
was that NASA should immediately begin planning a contingency HST servicing
mission to occur as soon as possible after STS-61 to accomplish the tasks that were
not performed during _1. In response to this idea, the Space Shuttle Program led
a study into the possibility of such a mission. It was determined that the timing of
the contingency mission was extremely dependent upon which tasks would have to
be rescheduled. It was decided that if one of the primary HST servicing tasks were
not accomplished during STS-61, then the FiST Program Office would request a
second mission as soon as possible. Until the required tasks were known, it would
not be practical to actually manifest such a mission. However, normal mission
planning should include assumptions that not all scheduled tasks will be
accomplished.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 68: For the second and
subsequent HST servicing missions, mission planners should again
develop a list of primary tasks, which would trigger a contingency
mission if not completed.
The PRT also recommended that a senior NASA official from the science
organization, which was the customer for this mission, be designated as the Official-
In-Charge (OIC) of the execution of the HST SM-1. It was decided that the mission
management structure that had been established by the Space Shuttle Program
Project Plan for S_1 was adequate for mission support. An OIC was therefore not
designated.
The PRT recommended that all individuals involved in the mission, both
technical and management personnel, should participate in the JISs to the extent
possible. See Mission Director's Recommendation No. 21.
The PRT observed that it is important that real-time responsibilities and clear
lead and support roles for EVA procedures replanning and timeline estimation be
recognized and enforced. The EVA replanning efforts of the mission support team
were not well coordinated during the initial JISs, but were significantly improved by
the time of the mission as a result of the JISs.
The team suggested that, given the apparent discrepandes between the
priorities of the tasks in the nominal mission EVA timelines and the priorities of the
reduced duration mission, NASA should verify that the nominal timeline was
designed as if every EVA day were the last EVA day of the mission.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 69:. To the extent possible,
critical EVA mission timelines should be arranged so that at the
completion of each EVA day, the payload (or Space Station) is in the
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best possible configuration to be left in, in case the Orbiter must
deorbit before the next EVA.
The team also wanted NASA to verify that there were redundant methods of
accomplishing critical tasks in case the primary tool or device were lost or broken.
See Mission Director's Recommendations No. 12, No. 19, and No. 43.
The PRT also recommended timely failure analysis of the ORUs returned from
orbit to determine whether the improvements to the new designs had fixed the right
problems.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 70: Perform sufficient
failure analysis of returned HST components to ensure that failure
muses are understood. Also look for signs of degradation other than
those which caused the failures.
During the biweekly HST mission status telecon on April 9, 1993, it was
announced that STS-61 would not include the replacement of the fine guidance
sensor (FGS) which had degraded in February 1993. Procedural compensation had
been developed for the degradation. It was also announced that _1 would not
incorporate the capability to send video images from the ground to the Orbiter.
The HST science writers' workshop was conducted at GSFC on April 20-21,
1993.
During the May 7, 1993, FIST mission status telecon, it was announced that
during testing of the deployable optical bench of COSTAR, some physical
interference was encountered and some debris was generated.
An Orbit Flight Techniques Panel meeting was held May 14, 1993. The topics of
discussion included procedures needed to prevent HST contamination caused by
Orbiter water dumps.
A POWG meeting was held May 24-26, 1993. This meeting served as a dry run
for the FOR to enhance the maturity of the mission documents to be submitted for the
real FOIL During the meeting, GSFC and JSC personnel agreed to develop EVA
scenarios for use if only one, two, three, or four EVAs would be available due to
orbiter or mission constraints. JSC personnel agreed to draft a real-time operations
contingency management plan to document guidelines for "tiger team" activity for
significant off-nominal situations outside documented contingency plans. GSFC
personnel agreed to consider the scheduling of SA blanket retraction during the night
before the SA change-out EVA, instead of the morning of the EVA, to allow more
reaction time in case problems were encountered. At the conclusion of the meeting,
the chairman of the POWG related his reasons for his confidence that the STS-61
would be successful. His reasons included that the GSFC team was largely the same
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one that had supported the HST deployment during STS-31, that the GSPC internal
simulations had been occurring and exercising their interfaces with JSC, and that a
large number of JISs were to be conducted. The Space Shuttle Program Deputy for
Program integration expressed his desire that all relevant HST techn/cal data be
available at JSC during the mission.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 71: The Mission
Operations Directorate should develop a computerized system to
support decision making during real-time EVA mission replanning.
The system should provide the flisht team with access to
information related to the EVA timeline and procedures; tool
histories, performance capabilities, and locations; and payload
configuration. It should also provide access to photographs and
engineering drawings. See Mission Director's Recommendations
No. 25 and No. 41.
Dr. Joseph Shea's Revort of the Task Force on the Hubble Svace Telescope
Servicing Mission was released in May 1993. The team recommended that top
management continue paying close attention to the HST SM-1 mission management
organization. The use of formal reviews was also endorsed. See Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 37.
The Shea team recommended that training include end-to-end JISs of the EVAs.
JISs typically incorporate significant malfunctions to test and enhance the flight
control team's ability to make changes to the originally planned timelines. The
recommendation that the EVAs be practiced fully during JISs is, therefore, not totally
practical. However, it is valuable to provide to the flight control team and the flight
crew with as much experience with the nominal timeline as possible.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 72: To the extent practical,
expose the participants of joint integrated simulations to all the
nominal mission activities.
Dr. Shea's team recommended that the HST Project conduct a quantitative
assessment to determine the risk of verifying the status of all subsystems (both A and
B sides) before SM-1. The HST Project did reassess their rationale and again decided
that not all redundant systems should be verified. This decision was approved by
NASA administration and mission management. Part of the rationale for not
performing testing of redundant paths was the fear of entering into an irrecoverable
configuration in the event that the redundant path were not functional. Given the
improved health of the HST resulting from the HST SM-1, it may now be less risky to
verify the redundant systems.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 73: Reassess the rationale
for not verifying the redundancy of all HST systems, now that the
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telescope has been serviced. Consider verifying the function of
redundant elements whose health is not now known, where such
verification would not risk the health of the HST. This verification
should be performed early enoush to allow replannin 8 of the second
servicin 8 mission, should components be in need of replacement.
The Shea team also recommended that an integrated assessment of
contamination control procedures and plans for the HS_ servicing missions be
conducted. Such a preflight assessment was performed under the direction of Dr.
Michael Greenfield. His PRT reviewed the Contamination Control Master Plan
(CCMP) developed by the HST Project, which addressed contamination budgets for
each HST SM-1 instrument, handling at KSC, and on-orbit possibilities for
contamination. The PRT compared the current requirements documentation to that
used for the initial build of FIST. The HST SM-1 version of the CCMP was compared
to that used for the FIST deployment mission. The PRT found only minor
differences, which they considered to be inconsequential. The PRT reviewed the
resolution of the problems encountered in the testing of the COSTAR. They assessed
the design changes implemented into WF/PC H to prevent the self-contamination
experienced by WF/PC I. The PRT reviewed testing and hardware changes
implemented to minimize on-orbit contamination. They reviewed flight procedures
for possible threats. In all the above assessments, the PRT found the contamination
requirements and compliance to them to be adequate. The PRT also assessed KSC
ground processing guidelines and procedures. The PRT considered them adequate,
partially based on the pending successful completion of a special contamination
review by KSC following the refurbishment of Launch Pad A and before payload
arrival at the Payload Change-out Room (PCR). The PRT released their satisfactory
report on October 25, 1993. On October 30, 1993, sand and debris were blown into
the PCR at Pad A. The PRT then assessed the investigation and corrective actions
undertaken in response to the PCR contamination and found them to be satisfactory.
The PCR contamination is discussed below in the listing for October 30, 1993.
Dr. Shea's team also made recommendations related to accelerating the
development of EVA timelines and contingency timelines (See Mission Director's
Recommendations Nos. 15 and 86), to upgrading the NBS at MSFC (See the
discussion of the Stafford team meeting, February 11-12, 1993), to designating and
training a backup EVA crewmember (See Mission Director's Recommendation No.
64), to practicing HST tasks on earlier missions (See Mission Director's Recommenda-
tion No. 10), and to planning for a contingency mission (See Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 68).
The first two STS-61 human thermal vacuum test (HTVT) runs were conducted
May 25 and 28, 1993. The more significant hardware problems that were encoun-
tered during these tests are discussed below in connection with the July 13,1993,
report from the Brasher team. During the May 28 test, because of multiple previous
hardware malfunctions, the crewmember, Dr. Story Musgrave, spent a large amount
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of time handling the extremely cold tools to test every possible tool interface.
From this activity, Dr. Musgrave contracted frostbite injuries on eight of his
fingers. These injuries prevented Dr. Musgrave from fully participating in
training events for the next few weeks. This injury incident was the subject of a
mishap investigation. The final report of the mishap investigation board was
released as JSC memorandum NS2-93-147, dated July 8,1993.
The Payload Safety Review Panel Phase III Review took place June 1-4,
1993. Two payload hazard reports remained open at the conclusion of the
review, one involving inadvertent mechanism operations and one covering
mating and demating of powered electrical connectors.
During the June 4,1993, HST mission status telecon, it was announced that
the degraded FGS 2 had been successfully used during the previous week. Also
announced was the formation of a team led by Mr. Warren Brasher to investigate
the hardware problems discovered during the May HTVT runs. The plan for the
June NBS runs now called for the backup crewmember, Mr. Greg Harbaugh, to
replace Dr. Musgrave for the first runs to allow Dr. Musgrave more time to
recover from the frostbite he suffered during his HTVT run.
On June 9,1993, HST SM-1 status presentations were made to Mr. Brewster
Shaw, who had recently been transferred to JSC, serving as the Director of Space
Shuttle Operations, in the Space Shuttle Program Office (SSPO). Issues
mentioned in the presentations included the tool problems discovered in the
recent HTVT and the ongoing Brasher team investigation; the ambitious
schedules for hardware delivery to support crew equipment interface tests at
GSFC and KSC and for the completion of tool fit checks; the potential addition of
the SADE change-out to the mission; and that it was believed by JSC's MOD that
GSFC mission support response to real-time contingencies was slow, due to
immature contingency documentation, nonexistent preauthorized contingency
actions, and somewhat diffused management authority.
During the HST Tool CCB meeting on June 11,1993, the plan for closure of
tool certification discrepancy reports (DRs) and the hardware interface fit-check
matrix was presented. This plan was formulated based on comments and
recommendations from the Brasher investigation team, whose final report had
not yet been formally released.
An unprecedented series of thirty-two three-hour training runs, with the four
STS-61 crewmembers and the backup EVA crewmember as subjects, was held June
14-July 2,1993, in MSFC's NBS. These runs performed timeline verification for all the
EVA tasks as well as for some contingency scenarios. They also further cross-trained
the astronaut pairs to perform tasks scheduled to be done by the other EVA pair.
One of the results of these runs was the indication that there would likely be enough
timeline margin to include the replacement of the SADE. During this series, a
communications protocol verification was conducted to help ensure the capability to
support a full JIS using the NBS in October 1993.
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In spite of these accomplishments, however, some of the originally planned
major objectives of these tests could not be met. Because the Nitrox breathing system
was not yet installed, full six-hour tests, which could be used to better verify
timelines for entire EVA days, were not accomplished. Because the new upgraded
RMS simulator was not yet installed, valuable coordination training and RMS
timeline verification could not be accomplished. The communications protocol
mentioned above had originally been planned as a "mini-JIS," but with the runs
lasting only three hours, it was not practical to do more than just verify
communications.
The KSC Ground Operations Review (GOR) was conducted on June 18,1993.
Issues presented during the review included concerns over the ability of KSC
facilities and equipment to support the stringent gaseous nitrogen purge cleanliness
requirements. Difficulty in meeting these cleanliness requirements later led to a
relaxation of the requirements with the agreement of the HST Project. See Mission
Director's Recommendation No. 78 and its associated discussion.
Another GOR item of concern was the potential for conflicting needs for KSC's
Payload Hazardous Support Facility (PHSF) control rooms in case of a launch delay
of the STS-51 mission by more than one week past its then-scheduled date of July 17,
1993. A favored solution to the conflict, if it were to arise, was the reservation of a
trailer to house some of the STS-61 ground support equipment. It was later decided
to use such a trailer, thereby eliminating concern over any delay of STS-51. The
launch of STS-51 occurred in August 1993.
On July 8,1993, the STS-57 flight crew EVA debriefing was held. The most
significant result of the STS-57 EVA was that the Orbiter-bottom-to-sun attitude that
had been planned for several of the STS-61 HST servicing tasks was unacceptably
cold to the STS-57 EVA crewmembers. During the debriefing, the STS-61 Lead Flight
Director indicated that the STS-61 EVA thermal environment issue was now the top
priority issue to be resolved before the flight. JSC's Crew and Thermal Systems
Division (CTSD) personnel stated that they were proceeding with the development of
EVA gloves that had better thermal protection characteristics than the present glove
had.
In a subsequent _S-61 EVA thermal environment meeting on July 8,1993, the
intention to pursue the development of EVA hand-warmers was announced. It was
also announced that CTSD personnel would perform higher fidelity thermal analyses
of the known EVA thermal environment of STS-57 and the predicted environment of
STS-61.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 74: Prior to critical
missions, especially the HST servicing missions and Space Station
Assembly missions, perform detailed thermal analysis and modeling
to verify that crewmembers and hardware are not subjected to
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temperatures beyond their functional limits. Beta angle of the
mission's orbital plane(s) should be included in the analysis. This
analysis for the Space Station's womt-case altitude, inclination,
attitude, configuration, and beta angle should be performed as soon
as possible. See also Mission Director's Recommendation No. 10.
On July 13, 1993, the results of the investigation of Mr. Warren Brasher's Tool
Review Team were presented to the Space Shuttle Program management. One of the
recommendations of the Brasher team was that NASA consider the development of
EVA gloves that would have improved thermal protection of the EVA crewmember's
hands. C'ISD personnel were later able to complete the development of an improved
thermal and micrometeoroid garment (cover layer) for the EMU gloves, which had
not only greater thermal insulation, but also greater flexibility than the older design.
This development was a significant contribution to the success of the SIYo-_I mission.
The Brasher team also recommended that NASA evaluate the development of a
portable EVA hand-warmer. On the basis of results from detailed thermal modeling
and analysis, and from further human thermal vacuum testing, it was decided that a
hand warmer was not needed for $I$-61. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 51.
Another recommendation of the Brasher team was that NASA perform an
analysis of the ability to interface thermally worst-case tools and fasteners (one side
hot, other side cold). Thermal analysis personnel at both JSC and GSFC produced the
thermal analyses that indicated that tools and crew aids planned for use on STS-61
would be adequate, given the successful performance of the planned fit checks of the
interfaces. As an added measure, it was decided that sets of flight contingency socket
extensions, both 5/16" and 7/16," would be precisely machined to the maximum
allowable tolerances, to ensure that all fasteners could be accommodated by sockets
on board the Orbiter. This effort helped ensure the success of the STS-61 EVAs.
The Brasher team recommended that the chairman of the HST Tool CCB, Mr.
Steve Poulos, work with GSFC to develop the mechanism by which the CCB would
approve changes that affected form, fit or function changes to GSFC's tools and crew
aids. Within the limits of the responsibility given to him, Mr. Poulos provided very
effective leadership in the coordination of the JSC and GSFC design efforts.
Another Brasher team recommendation was that Mr. Poulos define an increased
scope of responsibilities for his HST Tool CCB. These responsibilities were to include
assessment and approval of all configuration changes that affected fit, form, or
function of all FIST crew aids and tools and assessment of GSFC and JSC certification
and verification matrices for technical adequacy. While the recommended increased
scope was an improvement to the coordination of the tool and crew aid development
effort, it was not extensive enough. Since the basic responsibility of hardware
certification continued to reside with the NASA center at which the hardware was
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developed, there continued to exist differences in design and certification philosophy
between JSC and GSFC. This situation resulted in discrepancies in the data provided
to mission control personnel, which were resolved only very late before launch and
with significant effort and management attention.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 75: EVA hardware,
including all tools, supplied by multiple NASA organizations
should be manufactured to standardized NASA-wide certification
requirements, and be controlled by a single configuration control
board. Performance verification (including fit checks and
verification of thermal tolerance) requirements should likewise be
standardized.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 76: Technical information,
including certification data, related to flight tools and other EVA
hardware, should be maintained in a rapidly accessible format to
support replanning and failure assessments during missions.
The Brasher team learned that some of the standard EVA tools planned for STS-61
had not been redesigned to meet requirements imposed following the Challenger
accident. The team recommended that the certification of the entire Space Shuttle tool
inventory be reverified, to ensure that no other tools had been omitted from the post-
STS-51L rebaselining effort. The certification of the entire complement of EVA tools
and crew aids contained in the _1 master manifest list was subsequently reviewed
and verified to be satisfactory.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 77: Verify that the
hardware and software to be used for critical mission operations are
not to be used outside the operational ranges for which they were
certified. Also verify that the certification requirements used for this
hardware and software are consistent with current program
certification guidelines.
The Brasher team tasked HST Tool CCB personnel with providing a list of
hardware failures that occurred during HTVTs. The list follows.
problem - Insertion forces of the push in, pull out (PIP) pin into the McTether
attachment was excessively high or would not go into tool at all.
Corrective action - Apply dry film lubricant to spool to decrease coefficient of
friction with housing. Install lighter spring in mechanism. Ensure a minimum
radius on pip pin edges, including plunger. Verify ball and socket dimensions
to ensure ball does not interfere with spool movement. Reduce acceptable
level for pip pin insertion force from ten pounds to no greater than six pounds.
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Problem - Force to install and remove tools from tool post was excessively
high.
Corrective action - Replace existing ball detent with one requiring lighter
spring force. Change acceptance levels for insertion and removal forces from
ten pounds to no greater than two pounds.
Problem -Toolbox door panel contingency door removal could not be
performed.
Corrective action - Remove material from door side hinge bracket and door
panel to eliminate interference. Stress analysis was performed to verify that
hinge is still within acceptable margin of safety.
problem - Tool board No. 5 was difficult to remove from toolbox.
Corrective action - Delrin inserts were added along the bottom of the
mounting slots to reduce the friction coefficient between tool board and its
mount. All tool board mounts were modified.
Problem - Stud caddie bayonet fitting would not interface with mini-
workstation (MWS).
Corrective action - Rework edge radius of bayonet fittings and brackets on
MWS to improve fit. Correct differences in allowable tolerances on drawings.
Problem - EVA portable light handle would not clamp securely to handrail.
Corrective action - Change shaft material to reduce susceptibility to galling.
Dry film lubricate the interface between the two rams in the housing to reduce
sliding friction. Engrave a direction indicator on the EVA knob to indicate
tighten and/or loosen. Procedures change to loosen knob prior to handle
release.
Problem - Unable to install PIP pin into McTether attachment on three tools.
One tool was not restrained on tool post.
Corrective action - Mandatory inspection of McTether to verify that Loctite has
not contaminated system. Modify Loctite application and curing instructions.
Additional inspection steps performed to verify correct spool displacement.
Perform additional thermal acceptance testing to verify proper operation of
McTethers.
During the presentation meeting, a discussion was held concerning the
temperature of tools in the HST tool box. Mr. John Young suggested that the EVA
tools be launched in the Orbiter cabin instead of in the HST tool box. Although the
STS-61 crew and EVA training personnel had previously expressed their desire to
launch the EVA tools in the Orbiter cabin, the apparent lack of available locker space
prevented the adoption of this idea. However, after this idea was again
recommended by the independent EVA Peer Review Team and endorsed by the
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Mission Director, some innovative stowage methods were implemented which
allowed the tools to be located in the cabin.
On July 15,1993, the HST Program Manager initiated a reassessment of the
adequacy of the HST aperture door to prevent contamination of HST optics during
the servicing mission. This reassessment considered Orbiter jet exhaust particle
impingement to be of negligible concern. However, given that pressure spikes were
indicated by the GHRS during STS-61 Orbiter jet firings, such spikes should be
assessed for possible contamination implications for future servicing missions. See
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 28.
During the HST Mission Status Telecon on July 23,1993, some of the results
from STS-57 were discussed. One result was that all Shuttle missions were now to be
required to reserve an additional 330 pounds of aft propellant due to the high usage
experienced during STS-57 and some previous missions. Before the imposition of
this requirement, STS-61 was carrying a margin of only 30 pounds, so this extra
restriction was a significant impact. The second result that was discussed involved
the EVA thermal environments expected on STS-61. It was estimated that the coldest
of the STS-61 environments, assuming the worst-case beta angle, would be roughly
equivalent to the Orbiter-bottom-to-sun attitude that was found to be unsatisfactory
during STS-57.
At a July 27,1993, meeting, GSFC personnel announced their planned action in
response to a leak that was experienced in one of the load isolators on their cargo
carriers. Their plan was to remove the damping fluid from an the isolators to
eliminate the risk of future leaks. They also intended to perform the hazard analysis
on the system using a "safe-life" approach instead of the previously planned "fan-
safe" method.
The fourth report from Dr. Greenfield's PRT was released July 28,1993. Because
of the large number of tool and hardware interface verifications to be accomplished
and the limited amount of time in which to do them, the team recommended that a
single office of prime responsibility be defined to establish criteria and priorities for
the fit checks. They also recommended the development of a pre-defined priority
scheme to ensure that the most important fit checks were the most likely to be
accomplished. Although the HST Tool CCB was tasked with approving the close-out
of the fit-check matrices of both JSC and GSFC tools, they did not determine the
priorities of an the fit checks before they were performed. Neither of these
recommendations was totally complied with. See Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 75.
The PRT also recommended that the pedigree of the various thermal go/no-go
determination methods be investigated to ensure that assumptions are consistent
among the various organizations/NASA centers involved in performing thermal
verification exercises. The go/no-go gauges used to screen probes, sockets, and bolts
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were made by different sources and controlled by different NASA centers. The effort
to understand what each gauge was designed to check (thermal expansion, machin-
ing tolerances, or both) required a significant amount of coordination between
centers just before flight. There remained sufficient uncertainty, even after the
coordination efforts, that it was decided to make specially sized sockets to accom-
modate the worst expected temperature differences. See Mission Director's
Recommendations No. 8 and No. 75.
The PRT's report recommended that, given the possibility that the FiST SM-1
flight hardware KSC nitrogen purge moisture and particulate requirements might
prove hard to meet, specific time periods of slightly higher moisture content and
particulate counts be allowed. A compromise was later agreed to by KSC and the
JPL, setting slightly higher steady-state allowances. However, even the more relaxed
moisture requirement was difficult to meet. It is believed that the more stringent
purge requirements could have been met with the use of JPL's purge purification
equipment.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 78: For HST servicing
missions and all other missions having payloads sensitive to
contamination, specify any purge purity requirements early enough
in the mission processing flow to allow for verification of the
capability to comply with those requirements, Consider the use of
special ground servicin 8 equipment (e.g., JPL's purge purification
equipment) to meet requirements too stringent to be met with
standard equipment.
The PRT recommended that KSC personnel renotify organizations operating in
the areas surrounding the payload processing areas of KS(= to restrict, during periods
of susceptibility, activities that might cause contamination of HST SM-1 hardware.
Subsequent to the PRT report, two significant risks to the cleanliness of the payload
developed. A lightning-caused grass fire generated significant amounts of smoke
dose enough to the payload processing facilities to be of concern. The second cause
for concern was the blowing of sand and debris into the PCR at Launch Pad A by
highwinds.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 79. For HST servicing
missions and all other missions having payloads sensitive to
contamination, have in place at the launch site a comprehensive plan
to protect the payloads from all sources of contamination, including
human-generated and natural sources.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 80:. For critical or sensitive
missions, minimize the number of any untried or unusual mission
preparation activities (e.g., launch pad refurbishment) or flight
activities that do not serve to increase chances of mission success.
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The PRT also recommended a special contamination review of the recently
refurbished Launch Pad A before arrival of the HST payload. Although such a
review was performed, neither this review nor the contamination control plan in
place at KSC was adequate to prevent the intrusion of wind-blown sand and debris
generated during pad modifications into the Pad A PCR and into the Orbiter payload
bay. This contamination is discussed below in the entry for October 30, 1993.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 81: Conduct an
independent assessment of the contamination control procedures
performed at KSC for STS-61. Assess them for adequacy for the
second HST servicing mission. Verify implementation of corrective
action to prevent recurrence of wind-blown contamination of the
Payload Change-out Room, or any other payload processing facility.
Another recommendation presentedby Dr. Greenfield,separatefrom thereport,
was thatthepotentialforcontamination of lIST by a leakingOrbiterRCS thrusterbe
assessed.This issuewas addressed by Dr. Lubert Leger atthe August 6,1993,
mission statusreview. He believedthatno propellantwould condense onto HST
surfacesatthe temperaturespredictedforthemission,and thattherewas no reason
forconcern. See Mission Director'sRecommendation No. 30.
On July 28,1993, at the request of the Mission Director, personnel from the
Medical Operations Branch at JSC presented the results of their assessment of
medical risks of the HST SM-1 EVAs. They had assessed the risks to EVA
crewmembers of space motion sickness, decompression sickness, metabolic and
nutrition deficiencies, dehydration, fatigue, congestion/barotrauma, cardiac
dysrhythmia, radiation exposure, and injury/trauma. The risks they believed to be
of the greatest concern were the risk of receiving insufficient nutrition on EVA days
and risk of fatigue. To prevent nutritional deficiencies, they recommended that the
crew's meal times should be protected and that pre-EVA and optional post-EVA
snacks should be provided in addition to the standard in-suit food bar. To help
prevent excessive fatigue, the doctors recommended a preflight physical conditioning
program and protection of the Appendix K scheduling constraints related to sleep,
meals, and exercise. They also considered it desirable to avoid the performance of
consecutive-day EVAs by a single crewmember. They also recognized the risk of ear
blockage during alrlock repressurization, but did not feel that any preventive
measures needed to be taken. See Mission Director's Recommendations No. 40, No.
42, and No. 56.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 82: Continue the practice
of not scheduling EVA crewmembers to perform EVAs on
consecutive days. Exceptions should be allowed only on a
contingency basis, with the concurrence of the crew, the flight
surgeon, and the mission management team.
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On July 29,1993, it was reported that during cargo integration test equipment
(CITE) testing, errors in the "decom" definitions of all 75 HST discrete measurements
were discovered. GSFC and JSC used different conventions for numbering bits in
their digital data processing using the Shuttle General Purpose Computer (GPC).
The development of the mass memory for the GPC to be used for processing HST
measurements had to be interrupted for approximately one month while this
discrepancy was corrected. This type of payload digital data definition discrepancy
has occurred repeatedly with various previous payloads. A single NASA-wide
method for defining digital data parameters would prevent this problem.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 83: Establish a single
NASA-wide set of standards for the definition of payload command
and data parameters.
On July 29,1993, a meeting was held to discuss whether any action should be
taken in anticipation of the possible encounter of the STS-51 mission with the annual
Perseid meteoroid shower. The concentration of meteoroids was suspected to be
greater than that seen on earth in hundreds, if not thousands of years. It was
announced that the HST control center was planning to reorient the HST to present
the least vulnerable side of the telescope to the meteoroids. After this meeting, it was
decided to delay the launch of STS-51 to avoid the Perseids.
On August 3, 1993, Mr. John Young released his memorandum AC5-93-22,
addressed to the STS-61 Mission Director. This letter contained a number of
concerns and recommendations. Mr. Young suggested that the flying of a drill tool
be considered for use in boring out any jammed bolts encountered during the EVAs.
The Space Shuttle Program later manifested a type of drill bit called a ball-end mill,
which might be used to try to drill out a jammed bolt. At the suggestion of the
STS-61 Mission Directors Office, personnel from JSC's CTSD quickly designed,
developed, certified, and flew a rotary impact tool, which was hoped to be able to
loosen a jammed bolt without causing the debris that would be generated by a drill
bit.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 84: Continue to develop
EVA methods to remove jammed mechanisms and bolts. Design
goals should include the capability to impart large forces to the
jammed mechanisms or bolts, while transferring little force to
payloads or other structures.
Mr. Young also suggested that HTVTs be conducted which accurately simulate
the worst expected EVA thermal environment to verify the EMU's capability to
provide adequate thermal comfort to the STS-61 EVA crewmembers. Such tests were
conducted to evaluate thermal modifications to the EMU and WF/PC handholds and
operating strategies for the EMU's temperature control valve. An inadequate
strategy for the control of EMU temperature was believed to have contributed to the
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uncomfortably cold conditions experienced by the STS-57 EVA crewmembers. These
tests showed that the modified hardware and procedures were adequate to keep the
EVA crewmembers thermally comfortable during the expected ST5-61 EVAs. See
Mission Director's Recommendations No. 8, No. 9, and No. 85.
Another recommendation in Mr. Young's memorandum was that a modification
be developed for the EMU that would completely terminate the flow of chilled water
through the liquid cooling and ventilation garment (LCVG) at the crewmember's
option. This modification was designed and tested in human thermal vacuum
chamber testing. It was determined to be unnecessary for STS-61 after incorporation
of other modifications to the EMUs and to the EMU cooling-maintenance strategy.
However, it is believed that, if the cooling maintenance strategy were not followed
properly, resulting in a crewmember's becoming uncomfortably cold, that the LCVG
bypass modification could allow the crewmember to regain comfort in significantly
less time than in the present EMU design.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 85: Complete the design of
and incorporate the liquid cooling and ventilation garment (LCVG)
bypass into EMUs to be used during potentially cold EVAs during
critical missions.
Mr. Young also recommended that contingency procedures for all problems that
are indicated or implied by engineering data from the _ (such as the non-
retractable SA) be trained for and accommodated in the planned mission timeline.
The SA contingency had previously been identified by the operations team as being
needful of attention.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 86: For critical EVA
missions, substantial early attention should continue to be devoted
to developing and training for contingency procedures. Those
procedures that have a reasonable chance of being needed should be
accommodated in the EVA timeline.
Another recommendation from Mr. Young was that thorough engineering
reviews of HST data be conducted to ensure that the repair timelines are accommo-
dating what the data tells us we will find. Little is presently known about the
expected mean time between failures of the HST components.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 87: Perform a thorough
analysis of all available data to understand the probable operational
lifetime of HST components. The results of this enhanced analysis
could then be used to better schedule component replacement on
HST servicing missions.
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The Flight Operations Review was held August 3-5, 1993. Results of an analysis
were presented which indicated that the HST would likely begin tumbling if a "Norm
Z" Orbiter reaction control system configuration were used for the approach to FIST
within 400 feet of HST. It was also pointed out during the meeting that, given the
required budget margins, STS-61 had a negative propellant margin.
On August 6, 1993, Mr. Brewster Shaw chaired a mission status review at JSC
for the management of the NASA Office of Space Flight and Office of Space Science.
Mr. Shaw assigned a number of action items at the conclusion of the meeting. One
action item assigned by Mr. Shaw was the development of a SA mission success plan
that would give guidance to make the decision of whether to save or jettison a SA
that could not be fully retracted. The plan was later developed which stated that the
minimum required effective surface area of a SA was 80 percent. The plan stated that
an old SA jammed with less than 80 percent area available would be jettisoned
immediately, and one jammed at greater than 80 percent would be saved until the
new array was successfully installed. This plan was tested thoroughly in JIS No. 2.
Because the flight and ground crews were well trained in this plan, little time was
lost when one of the SAs did become jammed during the mission and was
subsequently jettisoned.
Another action item assigned was to define IMAX camera in-cabin and crew
requirements and crew requirements and crew interference concerns. The amount of
lMAX crew training required was assessed by the flight crew and others and
determined to not be detrimental to the other, higher priority crew training. It was
decided that the STS-61 crew Commander would determine whether IMAX
photography would take place during the flight. If he judged that it would interfere
with the HST servicing tasks, he had the option to cancel the filming. This procedure
worked well during the mission.
Another action item was the definition of EMU gloves and LCVG configuration.
The excellent work done to develop and incorporate the improved glove thermal
micrometeoroid garment has been cited earlier in this report. Also contributing to
crew comfort during STS-61, were improvements in the LCVGs, thermal comfort
undergarments, and procedures for cooling control maintenance. An improvement
that was available, but which was not used significantly during the mission, was a
greatly improved thermal outer glove.
Mr. Shaw called for a review of all DTOs and DSOs for their impact to crew
schedules. The $IS-61 DTOs, DSOs, and secondary payloads were well managed so
they did not interfere with the HST servicing tasks.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 88: During a Space Shuttle
mission, no DTO or DSO should be conducted if it has the potential
to hinder the crew's complete accomplishment of the primary tasks.
66
I , , , Pre-Mission Events |
Mr. Shaw also assigned actions related to crew aid and tool modification
configuration control procedures, thermal analyses of Orbiter attitudes, and go/no-
go gauges. These issues are discussed elsewhere in this report.
In conjunction with the Mission Status Review, there was held an executive
session chaired by the STS-61 Mission Director. The Mission Director presented a
number of actions and issues that needed resolution before the launch of HST SM-1.
One of these actions was a review of the rationale of the plans to replace only two of
the three RSUs, to not fully verify both redundant paths of every system on board the
HST, and for SA contingencies. The rationale for these three plans was reviewed and
found to be acceptable.
The Mission Director asked for the completion of the development of
procedures and timelines for EVA scenarios if there were only one or two EVA days
in a shortened mission and for contingency actions for a failed SA retraction.
Although valuable procedure and timeline development for the SA contingency did
later take place, such development came late in the mission flow.
The Mission Director also called for the development of a detailed alternate plan
for crew and ground personnel training, simulations, and holiday and vacation
policies to be followed in case the launch were to be slipped to January or later. Such
a plan allows for minimization of impact to crew proficiency levels and to personnel
and facilities schedules. A plan was developed for crew training and some hardware
items.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 89: For critical missions,
especially including Space Station missions, which will likely have
only five-minute launch windows, develop detailed crew training
and hardware maintenance plans and schedules to be followed in
case of a significant launch delay.
The Mission Director asked for the development of a team sleep-shifting plan to
maximize the proficiency levels of launch and mission support personnel. Preflight
work schedules for flight controllers and some members of management were
reduced to allow the personnel to voluntarily adjust their sleep schedules to better be
able to support the EVAs, which were conducted in early morning hours. This sleep-
shifting was not part of a formal team-wide plan.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 90: For critical missions
that include crew operations scheduled to occur during normal sleep
hours, implement a formal plan to facilitate the sleep-shifting of the
mission support personnel (including management) before launch.
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Another recommendation from the Mission Director was that the portable in-
flight landing operations trainer (PILOT) be manifested on SIS-61. The PILOT was
manifested and was used by the crew, who indicated that it was of value.
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 91: Continue the
development and use of the portable in-flight landing operations
trainer (PILOT).
The Mission Director also presented the issues of tool fit checks and go/no-go
gauges, which are discussed above in connection with Dr. Greenfield's July 29,1993,
report.
During the August 13, 1993, biweekly STS-61 Mission Status Telecon, it was
announced that the higher-performance engines designated for use for STS-61 might
instead be reallocated for STS-51. It was later decided not to do this, because of their
importance to the HST mission. The telecon also included a discussion of a lightning
fire at KSC, which was generating smoke near payload handling facilities, which
caused concern about possible HST payload contamination.
On August 16, 1993, the HST Project notified STS-61 mission management that it
was likely that a task to replace four additional fuses would be added to I-IST SM-1.
The first STS-61 JIS was conducted August 24-25, 1993. This 36-hour simulated
mission time.line included rendezvous with and capture and berthing of the HST,
followed by EVA 1. Two of the significant simulated problems were low Orbiter
propellant margin and a Flight Support System (FSS) berthing latch malfunction. A
number of management issues arose during the JIS that the Mission Director
documented as needing the attention of the Customer Management Team and of the
Mission Management Team. These issues are discussed below in connection with JIS
No. 2.
On August 27, 1993, an HST Flight Techniques Panel meeting was held to
perform a safety review of all the HST SM-1 EVA procedures. Although the goal of
the meeting was to obtain safety concurrence in all the procedures from the entire
EVA commtmity, there was not enough time in a single meeting to address the
procedures in sufficient detail to satisfy all the concerns of JSC's crew equipment
safety and mission assurance personnel (NS231). The NS231 personnel accepted an
action item to perform their own detailed assessment of the procedures and to bring
their concerns to the attention of the Flight Techniques Panel. See Mission Director's
Recommendations No. 46 and No. 47.
An HST fam/liari_tion workshop for the news media was held at JSC August
30-September 1, 1993.
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JIS No. 2 was conducted August 31-September 1, 1993. Its timeline included the
38-hour period from the night before EVA 2 through post-EVA 2 HST testing.
Among the simulated problems presented were an SA secondary deployment
mechanism (SDM) failure, an SA primary deployment mechanism failure to stow, an
Orbiter nitrogen tank leakage, and low SA electrical power output. The Mission
team performed a jettison of an HST SA. Other EVA accomplishments during the
replanned EVA 2 included replacement of one SA, two ECUs, PDU fuse plugs, and
SADE-1.
During the first two EVA JISs, there arose a number of management issues,
which were documented in a September 29, 1993, memorandum from the Mission
Director to the STS-61 Mission Coordination Team. The Mission Director identified
the following enhancements as being needed for the remaining JISs and for the
mission itself.
a. Clearer delineation of real-time communication and decision-making paths
between the Flight Director and HST management
b. Clearer and more timely distribution paths for communicating Mission
Management Team (MMT) decisions to the Flight Control Team (FCT) and
to the HST Project personnel
c. More proactive participation of the STS-61 Mission Manager and Mission
Director in coordinating the resolution of real-time issues between the
Flight Director and HST management
d. Clearer definition of HST Project Manager and HST Servicing Mission
Manager roles and responsibilities during real-time operations
e. Better utilization and coordination by the HST Project of the Space
Telescope Operations and Control Center's (STOCC's) technical support
capability
f. Provision of succinct backgrounds and rationales for mission decisions as
they were being communicated by the decision makers
In early September, revisions were made to the planned timeline for EVA day 1.
On the basis of revised timelines resulting from WETF evaluations, it now was
reasonable to perform RSU change-out, solar array carrier preparation, and change-
outs of the ECUs and fuse plugs, all during the first EVA.
HTVTs of the thermal modifications to the EMU and of the WF/PC handhold
thermal covers were conducted September 10-12, 1993. On the basis of the results of
these runs, it was derided that the LCVG bypass modification was not needed for
STS-61. This LCVG bypass is discussed more thoroughly in connection with Mission
Director's Recommendation No. 85.
In mid-September it was decided by the Orbiter Project Office that all three STS-
61 inertial measurement units (IMUs) would be high accuracy inertial navigation
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system (HAINS) units. This decision was based on the fact that they have a greater
mean-time-between-failures prediction than the older design had.
The STS-51 EVA was conducted September 15, 1993. It induded evaluations of
the EVA thermal environment expected to occur during STS-61, and some of the
hardware and tasks planned for STS-61. The STS-51 EVA crewmembers remained
thermally comfortable, demonstrating that the newly adopted Orbiter attitude
protocol, combined with careful management of the temperature control of the EMU,
would also likely keep the STS-61 EVA crewmembers thermally comfortable. The
STS-51 crew provided the resultsof theirexperienceswith STS-61 hardware and
procedures to theSTS-61 crew.
In mid-September it was determined that the special clips intended to replace
the small SADE connector screws were not satisfactory. The small screws would
have to be reinstalled after the SADE change-out.
JIS No. 3 was conducted September 28, 1993. It was a ten-hour simulation that
included deployment of the HST.
On September 28, 1993, the Flight Requirements Document was revised to add
the PILOT DTO and to update the mission priorities.
During the HST flight status telecon on October 1, 1993, it was announced that
the RSU change-out tasks would be the first ones performed during the first EVA.
The crew equipment interface test (CELT) occurred in the Orbiter Processing
Facility on October 3, 1993.
The final series of NBS training exercises was conducted October 4-15, 1993.
These ten runs offered the EVA crew the first opportunity to train using the RMS II
and the Nitrox breathing system. For the first time, the crew was able to perform the
EVAs nearly from end-to-end with a high-fidelity RMS simulator. The timelines for
EVAs 1-4 were verified for both the scheduled pair of EVA crewmembers and the
alternate pair. EVA 5 was not performed during this series. The tasks included in
EVA 5 involved smaller hardware items and less critical RMS positioning and could
be accurately verified using part task activities in the WETF. Besides these eight
nominal procedure runs, the crew also participated in JIS No. 4 on October 8, and
performed SA contingencies on October 15, 1993.
JIS No. 4 was conducted on October 8, 1993, the first JIS to be performed with
the EVA crew in the NBS at MSFC. This 12-hour JIS included EVA 3. Simulated
problems included thermal cover interference during the installation of WF/PC II.
On October 18, 1993, the Stafford IIST SM Review Team conducted its final
STS-61 review at JSC. The Mission Director presented to them the status of mission
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preparation. The team expressed satisfaction with the efforts of the team working to
accomplish the servicing of the HST.
On October 21-22, 1993, GSFC conducted its internal flight readiness review
(FRR). The review board was generally pleased with the level of planning and
preparation for mission. The board assigned an action item to the HST Project to
reopen a previously dosed problem report on the torque output of JSC's mini-power
tool. The board was concerned that the higher-than-expected torque produced by the
tool could damage the SADE connector screws. In response to such concerns, JSC
performed force tests using the tool to install 100 SADE-type screws and
demonstrated that the tool would not damage the screws.
On October 27, 1993, STS-61 mission management discussed the first report of
significant problems mused by the refurbishment of Launch Pad A. A pipe down-
spout immediately outside the payload change-out room had been positioned such
that it prevented the opening of the cargo canister. The interfering downspout and
others nearby which had been added during the refurbishment were cut away to
remove the interference, and the residual pipe openings were plugged and sealed.
The use of facilities that have just undergone major changes _,carries increased risk of
such problems. See the next paragraph and Mission Director s Recommendation No.
0.
On October 30, 1993, contamination occurred of the PCR on Launch Pad A.
Extensive investigation and planning efforts were initiated to understand the source
of contamination, assess the condition of the flight hardware that was exposed to the
sand and debris, and develop and implement corrective action. Because it had been
double-bagged, most of the payload hardware was not affected, but the ORU carrier
(ORUC) and COPE were somewhat contaminated and were successfully recleaned.
Sand and debris particles, believed to be residue from sand-blasting operations
during the pad refurbishment, had been blown into the PCR by strong winds. The
particles are believed to have been on surfaces above the ceiling of the PCR and
blown into the PCR through gaps in the ceiling or between the ceiling and walls.
Cleaning of surfaces was performed in and around the PCRs of both Pads A and B, in
case it was decided to move the Shuttle and payload to Pad B for launch. The seams
and gaps in the ceiling and walls of both PCRs were caulked, taped and covered with
plastic to ensure no recurrence of the violation of PCR cleanliness. An assessment
was made which verified that outgassing of the caulk used would not be detrimental
to HST surfaces or materials. It was decided to launch the STS-61 mission from Pad
B. See Mission Director's Recommendations No. 79 and No. 80.
At the request of the NASA Administrator, a committee was formed and tasked
to provide independent assessment, validation and verification of all the medical
aspects of the STS-61 EVAs. The committee was chaired by Capt. E.T. Flynn, the
Command Officer of Naval Medical Research and Development. The committee also
included other medical experts and experienced EVA astronauts. On November 3-4,
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1993, the team conducted its formal review of the _1 medical management, EVA
plans, EVA history, and current issues. The committee found that the mission plans
had adequately addressed the medical risks of the STS-61 mission, and that there was
no medical reason not to proceed with the mission.
On November 5, 1993, the Flight Requirements Document was updated
(Revision F) to specify the launch date as December 1, 1993.
JIS No. 6 was conducted November 8-10, 1993. It was held before JIS No. 5 due
to facilities mission support requirements. JIS No. 6 was a 59-hour JIS, which
included EVA 4, EVA 5, and HST deployment. Simulated problems included a HSP
stowage problem (requiring the jettisoning of the HSP), an EMU-to-glove disconnect
problem (requiring EMU change-ou0, and an FSS tilt mechanism malfunction. These
and other HST and Orbiter simulated problems led to significant EVA replanning
and to the holding of the HST on the RMS overnight.
On November 12, 1993, the report by the HST Independent Test Review
Panel was released, detailing the results of their assessment of the testing and
verification performed on the replac_nent and new hardware to be installed into the
HST during STS-61. The panel, led by Dr. Herb Kottler, began its review on October
13, 1993. The panel concluded that the HST Project had developed good test
procedures to work around the problems associated with not having the HST
available for integration on the ground. They also found that the review and
verification process for the mission had worked quite well. They were impressed
with the quality and commitment of the people working on the mission, and satisfied
that the mission was ready for flight. The panel recommended that future HST
servicing missions give a greater amount of attention to the reliability of the HST
spacecraft infrasffucture (power, attitude control, etc.). The panel also recommended
that the HS_ Project consider improving the onboard diagnostic capability of the
HST. The panel recommended that a team be formed to capture the HST SM-1
lessons learned for the next servicing mission team in a living document. The
document should include up-to-date detailed test configurations, experience gained
in building and testing the servicing hardware, changes in procedures, and
translations of STS-61 EVA experience back into hardware design and test guidelines
for follow-on servicing missions. The panel also recommended the formation of a
multidisciplinary panel to investigate the cost and benefit trade-offs of upgrading the
HST simulators.
JIS No. 5 was conducted November 15, 1993. It was a 39-hour simulation that
included post-insertion and flight day (FD) 2 activities. During the JIS, the HST was
captured while in "safe" mode. The Orbiter was consequently required to be flown
through an unplanned roll maneuver to perform the capture.
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An ascent and post-insertion JIS was conducted November 16, 1993. Simulated
problems foreed the Hight Control Team to plan for a reduced-duration flight, with
capture of HST on FD 2 and one EVA on FD 3.
The Level I FRR was held November 17, 1993, at KSC. Issues presented during
the review as requiring resolution before flight included a cracked seal found in a
solid rocket booster auxiliary power unit fuel pump (not scheduled to be flown on
STS-61), and damage to the thermal protection system on the external tank used
during STS-58. The $Iv0-61 Mission Director presented the status of the recommen-
dations made by twelve different STS-61 review efforts. Of 195 total recommenda-
tions, 27 remained to be dosed. These open issues were expected to be resolved
before the S'IVo_l L-2 Day review.
On November 19, 1993, the first of several meetings was held dealing with a
malfunctioning secondary pressure sensor on the right inboard (RIB) elevon of OV-
105 (Endeavour). Under certain unlikely circumstances, the malfunction of this
sensor could contribute to degraded flight control of the Orbiter. After assessments
were made weighing the risk caused by the removal of this sensor's function against
having it function in the wrong manner, it was decided to disconnect the sensor.
On November 21, 1993, interface verification testing with the Shuttle on the
launch pad resulted in the Orbiter's acquisition of simulated HST data in an inverted
configuration. This problem is discussed above in connection with the January 26,
1993, report of Dr. Greenfield's Program Review Team, and Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 61.
On November 29, 1993, a combined L-2 Day and L-1 Day review was held for
_Ivo-61 at KSC. Special topics for discussion during the review included the RIB
sensor that had malfunctioned and was depinned for the mission. Results of an
independent assessment conducted by GSFC of the plans for dealing with the RIB
sensor were presented. The assessment resulted in agreement with the risk
assessment performed by the Space Shuttle Program and with the Program's chosen
course of action. The STS-61 Mission Director reported that all issues raised by the
various reviews of the HST SM-1 had successfully been resolved. The Mission
Director and the Director of GSFC were polled for their flight readiness concurrence,
as were the usual principal managers and organizations. All responded that they
were ready to proceed with the mission.
On December 1, 1993, the first launch attempt was canceled due to weather
constraint violations. The built-in ten-minute hold at launch minus nine minutes was
extended to approximately 45 minutes because of excessive crosswinds (greater than
15 knots) at the Shuttle Landing Facility. The countdown was then continued to the
launch minus five minute point to allow for a faster response in case of suddenly
improved weather near the end of the launch window. During the extended hold, a
cloud cover developed over the launch area, which violated the 8,000-foot minimum
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required by Range Safety rules. The launch hold continued until the end of the
launch window and launch was rescheduled for December 2, 1993.
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Launch of STS-61 occurred on December 2, 1993, beginning at 3:26:59.983 AM
CST.
During flight day I (FD1), mission support personnel were revising the loads
analysis for the SA jettison procedures. The prelaunch analysis did not cover the
jettison of an SA with the other array still deployed on the telescope. Procedures
changes needed to be incorporated to prevent the attached array's being hit by
reaction control system (RCS) jet plumes during an Orbiter separation from a
discarded array.
During FD2, GSFC personnel worked to resolve a potential conflict in access to
the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) between NASA and the
Department of Defense during the period of the mission in which the grappling of
HST was scheduled to occur.
On FD2, the Orbiter cabin pressure was reduced to approximately 10.2 pounds
per square inch (psi) as part of the EVA crew's denitrogenation protocol.
Testing of the EMU communications systems revealed noise problems with the
EV2 EMU. Trouble-shooting did not identify or correct the problem, but it was
believed to be caused by interference from the structural and electrical configuration
of the Orbiter airlock and would clear up when the EMU was outside the airlock.
While the crew slept at the end of FD2, ground commands were sent to HST to
stow the high-gain antennas (HGAs). Both HGAs were moved to the stowage
positions, but did not trigger their "ready-to-latch" indications. Plans were then
developed to perform a video survey of the HST after its capture to better understand
the failure of the HGAs to completely stow.
On FD3, communication links between the Orbiter and the FIST were estab-
lished without the inverted data problem that occurred during preflight testing.
The HST was grappled by the Orbiter RMS at 2:46:56 AM CST, December 4,
1993.
Visual inspection revealed that the old +V2 SA (attached to the FIST) was
warped approximately as much as the worst-case analyses had predicted.
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After assessment of the video survey of the HGAs and their latch configura-
tions, it was decided to proceed with latch closure. The HGA latches were com-
manded to be dosed. The latch on the +V3 HGA dosed successfully. The -V3 latch
was able to cage its HGA, but not move it completely to its stowage location. It was
determined that this configuration was structurally adequate to withstand a reboost
of the HST.
During EMU preparations, it was discovered that two of the four in-suit drink
bags (IDBs) were not stowed on the Orbiter. Both of the two bags on board devel-
oped leaks during the mission. The crew was able to stop the leaks and the bags
were usable.
On FD4, the first HST SM-1 EVA was conducted. The communication with both
EMUs was acceptable.
The change-outs of RSU 2 and RSU 3 were successfully performed. The -V3 aft
shroud doors could not be closed with the first attempts, and it was decided that the
EVA crewmembers would proceed with other tasks and would finish the closing of
the doors later in the EVA.
Some solar array carrier (SAC) preparation work was performed in parallel with
the ECU replacement tasks. Replacements of ECU 1 and ECU 3 were successfully
performed.
During the change-out of the fuse plugs, the crew noticed a different configura-
tion of J-hook pass-through than that expected before flight. The fuse plug change-
outs were successfully performed.
The -V3 aft shroud doors were eventually closed with the aid of a payload
retention device (PRD) strap and the efforts of both EVA crewmembers.
Following the EVA tasks, the -V2 SA was successfully retracted, but only after
repeated commands were transmitted. The +V2 SA retraction was stopped when the
crew saw the SA blanket becoming slack as the damaged area of bistem reached the
cassette. It was decided not to make further attempts to retract it, but to jettison it
during EVA 2.
During the overnight planning for EVA 2, there was some uncertainty concern-
ing whether the disconnection of the SA diode boxes needed to occur during night-
time so that electrical current from them would be minimized. For this reason it was
decided that nighttime disconnection would be performed (i.e., with no light shining
on the SAs from either the sun or the earth).
During the alrlock depressurization, the feedwater switch on the EV3 crewmem-
ber's EMU was found to have been bumped "on" prematurely, which, in the worst
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case, would cause the EMU cooling system to not function. The crew turned the
switch "off" and waited a sufficient time before turning it back "on" for the EMU to
then function properly.
At the start of EVA 2, the EV3 crewmember could not hear radio communica-
tion from either the Orbiter or the ground, but only from the EV4 crewmember. It
was decided to conduct the EVA having EV4 relay Orbiter and ground communica-
tions to EV3. This relaying of communications was allowed by flight rules, and
worked well during the execution of the EVA.
After the +V2 SA was removed, EV3 performed a manual release of it while
attached to the extended RMS. The Orbiter then performed an RCS four-pulse Low-
Z separation burn, followed by a sixteen-pulse Norm-Z separation burn, which
would normally impart a one foot-per-second separation rate. After the SA was hit
by the plume of the Norm-Z firings, however, it was estimated that the rate of sepa-
ration was four feet per second. During the Norm-Z firings, the GHRS instrumenta-
tion registered a pressure spike, indicating the presence of gas inside the HST.
The new SAs were successfully installed during the EVA.
The first task performed during EVA 3 was the successful change-out of the
WF/PC.
One of the HST power tools stopped working during the EVA.
The two magnetic sensing system (MSS) modifications were also successfully
installed during EVA 3. During the installation, two metal plates that were part of
the protective cover of MSS 1 were found to be loose and were removed by the EVA
crew. The primary heater on the old MSS 2 was reported to have failed.
Discussions occurred during the EVA concerning what tasks might be added to
the end of EVA 3, since the crewmembers were considerably ahead of schedule. The
GHRS redundancy kit was being considered as an added task. However, it was
decided that only simple tasks in preparation for the next day's EVAs would be
performed.
After EVA 3, considerable planning by the ground support team took place
concerning the need to re-cx)ver MSS-1 to limit further degradation of the foam from
exposure to sunlight and atomic oxygen. A plan was developed calling for the EVA
crewmembers to retrieve pieces of multi-layer insulation (MLD from the payload bay
during EVA 4. Some of this MLI would be used to fabricate new covers for both MSS
units.
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The HSP removal, and successful COSTAR and coprocessor installation all
occurred during EVA 4. No significant problems occurred related to these
operations.
The EVA crewmembers were initially told to retrieve MLI only from the two
radial scientific instrmnent protective enclosure (RSIPED "A" latch releases, but were
later told to also remove the MLI from the two WF/PC handle fixtures. The crew
brought all four MLI pieces into the cabin.
After EVA 4, the mission support team worked to resolve an apparent data
problem. During the analysis of data related to this problem, suspicions were raised
about the health of the memory of the coprocessor. Discussions were held about the
possible replacement of the DF-224 computer, in case a coprocessor problem had also
corrupted the original DF-224. It was eventually decided that if a coprocessor prob-
lem were to be verified, then the coprocessor would be disconnected electrically from
the DF-224, and both would remain in the HST. The data problem was later deter-
mined to be a communications problem unrelated to the HST.
The reboost occurred early on FD8 and was terminated by the crew when the
Orbiter trajectory was taking longer than expected to totally match the target
trajectory. Instead of a resulting circular orbit of 321 nautical miles, the final orbit
was approximately 321 by 320 nautical miles. The STS-61 Lead Flight Director has
commented that similar burns in the future should be terminated based on a velocity
target in the Orbiter "X" direction only. During the reboost, the crew was surprised
by the amount of relative motion between the HST and the Orbiter. However, this
relative motion was within the range predicted by preflight analyses.
The SA primary deployment mechanisms (PDMs) failed to move when com-
manded to do so before EVA 5. It was decided that the crew would perform the
SADE change-out while ground personnel would work on plans for SA PDM
deployment contingency procedures.
During the successful SADE change-out, four of the small connector screws
were lost, but each of the eight connectors was secured with at least one screw, and
only one screw is needed for adequate attachment.
The EVA crewmembers were able to manually deploy the SA PDMs.
The EVA crewmembers also successfully installed the GHRS redundancy kit
during EVA 5.
The EVA crew then installed the newly fabricated MLI covers onto both MSSs.
While the EVA crewmembers were doing their final payload bay clean-up
procedures, both SAs were successfully deployed.
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Additional data problems were encountered following EVA 5, which were
eventually attributed to a problem with a data interface unit no. 2 (DIU 2) side A in
the HST. The DIU was switched to side B, which functioned properly.
On FD9, HST was grappled, unberthed, and held by the RMS while the aperture
door was opened. At 4:26:47 AM CST, the HST was released from the RMS.
The crew was given a day off on FD10.
On FDll, the Commander and Pilot used the portable in-flight landing
operations trainer to practice Orbiter approaches and landings.
Because weather at KS(2 was predicted to deteriorate near the originally
planned landing time, it was decided to deorbit on orbit number 162, one earlier than
scheduled. Endeavour's wheels stopped rolling after landing December 12, 1993, at
11:25:35 PM CST, with a mission elapsed time of 10 days, 19 hours, 58 minutes, and
35 seconds.
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Mission Director's Recommendations
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EVA tasks requiring precise handling of medium and large masses should be
rehearsed on orbit to the extent possible. Tasks involving small, difficult-to-
handle objects such as noncaptive screws should also be practiced on orbit.
Every effort should be made to completely understand and to be able to
duplicate on the ground the configuration of hardware that is on orbit.
Methods that can be used to help achieve this capability include detailed
records (including photo documentation and accurate engineering drawings,
both made of the as-deployed configuration), molds of the interfaces, accurate
tooling representing mating interfaces, etc. Such a capability to duplicate on
earth what exists in orbit should be considered an initial design requirement
for on-orbit hardware.
The Space Station Program should develop and maintain a detailed three-
dimensional computer model of the planned Station configuration similar to
Orbiter models maintained in the PLAID and Integrated Graphics Operations
and Analysis Laboratory (IGOAL) systems at JSC. The model should be
made easy to update as design changes are made. It should be accessible by
the Space Station community of designers, customers, and operators. It
should be maintained as an as-built model of the station during and after the
assembly phase.
For critical and high-interest NASA missions, a thorough public-relations
strategic plan should be implemented. It should be well coordinated among
all involved NASA offices. A single NASA office should be in charge of the
implementation and updating of the plan at all NASA centers and any other
key sites (vendor facilities, etc.). Mission success criteria should be generated
by mission management early in mission planning and provided to the press
by the public-affairs organization(s). A contingency plan of action in
response to mission "failure" should be in place and announced before the
mission. Information at all levels of detail should be readily available to the
press. The mission's importance should not be overstated, and its complexity
should not be understated.
IAppendixA I
** Design all critical missions so that maximum possible mission duration is
incorporated at the inception of mission planning. Early development of
mission requirements is necessary. If needed to provide adequate margins,
an Orbiter with increased-duration modifications should be used for the
mission.
o
.
So
o
10.
11.
To ensure that timeline margin exists for each EVA day, continue to plan
tasks for an EVA so that they will take no longer than six hours to complete.
Analyze future HST and Space Station EVAs, both scheduled and
contingency, to determine whether three.crewmember EVA capability would
be desirable. If so, modify the Orbiter air-locks, Shuttle extravehicular
mobility units (EMUs), and training facilities to accommodate three-
crewmember EVAS. The modifications should include a third air-lock-to-
EMU umbilical connection, an EVA radio capable of three-channel operation,
and other changes as appropriate.
Flight hardware (including tool) operations and interfaces should be verified
as early as possible before flight, in worst-case thermal vacuum conditions to
the extent possible.
EVA crewmembers scheduled to perform EVA tasks in severe thermal
conditions should experience those conditions in their flight EMUs (or
equivalent) in vacuum chamber testing before their flight.
NASA should expand its efforts to evaluate all new hardware, untried
procedures, and thermal effects of new Orbiter attitudes, during missions
before the missions for which they are required. Development of mission
requirements is needed as early as possible to allow time to support these
earlier missions. For HST servicing missions, the HST Project organization
should develop the plan to exercise tasks and hardware as early as possible.
The Space Station Program should closely analyze EVA thermal environ-
ments (especially those which will exist while an Orbiter is attached to the
Station) to ensure adequate EVA thermal capability.
Designs of all hardware having the potential to be attached to or removed
from other hardware during EVA should be thoroughly assessed for adequate
temperature and vacuum tolerances. Past flight experience and the
knowledge base of previous EVA designers should be used in this
assessment. See also Mission Director's Recommendation No. 8.
12. Critical EVA tasks should be designed so that they can be fully accomplished
if there were total loss of the use of the RMS.
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13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
The Space Shuttle Program should thoroughly assess the feasibility of
manual capture and berthing of the HST. If determined to be feasible, such
procedures should be developed and futttre HST servicing mission EVA
crews should be trained to perform them.
For EVA missions, select the Payload Commander, the EVA crew, and the
Capcom as early as possible.
For complex EVA missions, perform flight production milestones earlier than
in the standard template. For the second HST servicing mission, consider the
following template.
EVENT MONTHS BEFORE FLIGHT
Selection of Payload
Commander and EVA
crew*
24
Baselining of Flight
Definition and
Requirements Directive
20
Cargo Integration Review 15
Flight Planning and
Stowage Review
11
Flight Operations Review 4
Other mission milestones should be moved earlier proportionately.
* For missions requiring close coordination among the commander, pilot,
RMS operator(s) and EVA crew, consideration should be given to selecting
the entire crew at this time.
Use EVA-experienced flight crewmembers, preferably the Payload
Commander and other EVA crewmember(s) who are assigned to the mission,
to help develop and evaluate critical EVA hardware, tasks, and procedures.
To the extent possible, assign an EVA-flight-experienced Commander and
Capcom to critical EVA missions.
To increase margins for the success of the Space Station assembly, determine
the tasks required for assembly and the number of crewmembers required to
perform them. Use EVAs on prior Space Shuttle missions to practice those
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19.
20.
21.
_o
_D3e
24.
25.
tasks and to provide EVA experience to as many different astronauts as
possible.
For critical EVA missions, select EVA crewmembers so that the required EVA
tasks can still be fully accomplished if either a crewmember or an EMU
becomes unable to support an EVA.
Establish a formal human factors assessment effort to identify and facilitate
improvements to generic EVA capabilities and hardware and to enhance EVA
procedures as required for specific EVA tasks. This responsibility might best
be assigned to the newly formed EVA and Crew Equipment Project Office.
Continue the practice of having all mission support personnel, including
management and especially customer management, participate in joint
integrated simulations OISs) for critical missions. JISs for scheduled EVAs
should be conducted with EVA crewmembers in underwater training
facilities, unless facility or mock-up limitations prevent the crew from
performing realistic activities.
For critical missions, the Mission Operations Directorate should develop
more dearly defined and detailed training objectives for the JlSs for flight
controllers, flight directors, and mission and customer management. Post-JIS
reports should be distributed to the JIS participants detailing these objectives
and how well they were achieved. Corrective actions should be assigned and
lessons learned should be formulated and distributed.
For HST servicing missions, continue the practice of conducting HST Project
internal simulations. They should be well structured and the results should
be well documented.
The Space Station Program should assess the benefits of performing internal
simulations prior to the JISs for Space Station assembly. If determined to be
of value, they should be well structured, with dear training objectives, and
the results should be documented distributed to the participants. Objectives
should include the definition and exercising of the relationship between the
Launch Package Teams and the Flight Control Team during both nominal and
contingency operations.
The Mission Operations Directorate should assess the methods used to access
payload technical data, drawings, and photographs durin 8 the STS-61
simulations and during the STS-61 mission. Corrective actions should be
implemented to eliminate all identified problems. Work should continue on
improvement of storage and retrieval efficiencies. See Mission Director's
Recommendations No. 41 and No. 71.
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The Space Station Program should consider the development of a top-level
fault-tree analysis.
Consider the implementation of an overall trainin 8 facilities requirements
control document for future HST servicing missions. It should define, as early
as possible, the testin 8 and training to be done at the various training
facilities (vendors, High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator [HFMS], KSC, WETF,
Neutral Buoyancy Simulator [NBS], et at,)
The Space Shuttle Program should perform a complete assessment of the
results of the HST SM-1 mission relating to potential sources of contamina-
tion. The results of this assessment should then be provided to all payload
owners, including the HST Project, and the Space Station Program. Review
crew comments, indications of pressure spikes inside the lIST, and films and
videotape made during the mission (including IMAX film of EVAs and
videotapes made during the opening of the payload bay doors).
The HST Project should examine returned components removed from HST
for indications of previous contamination and of material deterioration that
would indicate the potential for generation of contamination by similar
materials still on orbiL These results should be incorporated into the Space
Shuttle Program's assessment discussed in Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 28.
The Space Shuttle Program should develop and publish data indicating
temperature ranges and locations within the payload bay that should be
avoided by payloads sensitive to vapor or condensation of Orbiter supply
water, waste water, flash evaporator system water, reaction control system
(RCS) jet combustion products, and leaking RCS propellants.
Continue to provide to EVA astronauts clear and detailed training in what, ff
any, items in or near the EVA work areas should not be touched by them.
These items should be represented by mock-ups during training to ensure
that EVA procedures can be accomplished without contact with the "no-
touch .t zones.
For as long as the HST is in service, the HST Project should use strict
configuration control to maintain the fidelity of their High-Fidelity
Mechanical Simulator.
For both the Space Shuttle and the Space Station Programs, continue and
expand the efforts to make training mock-ups that are dimensionally as
flight-like as possible. Be alert to any differences between training and flight
hardware and incorporate the necessary precautions into the training plan to
avoid negative trainin 8. Take precautions to prevent damage from handling,
shipping, etc., and deterioration from corrosion, inadequate maintenance, etc.
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Develop and verify the adequacy of a multi-layer insulation (MLI) repair kit
for future HST servicin 8 missions. It should enable EVA astronauts to repair
the black MLI inside the telescope cavities and the MLI external to the
telescope and to repair light leaks resulting either from micrometeoroid or
other damage to the telescope or from poorly fitting doors or light seals.
35. Reassess the feasibility of developing a method for detecting light leaks in
the HST during futuze servicing missions.
For complex missions a management plan should be developed early in the
planning flow. The development and execution of the plan should be
coordinated among the various elements of the mission team.
37. For critical missions, including HST servicing and Space Station assembly
and maintenance missions, a multidisciplinary team should be established to
provide a thorough and comprehensive independent assessment of flight
readiness. The team should identify areas of potential risk and make
recommendations of appropriate actions to enhance mission success.
The team must possess a relevant experience base. The team leader and panel
chairs must possess broad program experience. The core team members
should be selected for applicable technical background and mission
experience, including EVA experience from a similar mission or membership
in a previous similar assessment effort. The team should identify and use a
large pool of independent experts, both internal and external to NASA in all
key areas. It should plan for sub-panel assessment activities to be led or
coordinated by a core member of the team.
There should be established a good understanding of, and agreement on, the
team's objectives, approach, and schedule, among the team, mission
management, payload (e.g., Space Station} and Space Shuttle program
management, and contractors. The team should establish close and on-going
interaction with the mission team management. A Mission Director, if
assigned, should be the overall focal point for interface and should establish
the process for contractor interface. The team should establish a formal
process for working with the mission team, using an informal working
relationship but maintaining a formal response and action process.
The team's effort should begin with payload hardware design reviews and
continue until launch. The team should develop a plan of action and
milestones for team effort based on established funding,. It should optimize
its level of effort for available funding and carefully track costs. The team
should strive to minimize disruption by scheduling their reviews in
coordination with established events and milestones for mission hardware,
for Space Shuttle Program (SSP) mission preparation milestones, and center
and Headquarters reviews. Their readiness review effort should be expanded
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for critical design review and test readiness reviews. A small sub-panel of
technical experts should participate in hardware reviews. Their expertise
should include EVA experience as appropriate. Their effort should focus on
design, testing, interfaces, fit, and processing. The team's effort should again
be expanded for mission planning and mission preparation activities. The
team should influence mission operation plans and contingencies.
The team should make extensive use of lessons learned data bases from
related activities. It should make extensive use of available data and
individual team members should conduct reviews prior to the collective
assessment effort in order to minimize travel.
It should conduct an independent assessment of the flight worthiness of the
design, the fabrication and testing, and the integration and preparation of the
mission hardware, software, and supporting systems. The team's review
should assess exceptions to performance and build norms, analyze waivers
and deviations, review failures and their resolutions, and assess payload
hardware-to-Orbiter interfaces. The team should also review preflight
planning activities, trainin 8 and simulation plans, and mission plans. The
mission management should be reviewed regarding structure, processes,
responsiveness, and effectiveness. The team should assess closure of
anomalies and management response to review team issues and
recommendations.
38. Establish nighttime Shuttle training aircraft (STA) training requirements for
the commanders and pilots of all Space Shuttle missions. This is especially
critical for missions scheduled to land at night and for ground-up rendezvous
missions, which have the potential for landing at night, depending on when
they are launched. Establish requirements for demonstrated minimum
performance levels for night landings.
To help ensure efficient and successful planning and execution of complex
EVA missions, it is important that EVA task priorities be established as early
as possible, preferably well before the standard time of publication of the
Payload Integration Plan, and before the occurrence of the Cargo Integration
Review.
40.
41.
Scheduling of critical EVAs before flight day four should be done only for
missions whose critical crewmembers have an established history of being
free of Space Adaptation Syndrome symptoms by the flight day of the EVA,
and should be done only with the concurrence of the crew and the flight
surgeon, based on a thorough analysis of pre-EvA activities and timeUnes.
For the future HST servicing missions, as well as for all other critical EVA
missions, including Space Station assembly and maintenance missions, it is
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important to develop comprehensive collections of photography (including
videotape and digital imagery) of the flight hardware, organized in a manner
that will support timely analysis and troubleshootin 8. To the extent possible,
plan to make a complete photographic record of the prelaumch and on-orbit
configurations of deployed hardware to help ensure that future mission
planning will be based on accurate data. Imagery data should be maintained
in a readily accessible, rapid-retrieval system. See Mission Director's
Recommendations No. 25 and No. 71.
To provide dearer decision-making guidelines for matters involving crew
activity constraints, the authority to waive constraints in Appendix K of the
Space Shuttle Crew Procedures Management Plan should be dearly defined.
For critical EVA tools and batteries, ensure that ample in-flight backups are
available. If the use of power tools is essential to the completion of required
tasks, fly enough tools and batteries to accommodate multiple failures of
each.
Review the performance of the batteries used during the STS-61 EVAS.
Assess the adequacy of the strategy used to manifest the types and quantities
of the batteries that were flown. Compare the STS-61 battery plan to other
techniques and technologies, including in-flight recharging, and other types
of batteries.
Investigate alternatives or improvements to the present foot restraint concept,
to enable an EVA crewmember to be secured at worksites for which the
present foot restraints are not satisfactory.
For each NASA human space mission, designate a single point of contact who
is directly responsible for coordinating the entire safety and mission
assurance effort for the mission (including hardware, systems, and
operations).
NASA should develop a single process that is responsible for all aspects of
EVA safety and mission assurance (S&MA). This process should assess the
integrated EVA-related S&MA aspects of flight crew equipment, other
government-furnished equipment, payload-related hardware, and EVA,
Orbiter, and payload operations.
A mission director should be appointed for future HST servicing missions
and other hishly complex space flights designated by the NASA
Administrator. The mission director should be responsible for the
management direction and overnight of the integration and flight preparation
process and accomplishment of the mission. The mission director's
responsibilities should include oversight of the mission training and
concurrence in the determination of the flight readiness of the flight crew, the
90
Mission Directors Recomn_endations [
_t
0t
51.
integrated operations team, the customer management team, and the mission
management personnel The mission director should provide concurrence in
the date and time of launch, and the launch window. The mission director
should also concur in the mission goals, objectives, priorities, and policies.
The mission director should participate and concur in the selection of the
crew. The mission director should be responsible for the proper coordination
amon 8 the various NASA offices, NASA centers, NASA program managers,
and persons, groups, and organizations external to NASA who have a
responsibility for the safe and successful execution of the mission. The
mission director should establish special committees and/or assessment
teams, as required, to assess the readiness of the STS and cargo to support
mission requirements. The mission director should have final approval
authority of the cargo mix, including secondary payloads, detailed test
objectives (DTOs), and detailed supplementary objectives (DSOs). The
mission dizector should be responsible for the resolution of key issues
involving any aspect of the mission. The mission director should co-chair the
Mission Management Team (MMT). The mission director should be
responsible for ensuring that the Space Transportation System (STS) and
cargo comply with all safety requirements. The mission director should be
responsible for mission assurance and flight readiness of the STS and cargo,
and provide concurrence in resolutions of payload or Orbiter anomalies that
have a potential impact on mission success. The mission director should be a
signatory on certificates of flight readiness that pertain to the specific flight
for which the director has responsibility. The mission director should
provide concurrence in the approval or disapproval of flight specific waivers.
The mission director should represent and report directly to the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight.
The Space Shuttle Program should formalize its various lessons-learned
databases and make them widely available to the Shuttle customer and
design communities. The EVA and Crew Equipment Project Office might be
the proper owner of the EVA and RMS lessons databases.
NASA should complete the development of a NASA-wide and interagency
database of lessons learned from aerospace programs. The input of data into
the database should be made a requirement for government aerospace
programs. The database should be well publicized and easily accessible to
NASA program and project managers.
Expand and use state-of-the-art EVA tools and training methods (such as RMS
II presently installed at MSFC's NBS, Nitrox, virtual reality, improved air-
bearin B techniques, et aL) to perform training and EVA tasks with max/mum
efficiency. Investigate other potential sources of ideas for improvements,
including time-motion studies and the experiences and techniques of the
Russian space program. Especially consider improvements in the area of
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thermal protection of the EVA crewmembers, assessing the desirability of
devices such as hand warmers and an EVA infrared temperature sensor.
_2o Fund and develop a fully integrated EVA training facility (such as the
proposed JSC Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory [NBL]), which would incorporate
a large capacity pool, state-of-the-art RMS simulator, Nitmx, flight-like video
and audio communication capabilities, and any other features useful to
provide the flight crew and flight controllers the best possible end-to-end
EVA training.
_53s For Space Station EVAs and for other EVAs with worksites too large to fit
into underwater tralntn 8 facilities, develop alternate training method(s) that
will accomplish reliable end-to-end timeline quantification and crew training.
Consider the use of virtual reality to provide three-dimensional training for
handling large masses and to develop methods of translating objects that
cannot be simulated in water-training facilities.
54. For EVA flight crews, develop and provide training EMUs that have flight-
like stiffness.
55. To minimize negative EVA training, continue to quantify shortcomings of
training facilities and to make sure that the differences between the training
and flight environments are well understood by the flight crew. Work to
eliminate these differences where possible. Also, where possible, provide
alternate part-task training to compensate for facility shortcomings.
Maximize the repeated exposure of actual flight hardware to the crew
throughout their training,
56. Continue the refinement of the strength and conditioning program in which
STS-61 EVA crewmembers participated. Implement this program as a
requirement for all assigned EVA crewmembers.
_7o The Space Shuttle Program should review the current bunch criteria and
procedures and incorporate changes that would safely enhance the likelihood
of supporting the expected requirement for a five-minute launch window for
Space Station missions.
58. Shuttle consumables reserved for Orbiter contingency EVAs should not be
reallocated for any other purposes.
_9Q For HST servicing missions and for Space Station missions, continue to
achieve the proper balance of payload commanding performed from the
ground and performed by the flight crew. To the extent practical, maximize
the amount of commanding which can be performed by the flight crew, to
avoid delays caused by waiting for a good air-to-ground communications
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link. Thoroughly rehearse and evaluate the commanding protocols during
joint integrated simulations.
Continue to maximize the amount of end-to-end communications and
commandin 8 testing performed before critical missions.
For the next HST servicing mission, fully understand the potential for
acquiring inverted data from the lIST. If the capability for in-flight rewiring
is determined to be necessary, make the necessary preflight modifications to
Orbiter equipment to allow the crew to perform this action with minimal
effort (e.g., operating a simple switch).
Identify requirements for joint center operations as early as possible in the
mission flow to allow time to resolve technical, budgetary, and administrative
issues w/thout causing impacts to mission schedules.
The Space Station Program should thoroughly assess requirements for
integrated RMS/EVA training in comparison to available facilities. If it is
determined that facilities at other centers are required (e.g., MSFC's Neutral
Buoyancy Simulator), necessary intercenter agreements should be established
as soon as possible to ensure availability and proper configuration of
facilities.
For HST servicing missions and for critical Space Station assembly missions,
NASA should consider designating a crewmember to serve as both EVA
Capcom and backup EVA crewmember.
Maximize communication among all organizations supporting critical
missions, both before and during the missions, to minimize wasted effort and
inaccurate data. This communication can be facilitated by periodic technical
interchange meetings and by regular management meetings similar to the
biweekly STS-61 mission status telecons conducted by the Mission Manager.
Also maximize use of electronic systems for the transfer of verbal and
graphical communications, including photographs and engineering drawings,
among the entire mission team.
Establish a single NASA-wide set of underwater diving requirements (dive
tables}.
For critical EVA missions, continue to maximize the amount of preflight
experience the EVA crew receives with the actual flight hardware.
For the second and subsequent HST servicing missions, mission planners
should again develop a list of primary tasks, which would trigger a
contingency mission if not completed.
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To the extent possible, critical EVA mission timelines should be arranged
such that at the completion of each EVA day, the payload (or Space Station) is
in the best possible configuration to be left in, in case the Orbiter must
deorbit before the next EVA.
Perform sufficient failure analysis of returned HST components to ensure
that failure causes are understood. Also look for signs of degradation other
than those which caused the failures.
The Mission Operations Directorate should develop a computerized system
to support decision making during real-time EVA mission replanning. The
system should provide the flight team with access to information related to
the EVA timeUne and procedures; tool histories, performance capabilities,
and locations; and payload configuration. It should also provide access to
photographs and engineering drawings. See Mission Director's
Recommendations No. 25 and No. 41.
To the extent practical, expose the participants of joint integrated simulations
to all the nominal mission activities.
Reassess the rationale for not verifying the redundancy of all HST systems,
now that the telescope has been serviced. Consider verifying the function of
redundant elements whose health is not now known, where such verification
would not risk the health of the HST. This verification should be performed
early enough to allow replanning of the second servicing mission, should
components be in need of replacement.
Prior to critical missions, especially the HST servicing missions and Space
Station Assembly missions, perform detailed thermal analysis and modeling
to verify that crewmembers and hardware are not subjected to temperatures
beyond their functional limits. Beta angle of the mission's orbital plane(s)
should be included in the analysis. This analysis for the Space Station's
worst-case altitude, inclination, attitude, configuration" and beta angle should
be performed as soon as possible. See also Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 10.
EVA hardware, including all tools, supplied by multiple NASA organizations
should be manufactured to standardized NASA-wide certification
requirements, and be controlled by a single configuration control board.
Performance verification (including fit checks and verification of thermal
tolerance) requirements should likewise be standardized.
Technical information" including certification data, related to flight tools and
other EVA hardware, should be maintained in a rapidly accessible format to
support replanning and failure assessments during missions.
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Verify that the hardware and software to be used for critical mission
operations are not to be used outside the operational ranges for which they
were certified. Also verify that the certification requirements used for this
hardware and software are consistent with current program certification
guidelines.
For HST servicing missions and all other missions having payloads sensitive
to contamination, specify any purge purity requirements early enough in the
mission processing flow to allow for verification of the capability to comply
with those requirements. Consider the use of special ground servicing
equipment (e.g., JPL's purge purification equipment) to meet requirements
too stringent to be met with standard equipment.
For HST servicing missions and all other missions having payloads sensitive
to contamination, have in place at the launch site a comprehensive plan to
protect the payloads from all sources of contamination, including human-
generated and natural sources.
For critical or sensitive missions, minimize the number of any untried or
unusual mission preparation activities (e.g., launch pad refurbishment) or
flight activities that do not serve to increase chances of mission success.
Conduct an independent assessment of the contamination control procedures
performed at KSC for STS-61. Assess them for adequacy for the second HST
servicing mission. Verify implementation of corrective action to prevent
recurrence of wind-blown contamination of the Payload Change-out Room, or
any other payload processing facility.
Continue the practice of not scheduling EVA crewmembers to perform EVAs
on consecutive days. Exceptions should be allowed only on a contingency
basis, with the concurrence of the crew, the flight surgeon, and the mission
management team.
Establish a single NASA-wide set of standards for the definition of payload
command and data parameters.
Continue to develop EVA methods to remove jammed mechanisms and bolts.
Design goals should include the capability to impart large forces to the
jammed mechanisms or bolts, while transferring little force to payloads or
other structures.
Complete the design of and incorporate the liquid cooling and ventilation
garment (LCVG) bypass into EMUs to be used during potentially cold EVAs
during critical missions.
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For critical EVA missions, substantial early attention should continue to be
devoted to developing and training for contingency procedures. Those
procedures that have a reasonable chance of being needed should be
accommodated in the EVA ttmeUne.
Perform a thorough analysis of all available data to understand the probable
operational lifetime of HST components. The results of this enhanced
analysis could then be used to better schedule component replacement on
HST servicing missions.
During a Space Shuttle mission, no DTO or DSO should be conducted if it
has the potential to hinder the crew's complete accomplishment of the
primary tasks.
For critical missions, especially including Space Station missions, which will
likely have only five-minute launch windows, develop detailed crew training
and hardware maintenance plans and schedules to be followed in case of a
significant launch delay.
For critical missions that include crew operations scheduled to occur during
normal sleep hours, implement a formal plan to facilitate the sleep-shifting of
the mission support personnel (including management) before launch.
Continue the development and use of the portable in-flight landing
operations trainer (PILOT).
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Payload Officers Recommendations
The following list of recommendations is excerpted from the Mission
Operations Directorate's STS_I Payload Officer Mission Report. written by the
Payloads Support Operations Section of the Mission Operations Directorate of the
Johnson Space Center.
Ao
1.
.
,
.
,
.
Mission Planning and Preparation
We recommend that no significant change be made to the Servicing Mission
Operations Concept in the areas of MCC [Mission Control Center]/STOCC
[Space Telescope Operations and Control Center] interfaces for subsequent
missions.
We recommend that an extended shift overlap be exercised on future EVA-
intensive missions involving integrated crew/ground command activity.
We recommend that future missions define the working relationship between
the FCT and customer EVA cadre early and train/debrief it often to allow it to
become habit for the integrated team.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendations
No. 21, No. 22 and No. 23.
We recommend that a) priority be given to the early development of EVA
contingency documentation, and b) any trend toward off-line contingency
planning during EVA or other critical mission phases be discouraged.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 86.
The EVA Working Group splinter to the HST Servicing Mission POWG forum
should be maintained in the planning of future servidng missions.
We encourage the project to continue the SMOWG [Servicing Mission
Operations Working Group] forum for future servicing missions.
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We recommend that the flight director office continue the practice of providing
regular opportunities for internal MOD tag-up meetings in the planning of
complex missions that require new and innovative ways of doing business.
We recommend that complex missions perform a similar dry run FOR process
as part of the POWG forum during the months preceding the actual FOR to
improve the effectiveness of the FOR process.
We recommend that long duration simulations spanning multiple shifts be
utilized as often as possible for complex missions, with a minimum of two such
sims to allow team performance problems to be identified and resolved.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendations
No. 21, No. 22 and No. 72.
We recommend that future sim scripts include systems anomalies to be dealt
with by the planning team in parallel to performing the replan function.
We recommend that future missions take advantage of any early training
opportunities to work out communications problems between centers prior to
the first FIS.
The Mission Director agrees.
We recommend that a JSC training counterpart become involved in GSFC
internal sim planning at the outset and provide coordination of simulated
anomalies, and simulated air-to-ground interchange. If this cannot be achieved,
then at a minimum the GSFC sire director should pre-brief the JSC team on the
anomalies he intends for us to report or respond to so that we can "fake it"
better.
The Mission Director agrees.
We recommend that the GSFC sire team include more SSE-related material in
future internal sire scripts.
We recommend that future training plans incorporate early opportunities to
include the integrated EVA team, with scripting that takes advantage of their
participation.
We recommend that high priority be given to contingency planning for
any complex or high priority mission well in advance of the FOR.
The Mission Director agrees, See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 86.
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We recommend that future servicing missions continue [to provide] the crew
with the ability to proceed with EVA servicing with a minimum of ground
interaction, if necessary.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 59.
Future missions should consider carefully whether an FDA on any given
measurement is required. If no crew action is driven by an indication, then
don't FDA the parameter unless requested to do so by the flight crew.
We recommend that the PLAIDS model of HST be maintained and upgraded, as
required, to support future servicing mission planning.
The Mission Director agrees.
We also recommend that the practice of performing an independent verification
of PLAIDS results using the RSOC [Rockwell Space Operations Contractor]
clearance analysis tool be continued.
g.
1.
.
HST Overations
Additional effort should be given to docmnenting the materials and
construction of the FIST components for future missions. The information
should be readily available during flight to help plan and react to possible EVA
scenarios.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendations
No. 2, No. 25, No. 41, and No. 71.
We recommend a broader distribution of engineering test results by the
sponsoring organization among the operations community in the POWG or
Flight Techniques Panel forums, with emphasis on operations impacts resulting
from test anomalies and work-arounds.
The Mission Director agrees.
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We recommend that, for payload comm-intensive missions, the lead Payload
Officer draft a memo to the lead INCO [Instrumentation and Communications
Officer] prior to the Flight Operations Review that summarizes the mission-
unique communications configurations and requirements for the INCO team.
We believe that this will assist the INCO team in reviewing the FOR data
package and preparing for start of simulations.
We recommend that the INCO comm plan be briefed at the mission-specific
Flight Techniques Panel prior to start of simulations, and the INCO Comm
Management memo be distributed well in advance of flight.
The Mission Director agrees.
We recommend that a multidisciplinary team from MOD (including payload
operations, flight planning, GNC [guidance, navigation and control] and RMS),
Cargo Integration, and Engineering Directorate (including Draper) be formed to
study suggested improvements in how coupled loads analyses are planned,
implemented, and disseminated to the operations community. A debrief of the
GSFC and Swales personnel involved in STS-61 should be included in this
assessment.
The Mission Director agrees.
Future spacecraft that rely on the Orbiter for repeated visits should be designed
for compatibility with the Orbiter payload communications system.
We see no significant value in pursuing additional PSP [payload signal
processor] bypass testing in an effort to understand how the PI works in this
configuration, which has always been considered outside its specification. We
have a system that works, and have work-arounds defined should an inversion
occur.
See Mission Director's Recommendation No. 61.
We recommend that a team from GSFC and JSC be formed to develop methods
and/or tools that will prevent misunderstandings on parameter definition in the
Command and Data Annex on future missions.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 83.
We recommend that a formal SAIL test be performed on payload GPC displays
using a payload-provided telemetry tape at the earliest opportunity subsequent
to engineering cycle release, and that customer personnel support this test and
participate in identifying and closing out discrepancies.
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We recommend that, in the absence of any network or Orbiter hardware
changes that will reliably alleviate the problem with transmitting 4 kbps DF-224
memory dump data on Ku-band channel 2, future missions be planned such
that...
1) DF-224 computer dumps be performed direct via TDRSS, or
2) the project assess the feasibility of a 32 kbps memory dump format
that will allow dumping of the HST computer via the Orbiter PDI
[payload data interleaved.
Present predictions indicate that a reboost will be required on the next servicing
mission, which in turn will require the SAs to be fully retracted and latched to
the side of the spacecraft. It is also believed that an STOCC-commanded PDM
stow is unlikely based on the following STS-61 flight experience:
1) The switch guards would most probably interfere with a full PDM
stow, and
2) During -V2 SDM retraction, the solar array deployment mechanism [SADM]
slipped outside the PDM stow range.
We therefore recommend that the next servidng mission be planned to include
a manual PDM stow (including replacement of the switch guards to the
NORMAL position) as part of the nominal EVA timeline.
The Mission Director agrees.
The FIST telemetry to be used by the crew that is dependent on the DIUs should
be documented in the CSM [Cargo Systems Manual] or other ground document.
A channelization table would help prevent any future confusion on the impact
DILl problems will have on the crew telemetry.
The Mission Director agrees.
Based on STS-61 flight experience, we recommend that the SA slew procedure
be simplified to remove use of a delay timer.
The program should consider relocating the standard switch panel to L10 or Lll
to improve flight crew access to critical payload functions.
We recommend that the SSE wiring be modified to telemeter command signals
from the SSP to the ground via the flexible multiplexer/demultiplexers [MDlVis]
on the FSS.
We recommend that the standard switch panel harness for the PSP BYPASS
switch be modified to feedback a signal to the corresponding switch talk-back
that will indicate that the switch output is present.
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Use of the ESC [electronic still camera] should be considered for future missions
involving complicated tasks which might involve detailed troubleshooting
tasks.
We recommend that the PDIP [payload data interleaver panel] relay be wired to
a PF [payload operational instrumentation MDM-forward] MDM discrete to
allow INCO to configure the ESC interface to the Ku system as required via up-
link command.
We recommend that any agreements to transfer technical data between control
centers be formally documented in the JOIP [Joint Operations Interface
Procedures] so that such agreements receive broader exposure to and review by
the integrated ops community.
The Mission Director agrees.
A JOIP procedure must be written detailing appropriate personnel to be
contacted for Ku-band coverage information in the event that off nominal
Orbiter attitudes prevent the use of the daily Flight Plan.
We recommend that for future servicing missions the REPLAN and HST
COORD loops be assigned an "owner" position to assist in keeping loop
protocol and traffic appropriate to the loops' assigned functions.
We recommend that the SYSTEMS MANAGER customer position in the CSR
[Customer Support Room] take more of a lead role in coordinating EVA-related
inputs to the SSP FCT, and, when EVA-related decisions are made that effect the
health and safety of the HST or SSE that these calls be made by the SMM
[Servicing Mission Manager] or SYSTEMS MANAGER on PRIME OPS fi.e.
implement the coordination plan developed by ourselves and the EVA folks).
C*
1.
.
.
S_E Operations
We recommend that DPC [direct power converter] load sharing characteristics
for this specific set of flight units be more completely docmnented preflight for
the operations team.
We recommend a reevaluation of the EVA indicator light design on both the
RSIPE and ASIPE [axial scientific instrument protective enclosure] before any
reflight. We also suggest the addition of the microswitch telemetry on the crew
spec in the event that a similar failure occurs in the future.
While issues were discussed in many different meetings, we recommend that a
clear summary list of all known issues/failures/concerns based on ground
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testing be generated and distributed preflight by the project to the operations
community.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 65.
D.
1.
.
.
.
.
.
Requirements _entation
We suggest a process to keep the SSP and customer in sync contractually, while
minimizing unnecessary paper traffic to maintain a product that is NOT used
during sims or flight:.
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
Baseline the FOSA [Flight Operations Support Annex] at the CIR
Proceed with development of flight documentation (without
concurrent FOSA CR traffic)
Execute the Flight Operations Review
At conclusion of the FOR board, have the customer sign a CR that
deletes procedural data from the FOSA and references the flight
documentation as the official repository of payload requirements
(including approved FOR DNs).
Subsequent to the FOR, process 482s to payload procedures with an
attached Mission Integration Change Request (MICR) to be signed by
the customer or consider having customers concur directly to 482s.
We feel that the above approach could be applied to other ops-related annexes
as well.
We recommend that the blank book FOSA should be modified to have book
managers document payload flight rule inputs in a format consistent with the
flight product.
We feel that the procedural parts of the FOSA format should be reworked
(based on present office technology) to more closely emulate the flight products.
As with the flight rule experience described above, this could enable the
community to work in terms of the desired end product much earlier in the
process instead of waiting until the FOR to see their inputs in flight form for the
first time.
We recommend that the usefulness of section 5.0 of the blank book FOSA be
revisited. If a user can be identified, we should find out if they are getting what
they need from the existing system.
We encourage rigorous pursuit by the [Payload Operations] branch of office
technologies which enhance our connectivity to the INTERNET to allow free
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flow of written information between our organization and our customers and
coworkers within MOD and SSPO.
The Mission Director agree_
We recommend that a team composed of TJ [Space Shuttle Integration and
Operations Office's Cargo Engineering Office (at ]SC)] and representatives of
SSP customer and user organizations be formed to investigate how application
of present office technology might improve the distribution of technical data
(mechanical and electrical engineering drawings, photographs, etc.).
The Mission Director agrees.
We recommend that TJ participate in the FOR process and have representation
on the FOR board to assure that operations planning reflects the most recent
engineering prior to start of integrated training.
E.
1.
.
Flight Data File Development
We recommend that for any future shuttle mission, if a book manager and the
FDF [Flight Data File] support personnel have been industrious enough to
incorporate all FOR results into the FDF in sufficient time for JIS start, regardless
of the nature of the data, that the material should and must be made available to
the flight crew and ground team for training.
The Mission Director agrees.
We propose that DSI [data source information] records are not required for
payload procedures. Operating data for payload procedures are, by definition,
provided by the customer. Their review of the FDF at the FOR is, in our
opinion, equivalent to concurrence that the operating parameters in the FDF are
correct. Subsequent changes to the FDF via 482 should not be made without
customer concurrence.
F.
1.
.
Ground Documentation
CSM development should utilize electronic transfer of customer drawings and
data to streamline product development. Technology stiU needs to be put in
place to avoid unnecessary drawing regeneration at JSC.
The Mission Director agrees.
Early in-house production of preliminary CSMs should be utilized were feasible
to improve product development.
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G.
1.
.
o
.
.
.
.
Cgnsol¢ Operations
We recommend that each console be equipped with existing office technology,
such as a WINDOWS-capable PC on a MPSR-LAN [multi-purpose support
room-local area network]. In the interim, a more central location for the one
existing PC we have would be helpful. Ideally, connectivity to a PC located at
the PAYLOADS console would improve real-time development and
coordination of paper products (flight notes, payload status, anomaly log
inputs, etc.).
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 65.
We recommend investigation of alternative ways of transmitting execute
package information to improve print quality and usability at the remote site.
One possible improvement is establishment of a remote laser printer capability
from the Flight Planning System to a laser printer at GSFC, similar to the
arrangement we have had between VAX computers at MSFC and a local laser
printer here for Spacelab replanning products.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 65.
We recommend investigation of a digital video capability that will allow low-
cost transmission of opaque TV video to remote destinations for use in real-time
review of up-link messages by remote centers.
We recommend that MEWS be modified to show MET instead of GMT on
request.
We recommend a formal statement from DJ at the MOD Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) providing the status of updates yet to be incorporated in the
MOC [mission operations computer] flight load, and tracking of those open
items to closure.
Baseline in the FOSA the specific arrangements for delivery of customer EGSE
[electrical ground support equipment], including proper forms, points of
contact, and preferred shipping methods.
We suggest that connectivity to the TMIS [Technical Management Information
System] and the INTERNET be provided in the CCC [Consolidated Control
Center].
105

Appendix C
EVA Section Recommendations
The following recommendations are excerpted from the $TS-61 EVA
FLIGHT REPORT, written by the EVA Section of the Mission Operations Directorate
of the Johnson Space Center.
,
.
°
,
TASK SUMMARY
DF42 and CB should be involved as early as possible in all future EVA and ORU
hardware design to maximize the chances of mission success.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's
Recommendations No. 14 and No. 16.
In a limited resource environment tool and crew aid fit verification could be
limited to the primary tools and two levels of redundancy with little additional
risk to mission success. In a mission with large numbers of tools and interfaces
this savings would be worth pursuing.
The Mission Director agrees.
All fit checks conducted by the flight crew should be considered verification -
the fit should already have been confirmed by other personnel. DF42 and the
flight crew should participate in fit checks as the schedule permits to increase
familiarity with flight hardware. The flight crew should verify the fit of primary
hardware but should not be required to fit check redundant or backup hard-
ware.
If acceptable go/no go gauges are not currently available, they should be
developed so that fit checking all tools to all interfaces would not be required.
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10.
11.
A single specification for PFR sockets and a single go/no go gauge reflecting
flight thermal conditions should be accepted and used to fit check PFR sockets
prior to their incorporation into flight hardware.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 75.
[H]TV tests should be required as part of the certification process for all new
complex EVA hardware that cannot be practically cycled in an unmanned
chamber.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendations
No. 8 and No. 10.
Thermal tool fit problems should be identified prior to flight crew [human]
thermal vacuum runs; these should be used to verify tool fit, not to make the
initial thermal fit check.
The Mission Director agrees.
The differences between engineering mockups and mass simulators and the
flight hardware should be documented as early as possible and this information
should be supplied to DF42 and updated as required.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendations
No. 2 and No. 33.
A more efficient use of limited EVA tool resources would be to eliminate
duplicate efforts, particularly within the same organization, on tool
development.
The Mission Director agrees.
A one-hand operation end effector should be developed. The system should
maintain flexibility to allow crewmembers to select their preferred mini-work
station end effector.
For flights with similar complexity or those with numerous tools and/or
possible stowage locations, early configuration control is necessary to facilitate
accurate tracking and stowage.
The Mission Director agrees.
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12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
A tool board similar to the HST Tools CCB, separate from the existing GFE CCB,
should be established for generic EVA hardware development as well as for
flights that have a need for a significant amount of new EVA tool development.
Also see Mission Director's Recommendation No. 75.
Future Annex 11s should focus on providing the appropriate level of technical
information without the burden of procedural details. (Also a recommendation
from _9.)
Every effort should be made to minimize call-outs in the IV column. The EVA
checklist should be produced in a modular form where feasible.
A detailed desk top payload model should be provided for DF42 as early as
practical for flights of similar complexity. The model should be available when
the flight crew is assigned and remain at JSC during the flight.
The Mission Director agrees.
The Flight Planning System should be used to develop EVA timelines for future
missions. DF42 needs a paraprofessional position to assist the EVA checklist
book manager and to perform these duties for future missions.
DF44/RMS personnel should provide RMS translation estimates as soon as
possible in the mission design factoring in appropriate adjustments for setup.
Timelines should be constructed from early water tank times combined with
RMS translation estimates and other requirements such as photo/TV
requirements and commanding. Although the crew will become more
proficient and able to execute the tasks more quickly in later neutral buoyancy
runs, the lirnelines should not be shortened.
The Mission Director agrees.
One JIS should be performed for every scheduled EVA. This JIS does not have
to be wet. This decision should be based on the degree of realism that will be
achieved on the simulated video down-link. Only one pre-JIS session per EVA
team is required for missions with related EVAs.
The Mission Director disagrees. See Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 21.
Crew schedules and training requirements for complex, multiple EVA flights
should reflect the increased time requirements for WETF training exercises.
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21.
24.
25.
26.
27.
The HST Project needs to increase funds available for neutral buoyancy
mockups. Funds will be necessary to repair mockups in addition to increasing
the fidelity of HST worksites for future servicing missions.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 33.
An audit should also be performed to verify that accurate fidelity is represented
in the mockups. Flight like shear plates should be added to all aft shroud doors.
Strong consideration should be given to fabricating a second HST neutral
buoyancy mockup and leaving it resident at the NBS.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendations
No. 33.
A set of mockups must be present at JSC for all complex flights from ap-
proximately L-4 weeks to landing.
The video hard copy machine should be available for all WETF training events
and underwater still photo support should be eliminated.
Training in a facility the size and fidelity of the NBS is required to properly
develop and verify timelines and to provide end to end training. The RMS
crewmember should be involved in neutral buoyancy training for future
missions with significant RMS/EV [extravehicular] interaction.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 52.
The trips to GSFC to observe/participate in flight hardware exercises were
extremely valuable and greatly increased the probability of mission success.
Training of this type should be conducted on all future missions with complex
EVAs.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 67.
Support of Orbiter CEITs [crew equipment interface tests] by DF42 and flight
crew often results in discovery of misconfigured flight hardware and increases
the potential for a safe and successful mission.
The Mission Director agrees.
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29.
31.
32.
33.
35.
37.
The payload bay walk-down should be supported by DF42 on all flights with
scheduled or complex unscheduled EVAs.
The Mission Director agrees.
When planning an EVA that will occur at temperatures outside the experience
base, an EV crewmember from that flJght should perform an [H]TV test.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 9.
For complex EVAs with extensive customer interaction, the TIMELINE and
MPSR SUPPORT positions should be added to the execute shift.
The need for the EVA TECHNICAL LIAISON position in the CSR should be
evaluated on a flight-specific basis.
EV crewmembers should not be required to translate with devices such as the
fish stringer.
Problems experienced in 1-G should be thoroughly evaluated to determine if
they will exist on-orbit; DF42 and CB should be provided information regarding
ground test problems that may result in on-orbit problems.
The Mission Director agrees.
Late hardware changes need to be exhaustively examined for potential
operational impacts.
The Mission Director agrees.
WETF training EMUs should have stiffness added to better replicate flight
conditions.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 54.
Truly captive pip pins which do not require hitch pins should be used when
required for temporary stowage.
EMU
Having multiple onboard copies of the EVA Prep, Post EVA, and EMU Status
procedures should be considered for all multiple EVA flights.
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39.
0.
41.
42.
43.
45.
49.
0.
Performing portions of Middeck Prep the day before each EVA is required in
order to get out of the hatch on time.
Any EMU hardware not provided at Bench Review should be appropriately
tracked.
The Mission Director agrees.
Future training should incorporate the leaky IDB work-around until the
redesign is implemented.
Training should emphasize the importance of a slow repress rate to preclude an
ear block and avoid the waste of consumables for depress/repress.
Future flights with multiple EVAs should manifest two Middeck Battery
Chargers (MBCs) when the impacts of a failure would be significant.
The Mission Director agrees.
A change should be made to the Generic EVA Checklist to combine Post EVA
and Water Recharge procedures.
The additional Post EVA time for reconfiguration of tools for the next EVA
should be reflected in the Flight Plan. A consumables tracking cue card should
be developed for all multiple EVA flights.
The EVA Checklist and Flight Plan should reflect the additional time required
for Post-EVA Entry Prep (PE/EP) or stress should be placed during training on
the amount of time required, especially if the tools are required to be restowed
in their launch configuration.
The new EMU stowage straps should be kept in the inventory for Mir and Space
Station missions that require the external airlock.
A training log system should be used for future, high visibility EVA flights.
It may be helpful in future instances to put together an outline of topics to cover
for the additional EMU C'WS [caution and warning system] classes.This option
should be made available to all scheduled EVA flights.
The nominal training flow for scheduled EVA flights should have two separate
CWS classes for the ETA run and final CWS classroom session.
A tabletop EVA Prep/Post dass is not necessary unless significant changes to
the procedures are required.
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51.
52.
53.
55.
Importance needs to be placed on the schedule for EVA Prep/Post classes. The
first class should be performed early in the training flow schedule. The final
class should be scheduled within the last few weeks of training when all or most
of the EVA tools and hardware are available and stowage is finalized.
For experienced EV and IV crewmembers, EMU donning should only be
required for one of the EVA Prep/Post classes.
Any tools that are required to be taken out of the cabin during an EVA should
be brought to EVA Prep/Post classes. These tools should be stowed in the
appropriate location and set up during the dass.
IV crewmembers should be requested to support both EV crewmembers' ETA
chamber runs for additional Class I EMU hardware experience.
A scheduled EVA crew should be given as much Class I EMU experience as is
possible.
The MBC trainer should produce the same light output as the flight units.
Crew schedules and training requirements for complex, multiple EVA flights
should reflect the increased time requirements for WETF training exercises.
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Appendix D
STS-61 Crew Comments and Recommendations
The following general comments and recommendations were made by one or
more STS-61 crewmembers during various debriefings following the mission. The
individual comments do not necessarily represent the opinion of the entire crew.
More specific comments relating to hardware and procedures can be found in the
STS-61 EVA Debriefing (JSC-26584) and in the STS-61 crew report.
* RMS II and Nitrox systems in NBS were crudal to mission preparation.
• Having to travel to MSFC's NBS was a significant negative impact.
• The NBL is needed for the Space Station Program.
• The NBL should have a direct-view flight-like window for the RMS operator.
A television camera view is not suffident.
• The Mission Spedalist Training Aircraft was crucial for providing logistical
support, flight training and esprit de corps.
• The new EMU glove thermal covers are great. Their flexibility is similar to
that of broken-in training gloves.
• EMU cooling water flow to the arms is not needed.
• Higher air pressure in training EMUs was not sufficient to simulate greater
stiffness of flight suits.
• Umbilicals and cables also exhibited surprising stiffness on orbit. Training
units should be made stiffer.
• The only training fadUty which could represent the RMS position used for
MISS change-out was the virtual reality facility.
• Payload hardware which is planned to be replaced by EVA crewmembers
should be designed and verified to strict EVA requirements. Hardware which
has any chance of requiring EVA replacement should be at least EVA-
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compatible, with captive fasteners, e.g., but might not require an expensive
verification process.
. Last-minute hardware changes, like the SA lockwire addition, must not only
be shown to the crew, but also must be practiced by the crew.
* It would be beneficial to include EVA on every Shuttle mission.
It is not essential that all crewmembers performing critical EVAs be
experienced, but it is essential that EVAs be designed by experienced EVA
crewmembers. Two experienced EVA crewmembers would have been
sufficient for STS-61.
• The flight crew should help develop a mission's hardware, EVA tasks and
EVA procedures.
• An easy-to-use computer database of EVA experience is needed.
• The Space Station Program should already be taking advantage of EVA DTOs
(EVAs of Opportunity).
• The early naming of the Payload Commander is important to the development
of a mission. Early crew assignment is recommended, especially the EVA
crew, but it should be based on real training milestones and not some arbitrary
date.
• The Mission Director was valuable in interfacing with the various STS-61
review committees.
• A Mission Director, if appointed, should be given dearer authority than was
given for STS-61.
• The performance of water-training sessions in excess of six hours was essential
to the mission, both for end-to-end fidelity and for crew conditioning.
• More than 6000 photographs were made during STS-61, many of them good
enough for engineering evaluations. They should be used for future missions.
• Air bearing facilitytrainingwas invaluable. The last minute Ix)go run was
especiallyhelpful.
• Planning EVAs to be no longer than six hours is the correct approach.
• We still need to better understand task timelines. We did well with our
predictions, but they came largely from the EVA officers' opinions, and not
straight from the WETF and NBS times.
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• There was much greater time spent using training mockups (WETF and NBS)
than using flight hardware (HFMS). Mockup discrepancies caused negative
training.
• Problem-solving practice during training runs is valuable, even if the problem
eventually is determined to be facility-unique.
• A steerable floodlight in the payload bay or on the RMS would be valuable.
• The mission would have been significantly negatively affected if the RMS had
not been available.
• Retention methods for small, loose items are not adequate. Better methods
should be developed.
• Jerry Ross' recommendation to pre-stage the tools and crew aids saved time.
• The HST Project should continue to pursue a method to repair light leaks. A
tape should be obtained which can stick to the telescope.
• Middeck preparation should continue to be scheduled for the day prior to the
EVA.
• The throttling of the air-lock equalization valve during repressurization
should be standardized to help alleviate ear blockage problems.
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EVA Manasement Office Recommendations [
The following recommendations are excerpted from memorandum GA23-94-021,
from the Space Shuttle Program's EVA Management Office.
Joint Center Operations
Issue
Unclear division of responsibilities for Nitrox activities between JSC and MSFC.
Ke_aha.l_
A joint Project and Products Review Team was formed which identified,
delineated and managed technical and programmatic issues between the Centers.
Recommendation
Management needs to identify very early the requirement for joint Center
operations. An appropriate team needs to be formed early in the process so that
issues can be identified and resolved to avoid potential cost or schedule impacts. An
informal group began Nitrox development work in January of 1992, but did not
receive program recognition. Earlier formation of a management-endorsed multi-
Center team to attack issues head-on would likely have prevented the schedule delay
of Nitrox activities at MSFC from June to October.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 62.
Thermal Environment
Issue
The EVA thermal environment exceeded EMU certification limits.
A combination of changes in the orbit and EMU hardware resulted in the ability
to successfully operate in the cold environment.
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Recommendation
Establish the expected orbital environmental conditions early in the flow so that
realistic simulations/analyses/tests can be performed and any needed hardware
modifications started early to avoid last-minute "crunches".
EVA Planning
Issue
Roles for EVA tool responsibilities between Centers were unclear.
Basaluli 
Use of the GFE Tool Board under Larry Bell and the biweekly $1S-61 Mission
Status Telecons under Hal Lambert managed to bracket and eventually control tool
issues/problems/resolution.
Recommendation
Use the recently formed EVA and Crew Equipment Project Office (ECEPO) with
its Project Integration and Operations Office as the point of entry for establishing
EVA requirements for the next Hubble mission. This group, overseeing the EVA
Assessment Team, can realistically evaluate the tasks to be performed; judge whether
or not existing tools and procedures are adequate for the envisioned tasks; suggest
needed changes to existing tools; identify the need for new tools and evaluate in an
iterative fashion the proposed procedures and tools as they come forward. The EVA
Management Office of the ECEPO, with the guidance of the EVA Support Equipment
Review Panel, will assure that the appropriate actions are taken to modify existing
tools and design/fabricate/test and provide new tools.
This procedure should encompass tools suggested by GSFC as well as those
from JSC. The Project Integration and Operations Office of the ECEPO should also be
the focal point for the planning activities leading to the successful conduct of the next
Hubble servicing mission, as it will be performing the same function for all
contingency and scheduled EVA missions starting with STS-64.
The Mission Director agrees with the spirit of this recommendation.
Incorporation of this plan would satisfy Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 75.
The following two related recommendations were also contained in
memorandum GA23-94-021.
Recommendation
Complex EVA operations using a large number of tools and crew aids require
an EVA hardware forum or technical clearinghouse composed specifically of the
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EVA community to resolve crew inputs and hardware modifications, additions, and
deletions.
Such missions also require use of a single configuration-controlled master list of
all EVA hardware on the mission, detailing quantities, part numbers, location, status,
etc. GSFC concurrence is also necessary for HST.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 75.
Right Equipment Processing
For STS-61, there were numerous changes or clarifications in requirements
affecting both intravehicular (IV) and extravehicular (EV) hardware introduced late
into the operational flow at the Flight Equipment Processing Contract (FEPC)
facilities. The FEPC process is flexible enough to absorb some of these types of
changes. However, with the volume that were introduced for STS-61, coupled with
their timing, severe impacts were experienced by FEPC's resource planning and
scheduling controls for both flight and training operations.
Kesalafllm
The STS-61 training and flight were successfully supported, but with
considerable difficulty.
Recommendation
Establish a focal point, having the authority, visibility, and experience to direct
where and when specific tasks are to be performed. This focal point would publish
an overall flight crew equipment (FCE) plan for missions similar to STS-61. When
changes are being evaluated, an implementation plan should be established with
gate reviews to control scheduling. If items cannot support the schedule, they are
candidates for demanifesting. Critical and common milestones should be included in
all plans (i.e. all changes to FCE must be completed and delivered in support of
Bench Review or vacuum chamber runs, etc.). Candidate items for manifesting
should be screened with regard to value added and safety risk. These types of
controls would enhance centralized information and decisions and would support
earlier resolution of issue.
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STS-61 Lessons Learned
Early establishment of the Project Team helped to focus the overall effort.
Members from the various disciplines (project office, stress, loads, materials, safety,
reliability, and quality engineering) within JSC should be assigned as part of the
project team early in the design phase. The team should remain together until
certification is complete. Monthly status meetings with all parties in attendance (this
should include the customer) helps to identify problems early. As major milestones
approach, meetings should become more frequent.
The Mission Director agrees. See also Mission Director's
Recommendation No. 75.
DAx/aim_C. 
Establishment of a Configuration Control Board that has budgetary flexibility
assists in the process of design changes and helps to maintain schedules. Board
members must include representatives from the [GFE] project office and crew.
Flight Hardware Shipments To Vendors/Other Centers
- When flight harclware is requested to be shipped to other centers or vendors to
support testing/fit checks, personnel from quality control and engineering should
accompany the hardware. Traceability is maintained and the hardware usage and
any discrepant condition can be documented.
StandardiT_d Desiwn/Certification Reauirements
Standardized _quirements documents (design and certification) should be
established to assist in the design and certification of EVA hardware by other groups.
Certification requirements document should establish documentation needs for
certification package. Training should be established so that certification flow can be
standardized. Hardware thermal certification testing should not be performed at
nominal mission conditions. Worst case attitudes should be used to assure that the
equipment is able to operate at all conditions. This should be identified as a
requirement.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's
Recommendations No. 8 and No. 75.
12hmal.r.agm
The use of digital pagers (local and national ) should be used for major projects.
The use of these assists in the quick resolution of problems when the team members
are not at their normal phones or on travel.
Post Mission Suvvort
Travel to K_ for post mission support assists in the early identification of
hardware problems and expedites the return of hardware.
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l_arly Coupled Loads Analysis
Normally, the coupleci loads analysis is not finalized until L-4 months. If the
analysis for the hardware comes back showing that the natural frequencies
are less that 35 Hz, major additions to the hardware are required to bring the
frequendes above the 35 Hz levels which severely impacts the schedules. Mini-
modal testing with training hardware to verify the model and early (L-12 months)
coupled loads analysis should be performed to verify that the natural frequencies are
within the structural design requirements.
The Mission Director agrees.
Hardware Trainin_ Coordinator
w
A person was assigned for STS-61 to act as a coordinator for the hardware
required to support training at the various facilities, GSFC, the WETF at JSC, and the
NBS at MSFC. The use of a person in this capacity helps in assuring that the right
hardware is available to support the training exercise and is also able to track the
hardware. This is particularly helpful when the hardware is being supplied by
multiple organizations.
Fit Check Matrix
A matrix of tool-to-tool and tool-to-hardware fit checks should be identified
early in the project. This should be a formal, deliverable document that is presented
and approved at the Critical Design Review. These tests should be noted as major
milestones on the schedules and identification for the location of testing should be
noted. Since these are major tests, time has to be allocated in the KSC schedules to
account for the tests if they cannot be accomplished at the vendors facilities.
The Mission Director agrees.
Certification AvDroval
Final certification of tools and crew aids provided by payload suppliers should
be approved by the EVA & Crew Equipment Projects Office (ECEPO) at JSC and
removed from the review of the Payload Review Safety Panel (PSRP). Presentations
can be given to the PSRP for information purposes only and any actions resulting be
directed to the ECEPO.
See Mission Director's Recommendation No. 75.
Desiim Reviews
All design reviews for items of EVA Tools and Crew Aids should include
representatives from Engineering and SR&QA. Previously, only representatives
from MOD have attended these reviews.
The Mission Director agrees.
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Resident En_n_em
In the area of EVA hardware development, considerable benefit could be gained
by GSFC's sending an engineer to ]SC, and vice-versa, for approximately the last 12-
14 months prior to flight. These resident engineers could work the intercenter
issues/concerns helping to ensure that coordinated engineering decisions are made
during the final months of hardware development. The resident engineers can also
work to ensure that the correct design information is available to the right people.
The resident engineers should be senior engineers, expert in the relevant systems.
This arrangement was successfully used between JSC and Langley Research Center
during the preparation for the EVA Development Flight Experiment during STS-37.
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Crew and Thermal Systems Division's
Recommendations
The following comments and recommendations were submitted by the JSC
Engineering Directorate's Crew and Thermal Systems Division.
EVA Crewmember Thermal Comfort Issues
Action Implemented for STS-61: Orbiter attitude changed to less severe cold
environment
Next Flight Recommendation: Use STS-61 Orbiter attitude. The primary factor in
crew thermal comfort appears to have been the change to a more environmentally
benign attitude.
Actions Implemented for STS-61:
• "4750" Glove Thermal Micrometeoroid Garments (TMGs), thermal overgloves,
multiple arm layer Thermal Comfort Undergarments developed, tested,
certified and flown.
• Liquid Cooling Ventilation Garments (LCVGs) modified to remove cooling
water flow throughout the arms
• Spectra comfort gloves provided as crew option.
Next Flight Recommendation: Use STS-61 hardware configuration as needed per
crew preference.
Mission Director's Comment: These modifications are valuable and
should be made available for all potentially cold EVAs. However, to
better accommodate cold case EVA& the LCVG bypass modification
which was considered but not implemented for STS-61 should also be
incorporated into the EMUs scheduled to be used for cold EVA& See
Mission Director's Recommendation No. 85.
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Action Implemented for STS-61: Thermal insulation added to metal WF/PC
handles when the Space Environment Simulation Laboratory (SESL) tests showed
crew could not grip for required time due to cold hands.
Next Flight Recommendations:
• If use of STS-61 Orbiter attitude not possible, plan to accommodate colder
environment well in advance with SESL testing and on-orbit EVAs to test new
hardware roods and EMU/tool interfaces.
Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendations
No. 8, No. 9, and No. 10.
• Improve thermal specification for payload EVA handholds. Encourage non-
conducting standoffs or composite handholds.
HST Optics Contain/nation Issues
Actions Implemented for STS-61:
• Particulates from TMG material and non-cycled Velcro fastener analyzed early
and determined not to be a concern. Velcro fastener removed from arms gloves
and watch covers. Crewmembers were trained to avoid Velcro cycling.
• Off-gassing of EMU materials analyzed and determined not to be a concern
except for glove/thermal overglove RTV [room temperature vulcanized rubber]
coating. These were vacuum-baked to reduce the chance of contaminating the
HST.
• FEPC processed all hardware as contamination-sensitive per FEMU-R-O01
EMU requirements.
Next Flight Recommendation: Process next HST mission EMU hardware in the
same manner.
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ohn Youn Comments and Recommendations
The following comments and recommendations are paraphrased from Mr. John
Young's memorandum number AC.5-94-05.
Lessons Learned
By August 1992, the Richard Fitts, Joe Allen and Tom Stafford reviews had
produced recommendations for the training and procedures upgrades needed to
make the HST SM-1 a success. Many of these recommendations eventually were
incorporated, but the incorporation process took longer than it should have.
Six-hour Nitmx Traininu in the NBS
v
Apparent misrouting of funds to MSFC caused this training to slip from June to
October. This mistake emphasizes the need for strict and energetic follow-up of all
Hubble Mission support activities.
NBS RMS Uo_rade
The installation of the RMS II at the MSFC's NBS may have been the single most
important end-to-end training capability to ensure Hubble success.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 52.
Use of Virtual Reality
Virtual reality (VR) was used in the early stages of the Hubble servicing mission
to help in determining the correct RMS joint angles for the various crew positions.
Eventually, VR may be coupled to a pressure-suit suspension system and a part-task
trainer to allow full Space Station end-to-end EVA assembly and maintenance.
Recommendation: Perform trade studies now to determine if this type of VR
trainin 8 capability might eliminate the need for a large water-based integrated
EVA training facility (e.g., the proposed Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory).
The Mission Director endorses this pursuit of VR and pressure suit
interactive capability as a supplement to a fully integrated water
training facility, not as a replacement for it.
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Thermal Vacuum Real-World Conditions
Even though astronauts have complained about cold EVA temperatures for
years, it wasn't until the incidence of frostbite in one of the S'IS-61 cold chamber runs
and the cold conditions in the STS-57 EVA simulation of the SIS-61 EVAs that
significant corrective actions were undertaken. Greatly improved EMU glove
thermal covers, better crew thermal control education, and better insulation ideas for
cold operations were all implemented and will apply directly to Space Station
missions, since those missions will not always have the capability to expose the crew
to the earth's albedo.
Tool Certification
Tool certification issues were still being discussed as late as the week before
launch. There were a number of different kinds of tool problems throughout the
preparation for STS-61. Recommendation: Establish a full-time Space Station
Assembly and Maintenance Tool Chief.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's Recommendation
No. 75.
loint Intem_ted Simulations
There was significant initial resistance to performing Joint Integrated
Simulations with the EVA crewmembers in MSFC's NBS and JSC's WETF. However,
this training was accomplished and was very helpful in getting the JSC/GSFC team
ready for the mission.
flubble and Fli_ht Crew Inputs
The STS-61flight crew developed several time-saving ideas, one of which, the
stowage of the primary tools in the Orbiter cabin, was not acted on by mission
planners until Jerry Ross' independent EVA assessment also recommended it. An
unusual amount of cooperation among the flight crew, JSC and GSFC personnel was
integral to the success of the HST SM-1. Person-to-person communications was key
to that cooperation.
EVA Ttmeline Production
The STS-61 EVA crewmembers were very well trained, but were not over-
trained. The EVA time spent during the mission was approximately 8.4 hour in
excess of the 27.1 hours scheduled. The extra time was caused both by tasks taking
longer than planned, and by tasks being added during the mission.
Recommendation: For complex EVA missions conducted during Space Station
Assembly and Maintenance, allow 25 per cent more time in the timeline than the
tasks are expected to take.
The Mission Director agrees. See Mission Director's
Recommendations No. 5 and No. 6.
128
I _ohn Young5 Comments and Recommendations |
Mission Director
Recommendation: "For very complex and important missions that require
extra resources to meet deadlines, I believe some person with an operational staff
should be assigned very early to the missions to worry the details of those
missions full time. However, that person should also be given the authority, if
they are going to get the responsibility, to make the missions happen right. If the
Mission Director had been in the loop sooner, possibly some of the 'took longer
than it should have' could have been corrected earlier."
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PDRS POST MISSION SUMMARY
The following is the complete STS-61 Payload Deployment and Retrieval System
(PDRS) post-mission summary, written by the Lead SIS-61 PDRS Officer.
OVERVIEW
The SIS-61 mission was launched December 2, 1993, and landed at KSC on
December 13. A prior attempt to launch on December I had been scrubbed due to
launch ceiling and KSC crosswind violations. The main objectives for the first
Hubble Space Telescope (t-ISD Servicing Mission were threefold: (1) to restore or
improve scientific capability of the HST, (2) to restore the reliability of HST systems,
and (3) to validate the on-orbit servicing concept planned for HST. Specific tasks
were to rendezvous with and capture the free-flying HST satellite, execute 5 EVAs in
support of servicing the satellite, reboost HST to a higher altitude as propellant
margins would allow, and to re-deploy the telescope into Earth orbit. Plans called for
the RMS (remote manipulator system) to be utilized for all aspects of servicing the
HST except for reboost.
Endeavour (OV-105) was flown with the RMS S/N 303 arm outfitted with the
S/N 303 end effector. The commander of this mission was Richard Covey. RMS
operators were Claude Nicollier [MS2] and Kenneth Bowersox [PLT]. EVA teams
were paired off as the "odd couple", Story Musgrave [MS4] with Jeffrey Hoffman
[MS3] and the "even couple", Kathy Thornton [MS1] with Thomas Akers [MSS].
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POST INSERTION and FLIGHT DAY 1
The crew performed ON-ORBIT INITIALIZATION during thepost-insertion
phase of the flightby configuringtheRMS to Temp Monitor Mode, verifyingGPC
DATA lightfunction,and releasingtheshoulder brace. As the ann was deselected,
an '_596 PDRS ABE COMM" fault message was received. This "ABE-fault"
annunciation was attributed to known timing differences which can occur between
the MCIU [manipulator controller interface unit] and the arm-based electronics
(ABE) whenever the arm is deselected. Similar spurious messages occurred during
STS-57 with the same RMS hardware. ON-ORBIT INITIALIZATION activities were
resumed as the crew completed testing the D&C [display and control] panel lighting,
activating port RMS heater A, and deploying the MPMs [manipulator positioning
mechanisms].
ORBIT - FLIGHT DAY 2
The crew performed RMS POWERUP to uncradle the arm as they prepared for
the RMS CHECKOUT and payload bay surveys. Single, Backup, and Direct drive
tests were conducted followed by checks of the RMS hand controllers, the manual
augmented modes, and the operator commanded auto sequence (OCAS) mode.
Also, per the PDRS procedures, checkout of the end effector in auto and manual
modes was conducted along with a backup payload release test. Backup release
occurred in 9.5 seconds as observed by the Mission Control Center (MCC) and
subsequently verified by operator Nicollier. All RMS subsystems were observed to
perform nominally.
Completion of the RMS CHECKOUT indicated a fully operational robotic arm,
and the next order of business for the crew was to perform a survey of the space
support equipment (SSE) in the shuttle payload bay. This type of scheduled task
provides the RMS operators an excellent opportunity to familiarize themselves with
the actual on-orbit feel of operating the shuttle arm while simultaneously providing
post-launch inspection services of the payload bay. Arm operators are thereby
allowed a chance to fine tune their zero-g technique prior to any critical arm
operations. The arm was maneuvered to provide a cursory scan of various areas in
the payload bay [e.g., orbital replacement unit carrier (ORUC), solar array carrier
(SAC), scientific instrument protective enclosures (SIPE), etc.]. Simultaneously,
berthing preparations for HST were underway. As a matter of convenience and
coincidence, the arm's wrist camera was utilized to monitor portions of the pivot-up
of the Flight Support Structure (FSS) ring. Upon expiration of the allotted time for
SSE survey, the RMS was cradled, latched, and configured to 'q'emp Monitor mode".
During crew sleep, HST operations in preparation for capture and berthing
continued. The STOCC (Space Telescope Operations Control Center) placed both of
HSTs high gain antennae (I-IGAs) in the stow position, however, there were no
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ready-to-latch indications. Consequently, the RMS flight control team began to
develop a survey procedure (MSC,-018) to view the HGA area in question.
ORBIT - FLI(_HT DAY 3
The arm was powered up in preparation for rendezvous and retrieval of the
free-flying HST. Payload ID (PLID) 1 was selected for the arm, and an OCAS
(operator commanded auto sequence) executed by the crew to configure the RMS at
the Poise for Capture position. Subsequently, several burns were completed by
Endeavour to continue closing the gap between the Orbiter and HST. In parallel with
this activity, the STOCC placed HST into a capture attitude. When the Orbiter
intercepted HST, a relative pitch misalignment of about 15 degrees was observed.
This misalignment was within the operational envelope of capturing HST. Bowersox
reported on the A/G loop that the 15 degrees did not present a problem, and the
crew proceeded to grapple HST's +V2 grapple fixture (GFI). Within the MCC, the
RMS team observed a 17 second grapple and rigidization time. RMS brakes were
applied as the crew reconfigured the Orbiter DAP (digital auto-pilo0 and performed
photo documentation.
The crew used Orbiter Loaded mode with rate hold applied in the X-axis to
maneuver the HST/RMS to the FSS Hover position. After translating to the FSS
Hover position, Nicoll/er adjusted the attitude (mainly yaw) to configure the HST for
berthing. In an iterative manner, slight corrections in the Y axis were made as part of
the berthing alignment. RMS brakes were cycled as PLID 2 was selected in
preparation for using the FSS target as the operational reference frame for mating
HST to the FSS ring. Within MCC, the Payloads officer reported the HST reaction
wheels had been Powered down. Berthing was commenced. About 18 inches above
the berth position, Nicollier made some attitude adjustments to bias the orientation of
HST prior to berthing. This was performed to take advantage of the inherent cross-
coupling effects encountered with fine maneuvering of heavy class payloads. RMS
brakes were applied as Story Musgrave reported to MCC the FSS was ready to latch.
The three FSS latches were subsequently dosed, and the FSS umbilical was
mated to the connector on HST. RMS Test mode was entered to relieve any strains
on the arm that may have built up during FSS latching. Next, End Effector mode was
entered, and an auto-release of HSTs grapple fixture was performed to allow the end
effector to back away from the berthed HST.
While the RMS operators selected Orbiter Unloaded mode to begin an HST
survey, other crewmembers reconfigured the shuttle's DAP for an Orbiter attitude
maneuver. The nominal RMS survey of the HST was completed in approximately 26
minutes. An additional HGA latch survey by the RMS (MSC,-018) was performed to
determine if the -V3 HGA latch was in good configuration. Upon viewing the latch
from the starboard side (-V2), the HST customer requested a reverse angle view from
the port side (+V2). While in transit from starboard to port, an elbow pitch
singularity was annunciated. RMS operations were continued without consequence.
133
IAppendix H I
Upon completion of the post-berth surveys, the RMS was maneuvered to an
approximation of the M]_ [manipulator foot restraint] Extended Park position. Prior
to crew sleep, a call to the crew reminded them to set the joint switch to "CR1T
TEMP". This action placed the RMS in a good configuration for overnight park.
ORBIT - FLI(_HT DAY 4
As the airlock was depressed for the start of EVA 1, the Orbiter's robotic arm
was maneuvered from its overnight configuration towards the cabin. The crew
egress was viewed with the elbow camera while Nicollier hovered the arm above the
Airlock Ingress/Egress position. The RMS was brought straight down in Orbiter-Z
to permit an EV (extravehicular) crewperson to tether to the arm. Subsequently, the
EV crewperson (a.k.a. EV2) was transported by the arm towards the stowed MFR
(manipulator foot restrain0. The wrist roll joint was aligned in preparation for
grappling the MFIL Auto end effector mode was used instead of manual mode to
grapple the MFR contrary to the nominal PDRS procedures. No problems were
encountered. Afterward, the arm was repositioned to facilitate MFR ingress. RMS
brakes were applied. In preparation for MFR-attached operations, PLID 3 was
selected to provide an EV2/MFR operational reference frame. Changes in the RMS
joint angle data received in the MCC indicated the EV crewperson was ingressing the
MFR.
The EV2 (Hoffman), after stationing himself on the MFR/RMS work platform,
was maneuvered by the arm operator towards the aft portion of the payload bay to
begin changeout of HST's rate sensing units (RSUs). Various RMS maneuvers at the
RSU worksite and between there and the small ORU protective enclosure (SOPE)
were successfully executed throughout EVA 1. The SOPE housed the replacement
RSUs and stored the original RSUs for ground return. Some difficulty was
encountered by the EV crewpersons with closing FISTs -V3 aft shroud doors after the
RSU swap was completed. As ground teams assessed this problem, Jeff Hoffman
was maneuvered for the electronics control unit (ECL0 changeout. Upon completion
of this task, the next EVA job requiring RMS maneuvers was to change some HST
fuse plugs. After the fuse plug replacements, plans called for a PFR (portable foot
restrain0 to be installed on HST in preparation for the next day's SA changeout task.
As Hoffman was procuring the PFR from the payload bay, his movements while on
the arm caused a "PDRS SLIP EP" annunciation. Slip messages may be expected
whenever an MFR-attached crewmember produces a large jerking motion while RMS
brakes are on. With his communications to the EVA crew, IVC (intravehicular
crewmember) Tom Akers confirmed the annundation coincided with Hoffman's
movements. RMS maneuvering resumed to support installation of the PFR onto
HST. Nicollier carefully avoided the deployed SAs as he positioned Hoffman to the
port location for PFR installation.
Having completed the planned EVA changeouts and installations, payload bay
closeout commenced with particular focus on dosing HST's uncooperative aft shroud
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doors. Another "PDRS SLIP EP" message was annunciated while Hoffman tried to
secure the door. Eventually, a PRD (payload retention device) was strapped across
the doors via the doorknobs which allowed Hoffman and Musgrave to cycle the
middle handle latch to successfully close the aft shroud doors.
Wrapping up the EVA, Nicollier positioned the arm near the cabin for EV
crewperson tool stowage and airlock ingress. As FSS rotation and pivot began in
preparation for retraction of FIST's SA secondary deployment mechanism (SDM),
Hoffman reported removal of the tether between the MFR and RMS end erector.
This was required nightly while the MFR was attached to the RMS to comply with
Orbiter rapid sating requirements. Afterwards, the arm was placed in a good MFR
park configuration, but the crew quickly realized the RMS was needed to view SDM
retraction per the Flight Plan.
Correspondingly, the arm was positioned to support viewing the SDM
retraction. The -V2 array retraction was completed and resulted in requiring a
manual stow of the primary deployment mechanism (PDM) during the next day's
EVA. This could easily be supported by the RMS using nominal PDRS procedures.
Due to deformation of the +V2 SA, Nicollier had to maneuver the arm clear of
structural interference as the FSS rotated HST with its twisted and deployed
appendage. The arm was repositioned for viewing as clearances permitted.
Retraction of the +V2 array was not as successful as the first (-V2) retraction. The
+V2 array was observed to have kinks and twists prior to HST grapple, so the
abnormal retraction was not surprising. The HST Project agreed to plan for a manual
jettison of the array during EVA 2. Upon completion of SDM viewing, the RMS was
maneuvered to the MFR Extended Park position and was placed in a good overnight
park configuration.
As the crew slept, MCC controllers developed a viable sequence for the next
day's events. Correspondingly, an updated Flight Plan was generated.
ORBIT - FLIGHT DAY 5
The replanned EVA 2 timeline scheduled jettison of the +V2 solar array (SA)
and then resumed the nominal SA changeout. Again, as the airlock was
depressurized, the RMS was maneuvered to the Airlock Ingress/Egress position.
Kathy Thornton ingressed the MFR on the arm, and NicoUier maneuvered her
towards the SA worksite to install the jettison handle as Akers began to remove the
diode box connectors. Nicollier maintained good RMS operational envelopes, and
the wrist pitch reach limit was avoided by having an MFR yaw orientation of about
15 degrees. In anticipation of moving Thornton and the +V2 array to the release
position, the arm operators established a safe RMS maneuvering rate by selecting
PLID 4 per the PDRS procedures. Based on real-time observations, Nicollier
proposed an optimum orientation to configure Thornton and the RMS for SA release.
This was reported to the PDRS flight controllers who verified that his proposed
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maneuvering was operationally viable. Nicollier maneuvered Thornton and the
array forward in the payload bay into a release orientation and waited for the release
window. When the time came, Thornton released the array, Nicollier brought
Thornton down in Orbiter-Z, and separation burns were executed. The array was
plumed by the Orbiter jets causing it to "flap like a pterodactyl".
As the abandoned array drifted away, Thornton and Akers assumed the task of
replacing the +V2 solar array. During installation of the diode box connectors to the
new array, the wrist pitch reach limit was annundated twice as Thornton was
positioned to support the changeout. Both times the arm was quickly reconfigured,
and RMS operations resumed with minimal impact to the EVA. Next, Thornton and
the RaMS operator moved the PFR from the SA worksite to the Wide-Field Planetary
Camera (WF/PC) worksite prior to FSS rotation. Rotation of lIST was needed to
access the -V2 SA changeout. The original -V2 array was removed and replaced with
a redesigned SA. Preparations continued for the next day's EVA as Thornton
installed an extender onto the PFR to be used at the WF/PC worksite. Having
completed the objectives for EVA 2, Bowersox maneuvered Thornton towards the
airlock. Akers and Thornton proceeded to stow the EVA tools. Akers reported the
MFR was untethered, and Bowersox maneuvered the RMS to the MFR Extended
Park position. The arm was placed into a good overnight configuration.
ORBIT -FLIGHT DAY 6
Simultaneous with airlock depress for EVA 3, the parked RMS was activated
and maneuvered to support airlock egress. Hoffman rode the ann towards WF/PC-I
to install the WF/PC guide-studs upon which a WF/PC handhold was installed. To
establish proper MFR/WF/PC handling rates, arm operators selected PLID 5 during
the WF/PC-I blind mate and ground strap demate. With RMS assistance, the EV
crewpersons removed and reinserted WF/PC-I. This allowed the EV crewpersons
and arm operators an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the on-orbit
handling characteristics of the large orbital replacement unit (ORL0 prior to the
critical installation of WF/PC-II. WF/PC-I was removed again, and as the WF/PC
was maneuvered towards the Orbiter's port side, the RMS wrist yaw singularity
message, "PDRS SING WY", was received twice. RMS maneuvers continued without
incident, and WF/PC-I was temporarily stowed above the Orbiter's port longeron on
the aft fixture of the ORU carrier (ORUC). Additional arm maneuvers were needed
for the removal of a second W-F/PC handhold from the forward fixture for placement
upon WF/PC-II.
Integrated EVA and RMS operations continued as the radial scientific
instrument protective enclosure (RSIPE) door was opened to ready the improved
WF/PC-II for installation into HST. The handhold was installed on WF/PC-II, and
WF/PC-r['s blind mate, ground strap, and A-latch were disconnected. The crew
smoothly extracted WF/PC-II from the RSIPE. As Musgrave free-floated along HST
to position himself at the worksite, Nicollier and Hoffman maneuvered the
136
I PDRS Post Mission Sununm_ |
replacement camera towards installation. Another wrist yaw singularity was
annunciated while in transit. Nicollier continued maneuvering the RMS without
experiendng any significant problems. The replacement WF/PC-II was first
positioned to allow Musgrave to remove the mirror cover and then was aligned for
the insertion task. Insertion of WF/PC-II proo_ded with no problems, and the
continuity check was successful. WF/PC-II's handhold was removed and returned to
the forward fixture on the ORUC. Next, Hoffman was positioned over Endeavour's
port radiator to install the mirror cover onto the old WF/PC-I. Then Hoffman was
repositioned to remove WF/PC-I from its temporary stowage. After aligning the
original WF/PC with the RSIPE, it was inserted and secured into the enclosure. The
handhold was removed from WF/PC-I and stowed onto the ORUC aft fixture. With
additional RMS repositioning, Hoffman retrieved the PFR to doseout the WF/PC
worksite on HST.
Next, FSS rotation and pivot were commenced in preparation for the next EVA
task of installing new magnetometers (a.k.a. magnetic sensing systems, MSS 1 & 2) on
HST. The original magnetometers were powered down by the STOCC as Hoffman
and Musgrave were transported to the MSS worksite by the Orbiter arm. New
magnetometers were installed on FIST to bypass the ailing old ones. Tests were
performed which verified the new MSS 1 and MSS 2 were "alive and functional".
While installing the replacement MSS 2, the EVA crew noticed the surface of the
original magnetometer had peeled off in various places. Loose material was
removed and stowed by Hoffman as ground controllers assessed potential
complications. Completing the day's EVA objectives, Hoffman and Musgrave rode
the arm down toward the Orbiter to begin the payload bay doseout. Musgrave
detached himself from the arm along the Orbiter's port sill while Hoffman was
maneuvered to the airlock. After completion of toolboard stowage and untethering
the MFR from the RMS, Nicollier maneuvered the arm to survey the WF/PC light
seals with the wrist camera. When the inspection was completed, Nicollier
configured the RMS into the planned overnight park position.
ORBIT - FLIGHT DAY 7
Airlock depress was initiated, and the RMS was positioned to support airlock
egress for EVA 4. Once Thornton completed ingress of the MFR, the RMS was
maneuvered towards the -V2 aft shroud for the High Speed Photometer (HSP) and
Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR) changeout tasks.
The arm was stopped momentarily as the EVA crew prepared their hardware for the
changeouts. A "PDRS SLIP WY" message occurred at this time, and the crew
confirmed post-flight this occurred while Thornton was twisting her body to yaw the
MFR platform. Arriving at the HST, the crew proceeded to open the -V2 doors. The
arm operators selected PLID 5, and Thornton was positioned into the HST cavity to
handle the HSP. The EVA crew and arm operators worked together to carefully
extract the phone-booth sized HSP from the telescope. Once clear of the HST cavity,
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a partial reinsertion was performed to practice the tight maneuvers required for
insertion of the COSTAR. Afterwards, the HSP was extracted again and maneuvered
towards the Orbiter port side and attached to the aft fixture on the ORUC. Following
HSP removal from HST, the wrist camera was used to inspect the multi-layer
insulation (MLD within the empty H_ bay.
Nicollier repositioned the RMS towards the axial scientific instrument protective
enclosure (ASIPE) on the ORUC in preparation for the removal of COSTAR. As
Nicollier maneuvered the RMS away from the carrier, the COSTAR was extracted
clear of the ASIPE. Thornton rotated the COSTAR, and Akers removed the
Deployable Optics Bench (DOB) cover. COSTAR was then transported to the HST
worksite and inserted into HST. After all the latches were engaged, the wrist camera
was used to videotape the worksite for post-flight documentation. Meanwhile, the
STOCC reported a "good" aliveness test for COSTAR. The aft shroud doors were
dosed, and the RMS was maneuvered back to the ORUC aft fixture to retrieve the
HSP. The HSP was removed from the aft fixture and oriented above the ASIPE for
insertion. After the HSP was stowed and the ASIPE dosed out, the FSS was rotated
to support the DF224 coprocessor task.
Claude Nicollier positioned the RMS near the large ORU protective enclosure
(LOPE) to allow the EVA crew to remove the new DF224 coprocessor. Akers and
Thornton traded places on the MFR. NicoUier maneuvered Akers and the
coprocessor towards the installation worksite at I-IS'Us Bay 1. After reaching the
worksite, Bowersox and Nicollier traded places operating the RMS. When the
coprocessor task was completed, Thornton and Akers traded places again on the
MFR. Next, Bowersox used the RMS wrist camera to perform a video survey of the
Bay I worksite prior to door closure. Upon completion of the survey, Bowersox
maneuvered Thornton towards the LOPE to stow the DF224 coprocessor handles.
Nicollier and Bowersox traded places as Thornton stowed the handles and Akers
procured MLI from the SSE. The MLI was needed to fabricate MSS covers for the
HST. Assessments by the ground team had identified thermal and contamination
concerns due to the peeling surface of the old magnetometers. Resolution of these
concerns required the crew to fabricate thermal covers for MSS 1 and MSS 2 from
scavenged MLI. In preparation for EVA closeout, Thornton was maneuvered to the
airlock for MFR egress, tool stowage, and untethering the MFR from the RMS.
Subsequently, the RMS/MFR was placed in the MFR Extended Park position in a
good configuration for overnight.
ORBIT - FLIGHT DAY 8
For the HST Reboost burn, the RMS was positioned to monitor the dearance
between the tilted _ and the ORUC. Post-bum, as the HST and FSS were
reconfigured to support the final EVA 5, the arm was placed temporarily near the
MFR Extended Park position. As the airlock was depressed, the arm operators
maneuvered the RMS into position for MFR ingress. Musgrave climbed aboard the
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MFR, and Nicollier maneuvered the arm port towards the contingency ORU
protective enclosure (COPE). After Musgrave retrieved the SA drive electronics
(SADE) replacement unit from the COPE, NicoUier positioned him at HST Bay 7 for
SADE changeout. Hoffman stationed himself nearby to assist in the task. During the
task, a loose screw drifted away from the worksite out of EV crewperson reach
towards the payload bay. Looking out the aft flight deck windows, the arm
operators sighted the screw. Nicollier responded quickly and translated the arm to
chase the free-flying screw. This allowed the EVA crew to recover the loose part.
The arm was repositioned at the SADE worksite, and the crew continued their task.
Meanwhile, STOCC commanding to deploy the telescope's solar array (SA)
Primary Deployment Mechanisms (PDMs) had been unsuccessful. This resulted in a
decision to manually deploy the PDMs. The RMS team would provide a work
platform for the EVA team with maneuvers similar to the previous SA changeout
task during EVA 2. Executing this plan, the -V2 PDM was deployed first followed by
FSS rotation to the 304 ° position. Then, with continued RMS support, the +V2 PDM
was deployed.
The next task required opening HSTs +V2 aft shroud doors for the Goddard
High Resolution Spectrograph (GHRS) repair kit installation. After the crew
completed the GHRS servicing, the arm was maneuvered to obtain close-out video-
documentation of the worksite using the end effector/wrist camera. Subsequently,
the aft shroud doors were closed, and preparations were made for the next task of
installing the crew-fabricated MLI covers over the HST magnetometers.
To prepare for the MLI cover installation, Hoffman tethered himself to the
MFR/RMS to hitch a ride alongside Musgrave on the Orbiter's arm. Meanwhile, the
FSS was rotated for MSS 2 access. Nicollier maneuvered both EV crewpersons to the
MSS 2 worksite. Completing the first cover installation, Musgrave and Hoffman
enjoyed the vantage point afforded by the RMS as from inside the Orbiter Kathy
Thornton rotated the FSS for MSS 1 worksite access. Bowersox took control of the
arm to position the EVA team for the second cover installation. After both MLI
covers for the magnetometers were successfully installed, Bowersox maneuvered the
arm starboard to the SOPE to allow Hoffman to egress the arm and begin payload
bay closeout. Musgrave was maneuvered to the aft end of HST (-V1) to remove the
low gain antenna cover.
Nicollier resumed control of the arm with PLID 3 to transport Musgrave
towards the aifltxk to begin EVA stowage. Near the airlock, a trash bag with a 80"
tether drifted port beyond Musgrave's reach. Nicollier, Bowersox, and Covey
worked together quickly to assist EV2 retrieval of the items. The equipment was
recovered, and closeout of the payload bay continued. During this activity, a STOCC
command had been sent to deploy HST's -V2 solar array. MCC requested the crew to
configure the RMS elbow camera for SA deploy. The crew complied with the MCC
request. Since the elbow camera provided the primary visual cue for positioning the
RMS for tool stowage in the airlock, Nicollier requested verbal directions from
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Musgrave to continue doseout activity. After all tool operations were completed, the
RMS was maneuvered to the port side of Orbiter bay 5 for MFR stowage. MFR
release was performed in EE [end effector] manual mode. Subsequently, Musgrave
untethered the MFR from the arm, and PLID 0 was selected. Musgrave clutched the
handhold on the RMS end effector and was transported back to the airlock by the
RMS. Upon alrlock ingress, the RMS was configured for overnight park.
ORBIT - FLI(_HT DAY 9
HST was in good configuration for grapple and deployment by the RMS. All
appendages were deployed with the -V3 HGA dish oriented towards the -V2 axis.
This provided good clearance for the R_MS grapple of the +V2 grapple fixture. FSS
latches were opened, whereupon Nicollier unberthed HST from the FSS and
maneuvered the RMS into the HST Release position. The crew and ground
controllers made final preparations for deployment. State vectors were uplinked,
and Covey readied the Orbiter for the separation burns. The STOCC readied HST for
operational free flight by successfully opening its aperture door. Orbiter deadband
collapse was commenced. When the time came for release, the Orbiter was set into
free drift. NicoUier executed an end effector auto-release and proceeded to back the
arm away from HST structure. The SEP 1 burn resulted in a .45 feet per second
opening rate, and SEP 2 increased the rate to 1.2 feet per second.
After separation maneuvers were completed, the RMS was cradled and latched.
Minor adjustments of the joint angles were needed to obtain the MRL [manipulator
retention latch] RFL [ready for latch] indications. This was expected due to previous
flight history of this hardware. With the exception of MPM stowage, RMS
Powerdown was complete with RMS Heater B active.
ORBIT - FLIGHT DAY 10
RMS Heater A was activated to provide redundancy with Heater B prior to
uncradling the RMS. An RMS survey of the Orbiter's water nozzle was performed
during a 10.2 psia H20 dump. Upon completion of the dump, the RMS was cradled
and latched. The MPMs were stowed, and the arm was configured to TEMP
MONITOR mode with Heater A - OFF and Heater B - ON.
ORBIT - FLIGHT DAY 12
The RMS was deactivated 4 hours 15 minutes prior to Endeavour touchdown.
140
[ PDRS Post Mission Summary |
Notes of Interest
A new technique to cradle the arm was utilized on STS-61 to acquire the MRL
ready-for-latch (RFL) indications. This technique was developed by RMS Training in
response to previous shuttle flights where minor difficulties were encountered in
maintaining the indications. First, the shoulder pitch joint is lowered until the
forward RFL indications appear. Next, the elbow pitch joint is lowered until the mid
RFL indications are set. If the forward RFL indications are lost during the elbow joint
maneuver, the shoulder pitch joint is adjusted to regain the RFL indications. Post-
flight, Nicollier and Bowersox reported this cradling technique to be very effective
and helpful.
For optimal planning, the baseline mission design should strive for a consistent
MFR yaw orientation to minimize crew reconfiguration. After a baseline is
established adjustments m procedures may be made as specific details are
understood (e.g., EVA crew arm length and reach, accessibility of worksite, EV
crewperson visibility, etc.). This simplifies the RMS mission design process.
Depending on the specific mission tasks, the tip of the end effector may be the
best reference frame to use when maneuvering an attached EV2 versus the standard
POR [point of reference] chosen to represent an imaginary rigid EV crewperson. This
may be decided with RMS operator input prior to submission of the RMS Level-C
inputs.
For integrated tasks involving EVA, RMS, and payload operations personnel,
coordination between PDRS, FAO [Flight Activities Officer], EVA, and Payloads is
imperative to insure there are no operational conflicts. Task details must be reviewed
to determine the viability of the sequence of events. For example, FSS rotation may
be required for RMS/EVA access to a particular HST worksite. Task transition must
be coordinated among all affected disciplines.
Claude Nicollier established a voice protocol for the EVA crew. This
streamlined the communications required for maneuvering the crewmembers
attached to the RMS. This is docmnented in the reference data section of the PDRS
OPS C/L, _1 Flight Supplement.
MSFC's Neutral Buoyancy Simulator (NBS) was a very valuable addition to the
standard RMS training facilities. A new working mockup of the shuttle robotic arm
(RMS ID was developed in time to support the HST servicing mission. The NBS's
large volume is the only environment available to date where the RMS operator can
maneuver through nearly the full range of RMS reach while an EV crewperson is
simultaneously attached to the (simulated) RMS [Note: JSC's WEIT arm geometries
are constrained by the WETFs comparably smaller volume.]. For this mission, the
NBS was the only facility able to provide an environment where the EVA crew and
arm operators could interact in a near beginning-to end simulation. Also, the
interaction afforded by the NBS between arm operator and EVA crew allowed for
refining the RMS procedures based on crew assessments.
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Virtual reality facilities were used pre-mission by the RMS mission designer, Sal
Ferrara and the STS-61 crew (Nicollier, et al) to evaluate and refine RMS positioning
in support of the EVA tasks. This was also helpful in providing early opportunities
for the EVA crew and RMS operators to familiarize themselves with the interactions
required for this flight. Additionally, in preparation for mission support, flight
controllers were given access to virtual reality facilities providing them with a
"hands-on" environment to familiarize themselves with the highly complex mission.
To insert and extract large ORUs, the crew developed a technique involving
iterative motion between the RMS and the EV crewperson (i.e."inchworm"
technique). For example, to remove the WF/PC, Hoffman held the WF/PC in place
as Nicollier pulled him back a little bit from the HST. Then Hoffman would pull a
little on the WF/PC. Nicollier would pull I-Ioffrnan back some more effectively
extending Hoffman's reach so that the WF/PC could be pulled some more. This
iterative technique worked very well on-orbit and enabled the crew to smoothly
handle various ORUs.
Albert Y. Lee
Lead PDRS Officer
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
ABE
AC5
AD
AMOS
ASEM
ASIPE
CAPCOM
CCB
CCC
CCMP
CDR
CEIT
CFE
CG
CIR
CITE
Comm
COORD
COSTAR
CR
CRIT
CSM
CSR
CST
CTSD
CWS
D&C
DAP
DF
DF-224
DF42
DF44
DIU
Arm-Based Electronics (RMS)
Marl Code for JSC's Special Assistant for Engineering, Operations, and
Safety
Aperture Door
Air Force Maul Optical Site calibration test
Assembly of [Space] Station by EVA Methods
Axial Scientific Instrument Protective Enclosure
"CAPsule" COMmunicator (Astronaut who transmits voice
communications from Mission Control to orbiting spacecraft)
Configuration Control Board
Consolidated Control Center
Contamination Control Master Plan
Critical Design Review
Crew Equipment Interface Test
Contractor Furnished [Orbiter] Equipment
Center of Gravity
Cargo Integration Review
Cargo Integration Test Equipment
Communication(s)
COORDination voice communication loop in Mission Control
Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement
Change Request
CRITical
Cargo Systems Manual
Customer Support Room
Central Standard Time
Crew and Thermal Systems Division (at JSC)
Caution and Warning System
Display and Control
Digital Auto-Pilot
Mail Code for MOD's Systems Division
Designation for HST primary computer
Mail Code for MOD's Systems Division's EVA Section
Mail Code for MOD's Systems Division's Robotics Section
Data Interface Unit
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DN
DPC
DR
DSI
DSO
DTO
ECEPO
ECrU
EE
EGSE
EMU
EP
EPRT
ESA
ESC
EV
EVA
EVASP
EVAWG
FAO
FCE
FCT
FD
FDF
FDRD
FEPC
FGS
FHST
FOC
FOR
FOS
FOSA
FPSR
FRD
FRR
FSS
GA23
GF1
GFE
GHRS
GNC
GOR
GPC
GSFC
Mail Code for MOD's Control Center Systems Division
Discrepancy Notice
Direct Power Converter (on lIST)
Discrepancy Report
Data Source Information
Detailed Supplementary Objective
Detailed Test Objective
EVA and Crew Equipment Project Office
Electronic Control Unit
End Effector
Electrical Ground Support Equipment
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (Space Sui0
Entry Preparation
EVA Peer Review Team
European Space Agency
Electronic Still Camera
Extravehicular
Designator of an extravehicular crewmember (EV1, EV2, EV3 or EV4)
Extravehicular Activity
EVA Servicing Mission Support Plan (GSFC)
EVA Working Group
Flight Activities Officer
Flight Crew Equipment
Flight Control Team
Flight Day
Flight Data File
Flight Definition and Requirements Directive
Flight Equipment Processing Contractor
Free Guidance Sensor
F_xed-Head Star Tracker
Faint Object Camera
Flight Operations Review
Faint Object Spectrograph
Flight Operations Support Annex
Flight Planning and Stowage Review
Flight Requirements _ent
Flight Readiness Review
Flight Support System
Mail Code for Space Shuttle Program's EVA Management Office
Grapple Fixture No. 1
Government Furnished Equipment
C.axidard High Resolution Spectrograph
Guidance, Navigation and Control
Ground Operations Review
General Purpose Computer (Carried on Orbiter)
Caxidard Space Flight Center
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H20
HAINS
HFMS
HGA
HSP
HST
HTVT
ICBC
ICHA
IDB
IGOAL
IMAX
IMU
INCO
ITR
WC
llS
joIP
IPL
JSC
kbps
KSC
LCVG
LGA
LMSC
MBC
MCC
MC1U
MCT
MDM
MFR
MICR
Mir
MLI
MMT
MOC
MOD
mod
MPM
MPSR
MRL
MS
MSFC
MSS
water
High Accuracy Inertial Navigation System
High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator
High Gain Antenna
High Speed Photometer
Hubble Space Telescope
Human Thermal Vacuum Test
IMAX Cargo Bay Camera
Integrated Cargo Hazard Assessment
In-suit Drink Bag
Integrated Graphics Operations and Analysis Laboratory
Trademark for large format motion picture system
Inertial Measurement Unit
INstrument and Communications Officer
Independent Test Review
IntraVehicular Crewmember
Joint Integrated Simulation
Joint Operations Interface Procedures
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
kilobytes per second
Kennedy Space Center
Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment
Low-Gain Antenna
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company
Middeck Battery Charger (for EMU batteries)
Mission Control Center (JSC)
Manipulator Controller Interface Unit (RMS)
Mission Coordination Team
Multiplexer/DeMultiplexer
Manipulator Foot Restraint (Attaches to RMS)
Mission Integration Change Request
Section of Russia's Space Station (Russian word for "peace")
Multi-Layer Insulation
millimeter
Mission Management Team
Mission Operations Computer
Mission Operations Directorate (at JSC)
Modification
Manipulator Positioning Mechanism (RMS)
Multi-Purpose Support Room
Manipulator Retention Latch (RMS)
Mission Specialist
Designator of specific Mission Specialist Crewmember (MS1, MS2, etc.)
Marshall Space Flight Center
Magnetic Sensing System
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MWS
NASA
NBL
NBS
Nitrox
NS2
NS231
OCAS
OIC
ops
ORU
ORUC
OV
PAO
PAR
PC
PCR
PDI
PDIP
PDM
PDR
PDRS
PDU
PE/EP
PF
PFR
PHSF
PILOT
PINCH
PIP
PIT
PLAID
PLID
PLT
POR
POWG
PRCBD
PRD
PRT
psi
psia
Mini-Work Station (attachment to EMU)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (not yet bull0
Neutral Buoyancy Simulator (at MSFC)
NFFRogen/OXygen mixture (Usually oxygen-enriched air)
Mail Code for Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance Division's
Payload and Crew Equipment Branch
Mail Code for Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance Division's GFE
and EVA Section
Operator-Commanded Auto Sequence (RMS)
Official-in-Charge
operations
Orbital Replacement Unit
ORU Carrier
Orbiting Vehicular (Designator of Shuttle Orbiter, 0V-105, etc.)
Public Affairs Office
Prelaunch Assessment Review (SR&QA)
Personal Computer
Payload Change-out Room
Payload Data Interleaver
Payload Data Interleaver Panel
Primary Deployment Mechanism
Preliminary Design Review
Payload Deployment and Retrieval System
Power Distribution Unit
Post-EVA Entry Preparation
Payload operational instrumentation MDM-Forward
Portable Foot Restraint
Payload Hazardous Support Facility (at KS(:)
Portable In-flight Landing Operations Trainer
Payload Integration Nominal Cost Hardware
Payload Integration Plan
Push In, Pull out (PIP pin: a locking pin used in EVA applications)
Process Improvement Team
Not a current acronym. Name for computer graphics laboratory
maintained by JSC's Space and Life Sciences Directorate
PayLoad IDentification
Pilot
Point Of Reference
Payload Operations Working Group
Program Requirements Control Board Directive
Payload Retention Device
Power Ratchet Tool
Program Review Team (Chaired by Dr. Michael Greenfield)
Pounds per Square Inch
Pounds per Square Inch-Absolute
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PSP
PSRP
RCS
RFL
RIB
RMS
RSIPE
RSOC
RSU
RTLS
RTV
SA
SAC
SADA
SADE
SADM
SAS
SDM
SEP
SESL
SI
sim
SIPE
SM
S&MA
SMM
SMOWG
SOPE
spec
SR&QA
SSE
SSP
SSPO
SSRP
STA
STOCC
SIS
sync
TDRSS
TJ
TMG
TMIS
TRR
VR
Payload Signal Processor
Payload Safety Review Panel 0SC)
Reaction Control System (Orbiter's attitude control and maneuvering jets)
Ready-For-Latch (PDRS)
Right InBoard flocation on Orbiter)
Remote Manipulator System
Radial Scientific Instrument Protective Enclosure
Rockwell Space Operations Contractor
Rate Sensor Unit
Return To Launch Site
Room-Temperature Vulcanized
Solar Array
Solar Array Carrier
Solar Array Drive Assembly
Solar Array Drive Electronics
SolarArray Deployment Mechanism
Space Adaptation Syndrome
Secondary Deployment Mechanism
SEParation
Space Environment Simulation Laboratory
Scientific Instrument
simulation
Scientific Instrument Protective Enclosure
Servicing Mission
Safety and Mission Assurance
Servicing Mission Manager
Servicing Mission Operations Working Group
Small ORU Protective Enclosure
specification
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
Space Support Equipment
Space Shuttle Program
Space Shuttle Program Office
Systems Safety Review Panel
Shuttle Training Aircraft
Space Telescope Operations and Control Center
Space Transportation System
Designator for a Space Shuttle Mission (e.g., STS-61)
synchronization
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
Mail Code for the Space Shuttle Integration and Operations Office's
Cargo Engineering Office (at JSC)
Thermai/Micrometeoroid Garment (Protective covering for EMU)
Technical Management Information System
Test Readiness Review
Virtual Reality
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WF/PC
WG
WIT
Weightless Environment Training FadUty (at JSC)
Wide Field/Planetary Camera
Working Group
WF/PC Installation Tool
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